05000454/FIN-2011005-02
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | High Energy Line Break Operability Evaluation |
| Description | The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance and an associated NCV of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, when licensee personnel failed to adhere to Operability Determination Process standards after identifying a non-conservative assumption related to closure times for hazard barrier dampers separating the Turbine Building from various safety-related rooms within the Auxiliary Building. In particular, the issues raised by the inspectors during their review of Operability Evaluation 11-006, Revision 1, resulted in the station re-evaluating the non-conservative assumptions against aspects of the current licensing basis (CLB) not previously considered, and substantially revising the Operability Evaluation. The licensee entered these issues into their CAP as IR 1184258, IR 1237133, IR 1238611, IR 1240295, IR 1244251, and IR 1276895. In addition to revising Operability Evaluation 2011-006, corrective actions included an assignment to reconstitute design basis calculation records and plans to re-design the hazard barrier dampers. This finding was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the Design Control attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). The inspectors determined that the finding could be evaluated using the SDP in accordance with IMC 0609, Significance Determination Process, Attachment 0609.04, Phase 1 Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, Table 4a, for the Mitigating Systems cornerstone. Specifically, the inspectors answered No to all of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone questions in Table 4a. Based upon this Phase 1 screening, the inspectors concluded that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green). This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the Corrective Action Program component of the Problem Identification and Resolution cross-cutting area P.1(c) because the licensee failed to thoroughly evaluate the impact on operability of a non-conforming condition associated with hazard barrier damper closure times. |
| Site: | Byron  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000454/2011005 Section 1R15 |
| Date counted | Dec 31, 2011 (2011Q4) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.15 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | R Jickling R Ng C Thompson B Bartlett J Robbins J Cassidy B Palagi J Benjamin E Duncan J Dalzell J Nance |
| CCA | P.2, Evaluation |
| INPO aspect | PI.2 |
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Finding - Byron - IR 05000454/2011005 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Byron) @ 2011Q4
Self-Identified List (Byron)
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