05000461/FIN-2010005-01
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Failure to Control Transient Combustible Materials in Accordance with Fire Protection Program |
| Description | On November 30, 2010, the inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance with an associated Non-Cited Violation of the Clinton Power Station Unit 1 Operating License (NPF-62, Section 2.F). The licensee failed to implement the Fire Protection Program in accordance with program requirements by failing to follow approved Fire Protection Program procedures for the control of transient combustible materials. The licensee promptly removed the transient combustible materials found by the inspectors. The inspectors concluded that this finding could be reasonably viewed as a precursor to a significant event (i.e., a fire affecting more than one train of safe shutdown equipment). Specifically, the presence of transient combustible materials in a combustible free zone could reasonably result in degradation of the fire protection defense-in-depth elements in place to prevent fires from starting and to mitigate the consequences of fires. In addition, based on review of Example 4k in IMC 0612, Power Reactor Inspection Reports, Appendix E, Examples of Minor Issues, the issue would be considered to be of more than minor significance because the identified transient combustibles were found in a combustible free zone required for separation of redundant trains. The finding was of very low safety significance because the items found in the combustible free zone would not be considered transient combustibles of significance as defined in IMC 0609, Appendix F, Fire Protection Significance Determination Process, Attachment 2, Degradation Rating Guidance Specific to Various Fire Protection Program Elements, and, therefore, the issue was assigned a low degradation rating. The inspectors concluded that this finding affected the cross-cutting area of human performance. Specifically, the licensee failed to recognize that moving a bullet-resistant container (BRC) was an infrequent activity and, as such, a pre-job briefing should have been performed and was not. In addition, a questioning attitude was not cultivated by the licensee once the correct location of the BRC was challenged such that security staff proceeded in the face of uncertainty. Therefore, the inspectors concluded that the licensees work practices that support human performance were less than effective. |
| Site: | Clinton  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000461/2010005 Section 1R05 |
| Date counted | Dec 31, 2010 (2010Q4) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Initiating Events |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.05 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | D Mcneil M Ring S Mischke D Lords A Scarbeary |
| CCA | H.12, Avoid Complacency |
| INPO aspect | QA.4 |
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Finding - Clinton - IR 05000461/2010005 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Clinton) @ 2010Q4
Self-Identified List (Clinton)
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