05000458/FIN-2017003-02
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Manual Reactor Scram Initiated in Response to Increase in Steam Pressure during Steam Leak Troubleshooting |
| Description | The inspectors reviewed a self-revealed finding for the licensees failure to properly complete steps of an approved procedure during the installation of a modification to the turbine electro-hydraulic control system. Specifically, the licensee failed to properly install a tee connection in a steam supply line to turbine pressure transmitters in the system, creating conditions for an eventual steam leak that led to a reactor scram. Corrective actions included properly installing the tee connection and writing specific procedural guidance on compression fitting inspection, installation, remake, and repair (CR-RBS-2017-02405).The failure to properly complete steps of an approved procedure during the installation of a modification to the turbine electro-hydraulic control system was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more than minor, and therefore a finding, because it was associated with the design control attribute of the Initiating Events Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. Specifically, the licensees failure to properly install the tee connection caused a steam leak that led to a reactor scram. The inspectors performed the initial significance determination using NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, Exhibit 1, Initiating Events Screening Questions. The inspectors determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding did not cause a loss of mitigation equipment relied upon to transition the plant from the onset of a trip to a stable shutdown condition. The finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance, work management, because the licensee failed to implement a process of planning, controlling, and executing work activities such that nuclear safety is the overriding priority [H.5]. |
| Site: | River Bend  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000458/2017003 Section 4OA3 |
| Date counted | Sep 30, 2017 (2017Q3) |
| Type: | Finding: Green |
| cornerstone | Initiating Events |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71153 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | J Sowa B Parks L Carson N Greene S Money J O'Donnell J Braisted J Kozal |
| Violation of: | Pending |
| CCA | H.5, Work Management |
| INPO aspect | WP.1 |
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Finding - River Bend - IR 05000458/2017003 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (River Bend) @ 2017Q3
Self-Identified List (River Bend)
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