05000454/FIN-2012003-01
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Leakage Detection Trough with Large Accumulation of Boric Acid Identified |
| Description | A finding of very low safety significance and an associated NCV of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, was identified by the inspectors when licensee personnel failed to identify boric acid accumulation that would have impeded flow from the containment leakage detection trough to the containment sump. The licensee entered this issue into the Corrective Action Program (CAP) as Issue Report (IR) 1339957. Corrective actions included removing the boric acid accumulation from the leakage detection trough and passing water through the drain to verify associated piping was free of obstruction. The finding was determined to be more than minor because the finding was similar to IMC 0612, Appendix E, Example 4(a). Example 4 focuses on procedural errors. The not minor if section in Example 4(a) discussed that if a later evaluation determines that the safety-related equipment was adversely impacted, it was more than minor. The flow obstruction in the leakage detection trough would have delayed the flow of water to the sump thereby delaying any subsequent alarm. Therefore, this performance deficiency adversely impacted the Equipment Performance aspect of the Initiating Events Cornerstone. The inspectors determined the finding could be evaluated using the SDP in accordance with IMC 0609, Significance Determination Process, Attachment 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, Table 4a, Characterization Worksheet for Initiating Events Cornerstone. The inspectors answered No to Question 1: Assuming worst case degradation, would the finding result in exceeding the Technical Specification (TS) limit for any RCS [Reactor Coolant System] leakage or could the finding have likely affected other mitigation systems resulting in a total loss of their safety function? Therefore, this finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green). This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the Corrective Action Program component of the Problem Identification and Resolution cross-cutting area because licensee personnel failed to ensure that an issue potentially impacting nuclear safety was promptly identified and fully evaluated, and that actions were taken to address safety issues in a timely manner, commensurate with their significance. |
| Site: | Byron  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000454/2012003 Section 1R15 |
| Date counted | Jun 30, 2012 (2012Q2) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Initiating Events |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.15 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | J Tapp E Duncan J Gilliam C Crisden M Learn L Rodriguez R Jickling R Langstaff C Thompson B Bartlett J Robbins K Walton |
| CCA | P.3, Resolution |
| INPO aspect | PI.3 |
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Finding - Byron - IR 05000454/2012003 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Byron) @ 2012Q2
Self-Identified List (Byron)
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