05000461/FIN-2011004-05
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Failure to Evaluate Operability of Control Room Ventilation System for Degraded Flow Condition |
| Description | The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance. The licensee failed to appropriately evaluate the operability of Control Room Ventilation Train A after identifying a degraded/nonconforming system flow condition while performing surveillance testing on April 1, 2001, that could have affected the ability of the system to perform its safety function. No violation of regulatory requirements was identified. The licensee initiated corrective actions to provide read & sign training for licensed operators and a procedure change to add an acceptance criterion for filtered flow rate in the surveillance test procedure. The failure to correctly evaluate a degraded/nonconforming condition potentially affecting the operability of structures, systems, and components (SSCs) required to be operable by Technical Specifications (TS) would become a more significant safety concern if left uncorrected because it could reasonably result in an unrecognized condition of an SSC failing to fulfill a safety-related function. The finding was therefore of more than minor significance. Because the Control Room ventilation system supports the radiological barrier function to protect operators inside the Control Room following certain design basis accidents, the inspectors concluded that this issue was associated with the Barrier Integrity Cornerstone. The finding was a licensee performance deficiency of very low safety significance because it involved only a degradation of the radiological barrier function provided for the Control Room. The inspectors concluded that this finding affected the cross-cutting area of human performance. Specifically, licensee decision making using a systematic process to evaluate the operability of an SSC required to be operable by TS when a degraded/nonconforming condition was identified was not appropriately implemented as designed by licensed senior reactor operators. |
| Site: | Clinton  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000461/2011004 Section 4OA5 |
| Date counted | Sep 30, 2011 (2011Q3) |
| Type: | Finding: Green |
| cornerstone | Barrier Integrity |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | |
| Inspectors (proximate) | B Kemker D Lords J Cassidy J Draper M Ring R Langstaff S Bell S Mischke V Myersb Kemkerc Brown D Lords D Szwarc J Bozga J Cassidy M Ring R Orlikowski S Bell S Mischke |
| CCA | H.13, Consistent Process |
| INPO aspect | DM.1 |
| ' | |
Finding - Clinton - IR 05000461/2011004 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Clinton) @ 2011Q3
Self-Identified List (Clinton)
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