05000461/FIN-2010003-03
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Operability Assessment of Inservice Testing Surveillance Discrpancies for Excess Flow Check Valves |
| Description | The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance associated with the licensee‟s failure to evaluate the functionality of multiple excess flow check valves that had not been tested in accordance with the American Society of Mechanical Engineers / American National Standards Institute (ASME/ANSI) Code Inservice Testing requirements to establish whether the nonconforming condition warranted starting the Technical Specification (TS) action time for the suppression pool makeup (SPMU) system. In response to the inspectors‟ questions, the licensee subsequently performed an operability evaluation. No violation of regulatory requirements was identified because subsequent testing by the licensee determined that the valves were functional. The finding would become a more significant safety concern, if left uncorrected, and was, therefore, more than a minor concern. Specifically, the failure to correctly evaluate a degraded/nonconforming condition potentially affecting the operability of structures, systems, and components (SSCs) required to be operable by TS could reasonably result in an unrecognized condition of a SSC failing to fulfill a safety-related function. Because the SPMU system was primarily associated with long term decay heat removal following certain design basis accidents, the inspectors concluded that this issue was associated with the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone. The finding was of very low safety significance because the issue: (1) was not a design or qualification deficiency; (2) did not represent an actual loss of safety function of a system; (3) did not represent an actual loss of safety function of a single train for greater than its TS allowed outage time; (4) did not represent an actual loss of safety function of one or more non-TS trains of equipment designated as risk significant; and (5) did not screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. The inspectors concluded that this finding affected the cross-cutting area of human performance because the licensee did not have a formal process in place with adequate guidance and training to enable licensed senior reactor operators to properly and promptly evaluate operability in this instance. As a result, senior reactor operators took it for granted that utilizing the relief allowed by TS Surveillance Requirement 3.0.3 and performing a risk evaluation obviated the need to address operability of the instrumentation supported by the excess flow check valves for the ASME/ANSI Code noncompliance. (IMC 0310 H.1(a)) |
| Site: | Clinton  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000461/2010003 Section 1R15 |
| Date counted | Jun 30, 2010 (2010Q2) |
| Type: | Finding: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.15 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | B Kemker C Brown D Lords D Szwarc J Bozga J Cassidy M Ring R Orlikowski S Bell S Mischkeb Kemkerd Lords D Melendez Colon E Coffman J Cassidy M Mitchell M Ring R Russell S Mischke |
| CCA | H.13, Consistent Process |
| INPO aspect | DM.1 |
| ' | |
Finding - Clinton - IR 05000461/2010003 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Clinton) @ 2010Q2
Self-Identified List (Clinton)
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