05000454/FIN-2011005-01
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Failure to Identify Voided Sections of Af Piping |
| Description | The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance and an associated NCV of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, when licensee personnel failed to identify voided piping between Unit 1 valves 1AF006B and 1AF017B and Unit 2 valves 2AF006B and 2AF017B of the auxiliary feedwater (AF) system. The piping between these valves had been historically voided until they were recently re-designed to be filled and maintained filled with water to address an NRC-identified Green finding and an associated NCV of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control. The licensee entered this issue into their Corrective Action Program (CAP) as IR 1296819, IR 1292337, and IR 1295760. Corrective actions included instituting an Operations Standing Order, replacing the Unit 1 AF drain valve, and the isolation of the Unit 2 AF drain valve. This finding was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the Design Control attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). The inspectors determined that the finding could be evaluated using the SDP in accordance with IMC 0609, Significance Determination Process, Attachment 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, Table 4a for the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone. Specifically, the inspectors answered Yes to Question 1 Is the finding a design or qualification deficiency confirmed not to result in a loss of operability or functionality? Based upon this Phase 1 screening, the inspectors concluded that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green). This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the Resources component of the Human Performance cross-cutting area H.2(c) because the licensee did not have adequate procedures to ensure that piping between Unit 1 valves 1AF006B and 1AF017B and Unit 2 valves 2AF006B and 2AF017B were maintained filled with water. |
| Site: | Byron  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000454/2011005 Section 1R15 |
| Date counted | Dec 31, 2011 (2011Q4) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.15 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | R Jickling R Ng C Thompson B Bartlett J Robbins J Cassidy B Palagi J Benjamin E Duncan J Dalzell J Nance |
| CCA | H.7, Documentation |
| INPO aspect | WP.3 |
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Finding - Byron - IR 05000454/2011005 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Byron) @ 2011Q4
Self-Identified List (Byron)
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