05000440/FIN-2016001-02
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Finding | |
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| Title | Failure to Control Welding and Inspection Activities to Maintain Reactor Coolant System Integrity |
| Description | A finding of very low safety significance and an associated NCV of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion IX, Control of Special Processes, was self-revealed on January 24, 2016, for the licensees failure to control welding and inspection activities during the replacement of the reactor recirculation loop A pump discharge valve vent line during the 2015 refueling outage. When identified as the source of reactor boundary leakage in January 2016, the licensee determined that the weld did not meet the requirements on the design drawing and that the quality control (QC) inspection should have identified the non-conforming weld. The issue was entered into the licensees corrective action program as CR 201601071. Corrective actions included installation of an alternative pipe and cap to replace the failed vent line appendage, plugging and capping of the reactor recirculation loop A flow control valve vent line appendage and performed a weld build up on the reactor recirculation loop B flow control valve vent appendage line. The inspectors determined that the licensees failure to control welding and inspection activities was a performance deficiency that was determined to be more than minor and thus a finding, because it was associated with the Initiating Events cornerstone attribute of human performance and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because it was determined that after a reasonable assessment of degradation, the leak would not have exceeded the reactor coolant system leak rate for a small-break loss of coolant accident (LOCA) and the leak would not have affected other systems used to mitigate a LOCA (e.g., an interfacing system LOCA). This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance, resources, because the licensee failed to ensure that personnel, equipment, procedures, and other resources were available and adequate to support nuclear safety. Specifically, the licensee failed to provide additional precautions, controls, and oversight for the personnel performing the welding activities, inspection activities, and supervisory activities, such that the welder, QC inspector, and supervisor were able to complete a weld that met the requirements of the design drawing and to perform an adequate inspection of the weld to determine that it met the acceptance criteria established by the design drawing [IMC 0310, H.1]. |
| Site: | Perry  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000440/2016001 Section 1R20 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2016 (2016Q1) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Initiating Events |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.2 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | B Dickson J Nance M Marshfield |
| Violation of: | 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion IX |
| CCA | H.1, Resources |
| INPO aspect | LA.1 |
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Finding - Perry - IR 05000440/2016001 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Perry) @ 2016Q1
Self-Identified List (Perry)
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