05000454/LER-1985-102

LER 85-102-01:on 851231,determined That FW 1D Preheater Bypass Valve 1FW039D in Svc 18 Days W/O Proper Operational Testing.Caused by Procedural Deficiency.Byron Administrative Procedure Bap 330-1 Will Be revised.W/930806 Ltr

ML20056D649
Person / Time
Site:	Byron
Issue date:	08/04/1993
From:	Frantz G, Schwartz G COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
BYRON-93-0396, BYRON-93-396, LER-85-102, NUDOCS 9308170260
Download: ML20056D649 (5)

LER-2085-102,

Event date:
Report date:
4542085102R00 - NRC Website

text

____ _____--

N CCmm:nw;;lth Edison 2

. Byron Nuclear Station

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O '- 4450 North German Church Road Byron, Illinois 61010 August 6, 1993 LTR: BYRON 93-0396 FILE: 3.03.0800 (1.10.0101)

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555

Dear Sir:

The Enclosed Supplemental Licensee Event Report from Byron Generating Station is being transmitted to you in accordance with the requirements of 10CFR50.73 (a) (2) (i) .

This report is number 85-102; Docket No. 50-454.

Sincerely, ft ,

/z

/ _-

G.K. Schwartz Station Manager Byron Nuclear Power Station GYS/DSK/ng

Enclosure:

Licensee Event Report No.85-102 Supplement 1 cc: J. Martfn, NRC Region III Administrator NRC Senior Resident Inspector INPO Record Center CECO Distribution List 1G0005 (9997R',WPfl072693 5)

T 9308170260 0804 PDR ADDCK 000454 8 S PDR @

LER Number 454:85-102-01 Title of Event: Missed ISI Surveillance due to Outace Procedure Deficiency Occurred: 12/31/85/ 114fL Date Time 1

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Acceptance by Station Review:

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1 Am / YbfA3 b.I /) $

OE Date TSS fate-i k j9/21/E2 l RAS Date OTHER Date

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Approved by: ///f / f l statioriha e Ddte/ ,

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i l- 19997Rin?R072693-1)

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) l f ACluTT NAME DOCKET NUMBER PAGE l BYRON NUCLEAR POWER STAT 10N. Unit 1 0l5l0l0l0l4l5l4 1l0Fl0l3 TITLE i MISSED ISI SURVELLLANCE DUE TO DUTAGE PROCEDURE DEFICIENCY EVENT CATE LER NUMBER REPORT DATE OTHER F ACluTIES INVOLVED MONTH CAY YEAR YE AR 'SEC NUMBER REV!SION MONTH DAY YEAR f ACluTT NAMES DOCKET NUMBER (S) 4 NONE Ol5l0l0l0l l l 1l2 3l1 9 IS Bl5 -

1l0l2 -

Ol1 0lB 0l4 9l3 0l5l0l0l0l l l f THis REPORT IS SUBM:TTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 5: (CHECK ONE OR MORE OF THE FOLLOWING)

DPERATING MODE j 73.71M 1 20.402[t) 20.405tel 50.71sX2Xiv) 20.409sXIXD 50.36(cM1) 50.73aX2iM 73.71tc)

POWER LEVEE CTHER (Specify m Abstract below Dl9l2 20.40ksX1Kii) 50.38tcX21 50.73sM2Nviil 20 *05te1Xia X 50.73sX2XD 50.73eX2XvsXA) 20.405fsW1Hnel 50.73aX2Xi) 50.73sX2xviiXBI 20.40kaN1xvi 50.73!aX2Xsil 50.73aK2Xx)

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER  ;

ARE A CODE G. FR ANTZ, 0PER ATING DEPARTMENT EXT. 2992 8l1l5 2l3l4l~l5l4l4l1 COMPLETE ONE UNE FOR E ACH COMPONENT FAfLURE DESCR$ED IN TH!S REPORT CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER p PR S l

l 1 I I I I I I III II I I i1 1 I I I I I I I i1 I SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED EXPECTED MONTH CAT YEAR

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SU5M SSION I

] YES. Of yes. complete EXPECTED SUBM:SSION DATEl M NO DATE l { l ABSTR ACT (Lamt is 1400 spaces, is, appromenately fifteen smeltspace typewnften imes).

While in Mode 1 at 92% power, the System Engineer was asked to stroke time the 1D Feeduater Preheater Bypass Valve,1FWO39D, a containment isolation valve, following maintenance performed during a recent outage.

It was determined that the valve had been in service for 18 days, following the outage, without proper testing to l declare it operable. The appropriate Technical Specification Action Staternent was entered, power was reduced to 80% and the valve was successfully stroke timed. Because of the successful stroke time and back-up  !

containment isolation throughout the 18 days, plant and public safety was never in jeopardy. A procedural i deficiency in the computerized outage tracking program allowed this testing requirement to go unnoticed. The procedural deficiency will be rectified.

l (9997R;WPRD72693 2)

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s LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION l F AtrJTY NAME DDCKET NUMBER LER NUMBER FAGE YEAR SED. WJMBER REVIS!DN

.l BYRON NUCLEAR POWER STATf0N j olSl0l0l0l4l5l4 sl5 -

1l0l2 ol1 ol2 0F ol3 f TEXT Energy industry identifzeten Srstem (DIS) cafes are adentifad m the test as ]XX]

A. PLANT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO EVENT:

MODE 1 - Power Ooeration Rx Power 92% RCS (AB] Temperature / Pressure 580oF B. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT:

On December 31,1985 at 1140 CST following maintenance, the System Engineer was asked to stroke time the  !

1D Feedwater Preheater Bypass Valve,1FWO39D, a containment isolation valve IJM]. Upon inspection of the I completed work package calling out this test, it was determined that the valve to be tested had ben returned to  ;

service and was in operation prior to the performance of this inservice Inspection required stroke time test . The i valve was immediately declared inoperable and the appropriate Tech 1ical Specification Actio.n Statement was I entered. A load reduction to 80% power was made where the vaWe was sucesssfully stroked and then returned i I

to service.

C. CAUSE OF EVENT: i The root cause of this incident was found to be a deficiency in the previous outage out of service program.

Throughout the outage, the Feedwater System ISJ) was taken out of service under a " blanket" out of service, i.e.

every component in the system was declared out of service. With the whole system out of service, work could be i done freely without additional out of services being processed. During the outage only work on the compt terized I outage list was to be performed under the blanket out of service. The computerized system was to track work to i be performed and testing required prior to unit start-up. This valve was not on the outage list. Its affect on mode I

change went undetected. There was no program in place to explicitly track Technical Specification / Mode change ,

required work if it did not appear on the outage list but was under the blanket out of service.

l D. SAFETY ANALYSIS: ,

l j The work was performed on this Borg-Wamer manufactured valve on December 7,1985. It was not properly )

tested and returned to service until December 31,1985. The applicable mode for which this valve must be '

operable was entered on December 13th. During the 18 days that this valve was in service, yet not tested, the Feedwater Regulating Valves and an inline check valve would have been provided Containment Isolation if it had j been required. The successful passing of the stroke time test on December 31st did indicate, however, that the i Preheater Bypass Valve would have been provided containment isolation even though it had not been previously  !

tested. Because of the back-up isolation and the successful testing of the valve, it can be determined that at no point in time was plant or public safety jeopardized.

1 E. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:

The corrective action to be taken to prevent reoccurrence will involve incorporation of all outage work in to the j computerized outage tracking program. A revision to Byron Administrative Procedure BAP 330-1, " Station Equipment Out-of-Service Procedure", will be processed to ensure that under the blanket out of service, no work ,

i can be performed on a safety-related piece of equipment unless the NWR number appears on the Out of Service l Form. The out of service may be used to track operability of the piece of safety-related equipment to prevent i declaring the equipment operable until all work is completed including all necessary testing.

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(9997R;WPR072693-3)

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- LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LEll) TEXT CONTINUATION I

F ACIUTY NAME DOCKET NUMBER LER NUMBER FAGE TEAR SE(L NUMBER -REVISIDN BYRON NUCLEAR PDWER ETATION 0l5l0l0l0l4lEl4 8l5 1l0l2 l Dl1 0l3 0F 0l3 TEXT Ene sy industry identifcaten Sr:1em (Elfsi codes are identifed m the text s IXXI Justification for the change:

1 1). All outage related NWR's are now tracked by P-2, a computerized outage tracking program. Each NWR receives a three digit ccde that determines the mode in which the equipment is required to be operable. The outage coordinators track the status of these NWR's by use of a pre-sorted print-out listing all NWR's required for each mode.

2). Prior to each mode change, a Byron On-Site Review (BOSR) is held, at which time, all NWR's are reviewed for applicability to the assoc 4ted mode change. Any work not completed or not completely tested prior to the mode change is noied on the BOSR which is provided to the Shift Engineer prior to the mode change for review.

3). The QA Manual now allows out of services to be clear 3d prior to testing and approval for operation as long as the " Work Completed" section is signed. This is not often done with safety-related equipment, but the option does exist.

This event has never happened before at Byron Station. This report is in compliance with 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(b).

This report will become required reading the Operating and Maintenance Department personnel.

F. PREVIOUS OCCURRENCES:

LER NUMBER TITLE NONE 1

G. COMPONENT FAILURE DATA:

MANUFACTURER NOMENCLATURE MODEL NUMBER MFG PART NUMBER NONE l

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