05000456/FIN-2016003-01

Finding

Title

Failure to Erect Scaffolding in Accordance with Station Procedures

Description

The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance and an associated NCV of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, for the failure to follow Revision 7 of NESMS04.1, Seismic Prequalified Scaffolds. Specifically, the licensee erected four scaffolds within 3 inches of safety-related equipment and failed to account for seismic movements of safety-related equipment in close proximity to scaffolds in accordance with NESMS04.1. As part of their corrective actions, the licensee performed walk downs of installed scaffolds to ensure that they were in compliance with NESMS04.1. Additionally, the licensee performed refresher training for all personnel involved in erecting and inspecting scaffolds. This issue was entered into the licensees CAP as IRs 2703650, 2703895, 2703967, and 2705092. The inspectors determined that the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Mitigating Systems cornerstone attribute of Protection Against External Factors and adversely impacted the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). Specifically, scaffolds built in close proximity to or in contact with safety-related equipment could adversely affect the ability of those systems to perform their intended safety function during a seismic event. The inspectors determined that this finding was of very low safety significance because it did not result in the loss of operability or functionality of a mitigating system. Specifically, an engineering evaluation reasonably determined that the failure to build the scaffolds in accordance with NESMS04.1 did not result in a loss of operability to safety-related equipment. The inspectors determined that this finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the Human Performance area of Teamwork. Specifically, there were multiple points in the scaffold erection process to engage other workgroups to ensure the seismic qualification of scaffolds, and in every example there was no coordination with other groups to ensure nuclear safety was maintained (H.4).

01
Site:	Braidwood
Report	IR 05000456/2016003 Section 1R15
Date counted	Sep 30, 2016 (2016Q3)
Type:	NCV: Green
cornerstone	Mitigating Systems
Identified by:	NRC identified
Inspection Procedure:	IP 71111.15
Inspectors (proximate)	D Betancourt D Sargis E Duncan E Sanchez-Santiago M Holmberg T Go
Violation of:	10 CFR 50 Appendix B 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion V
CCA	H.4, Teamwork
INPO aspect	PA.3
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v • d • e

Finding - Braidwood - IR 05000456/2016003

1(5)2(4)3(2)4(1)5(0)6(0)7(2)8(2)201(1)301(0)403(0)405(0)502(0)

IR 05000456/2016003: 1 2

Finding List (Braidwood) @ 2016Q3

CCA Matrix: 2016Q3

	Q	CCA	Title
05000457/FIN-2015004-02	2015Q4		Failure of Startup Feedwater Pump to Start During Plant Shutdown
05000457/FIN-2015004-01	2015Q4		Loss of Shutdown Cooling Train During Refueling Cavity Fill and Associated Reduced Inventory Operations
05000456/FIN-2015004-03	2015Q4		Failure to Establish Adequate Feedwater Pump Operational Guidance During a Normal Plant Shutdown
05000456/FIN-2015004-04	2015Q4		Failure to Establish a Written Procedure for a Loss of Feedwater Event in Mode 3
05000456/FIN-2016008-01	2016Q1		Failure to Verify the Tripping Characteristic of Molded Case Circuit Breakers (MCCBs) Used as Isolation Devices for the 120 Vac Instrument Power System
05000456/FIN-2016008-02	2016Q1		Failure to Verify Air Intake for Diesel Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump was Adequately Protected from a High Energy Line Break
05000456/FIN-2016001-01	2016Q1	H.5	Failure to Follow Fire Prevention for Hot Work Procedure
05000457/FIN-2016001-02	2016Q1	H.5	Failure to Have Adequate Work Instructions and Procedures Leads to a Loss of Inventory From the Volume Control Tank
05000456/FIN-2016001-03	2016Q1		Failure to Correct a Condition Adverse to Quality Leads to Loss of One Train of Shutdown Cooling in Mode 6
05000456/FIN-2016001-05	2016Q1		Failure to Ensure Unit 2 Startup Feedwater Pump Availability
05000456/FIN-2016001-04	2016Q1		Questions Regarding the Implementation of the Gas Accumulation Program
05000456/FIN-2016002-01	2016Q2	H.12	Multiple Failure to Follow Procedures Leads to Inadequate Monitoring of Gas Susceptible Locations
05000456/FIN-2016002-04	2016Q2		Licensee Implementation of Enforcement Guidance Memorandum 15002, Enforcement Discretion for Tornado-Generated Missile Protection Noncompliance
05000456/FIN-2016002-03	2016Q2		Missed Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program Sampling
05000457/FIN-2016002-02	2016Q2	H.11	Failure to Manage Gas Accumulation in the 2A SI Train
05000456/FIN-2016007-01	2016Q3		Identification of SCAQs in Accordance with the QATR
05000456/FIN-2016007-02	2016Q3		Operation of SX System Valves Results in Cavitation Damage and Pipe Leakage
05000456/FIN-2016201-01	2016Q3		Security
05000456/FIN-2016003-02	2016Q3	H.9	Failure to Follow Inservice Testing Requirements for the 2A Essential Service Water Pump Leads to an Invalid Test
05000456/FIN-2016003-01	2016Q3	H.4	Failure to Erect Scaffolding in Accordance with Station Procedures

Self-Identified List (Braidwood)

	Q	Title
05000456/FIN-2015407-01	2015Q4	Licensee-Identified Violation

[Braidwood Findings full list]

05000456/FIN-2016003-01

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