05000456/FIN-2016003-02
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Failure to Follow Inservice Testing Requirements for the 2A Essential Service Water Pump Leads to an Invalid Test |
| Description | The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance and an associated NCV of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, for the failure to follow Revision 9 of Procedure 2BwOSR 5.5.8.SX6A, Comprehensive Inservice Testing (IST) Requirements for 2A Essential Service Water Pump (2SX01PA). Specifically, on September 7, 2016, the licensee failed to establish flow as close as possible to the reference point of 24,000 gallons per minute (gpm), as specified in Step 1.17 of the procedure, which ultimately led to an invalid test. The planned corrective actions included re-performing the comprehensive test on September 26, 2017, and an action to revise affected procedures to specify that the flow should be established as close as possible to the reference value, and to not throttle flow to below the reference value to obtain acceptable testing results. This issue was entered into the licensees CAP as IRs 2644532 and 2660824. The inspectors determined that the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Mitigating Systems cornerstone attribute of Equipment Performance and adversely impacted the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). Specifically, the failure to follow the requirements established by the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) for comprehensive testing led to an invalid test of the pump on September 7, 2016. The inspectors determined that this finding was of very low safety significance because it did not result in the loss of operability or functionality of a mitigating system. Specifically, when the test was re-performed on September 26, 2016, it was confirmed that the 2A essential service water pump was operable. The inspectors determined that this finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the Human Performance area of Training. Specifically, licensee staff in Operations and Engineering were under the impression that they did not need to establish flow as close as possible to the reference value of 24,000 gpm. Instead, their belief was that the flow band in the surveillance procedure allowed them to set flow at any point in the band; therefore, when faced with results that fell within the Required Action Range, licensee staff believed that it was acceptable to lower flow to obtain more favorable results provided the system flow remained within the flow band (H.9). |
| Site: | Braidwood  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000456/2016003 Section 1R22 |
| Date counted | Sep 30, 2016 (2016Q3) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.22 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | D Betancourt D Sargis E Duncan E Sanchez-Santiago M Holmberg T Go |
| Violation of: | 10 CFR 50 Appendix B 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion V |
| CCA | H.9, Training |
| INPO aspect | CL.4 |
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Finding - Braidwood - IR 05000456/2016003 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Braidwood) @ 2016Q3
Self-Identified List (Braidwood)
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