05000456/FIN-2016001-01
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Finding | |
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| Title | Failure to Follow Fire Prevention for Hot Work Procedure |
| Description | The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance and an associated NCV of License Condition 2.E when licensee personnel failed to follow the requirements of the Fire Prevention for Hot Work procedure on two separate occasions. Specifically, (Issue 1) on February 2, 2016, a very small fire occurred during a planned hot work activity that involved pipe grinding on a small waste gas decay tank pressure line because the licensee failed to recognize the potential for hydrogen within the line. Additionally, (Issue 2) on February 25, 2016, the inspectors identified that a hot work permit was inadequate prior to the licensee performing a piping weld repair activity associated with the Unit 2 main generator stator cooling water system because the permit referenced the wrong work location and did not require appropriate controls. These issues were entered into the licensees Corrective Action Program (CAP) as Issue Reports (IRs) 2620772 and 2632182. The inspectors determined that the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Human Performance attribute of the Initiating Events cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of limiting the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown and power operations. Specifically, for Issue 1, the performance deficiency resulted in the occurrence of a small hydrogen fire in the auxiliary building. For Issue 2, the performance deficiency increased the likelihood of a fire occurring during an emergent weld repair in the turbine building. The inspectors determined that this finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the fire (Issue 1) and increased likelihood of a fire occurring (Issue 2) was limited to equipment which was not important to safety. The inspectors determined that the finding had a Work Management cross-cutting aspect in the Human Performance area. Specifically, a significant contributor to the performance deficiency was related to the organization not implementing a process for planning, controlling, and executing work activities such that nuclear safety is the overriding priority (H.5). |
| Site: | Braidwood  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000456/2016001 Section 1R05 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2016 (2016Q1) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Initiating Events |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.05 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | C Hunt D Betancourt E Duncan G Hausman J Benjamin M Doyle N Feliz-Adorno T Go D Sargis |
| Violation of: | License Condition License Condition - Fire Protection |
| CCA | H.5, Work Management |
| INPO aspect | WP.1 |
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Finding - Braidwood - IR 05000456/2016001 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Braidwood) @ 2016Q1
Self-Identified List (Braidwood)
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