05000413/LER-2004-002, Unit Manual Reactor Trip Initiated Due to the Closure of a Main Feedwater Isolation Valve
| ML041190431 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Catawba  |
| Issue date: | 04/20/2004 |
| From: | Jamil D Duke Energy Corp, Duke Power Co |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| LER 04-002-00 | |
| Download: ML041190431 (10) | |
| Event date: | |
|---|---|
| Report date: | |
| 4132004002R00 - NRC Website | |
text
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Duke D.M. JAMIL
.rUPowere Vice President A Duke Energy Company Duke Power Catawba Nuclear Station 4800 Concord Rd. / CNO1 VP York, SC 29745-9635 803 831 4251 803 831 3221 fax April 20, 2004 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn:
Document Control Washington D.C.
20555-0001
Subject:
Duke Energy Corporation Catawba Nuclear Station Unit 1 Docket No. 50-413 License Event Report 413/2004-002, Revision 0 Manual Reactor Trip Initiated due to the Closure of a Main Feedwater Isolation Valve Attached please find License Event Report 413/2004-002, Revision 0 entitled, "Manual Reactor Trip Initiated Due to the Closure of a Main Feedwater Isolation Valve."
This Licensee Event Report does not contain any regulatory
commitments
This event is considered to be of no significance with respect to the health and safety of the public.
Questions regarding this License Event Report should be directed to A. Jones-Young at (803) 831-3051.
Sincerely, D. M. Jamil Attachment 9bawa www. duke-energy. corn
U.S. NRC April 20, 2004 Page 2 xc:
L. A. Reyes U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Regional Administrator, Region II Atlanta Federal Center 61 Forsyth St., SW, Suite 23T85 Atlanta, GA 30303 S. E. Peters NRC Senior Project Manager U. S. Nuclear Regulatory commission Mail Stop 0-8 H12 Washington, DC 20555-0001 E. F. Guthrie Senior Resident Inspector U. S. Nuclear Regulatory commission Catawba Nuclear Site
Abstract
On February 22, 2004, at 1729 hours0.02 days <br />0.48 hours <br />0.00286 weeks <br />6.578845e-4 months <br />, with Catawba Unit 1 operating in Mode 1 at 100% power, the hydraulic system for the actuator on 1B Steam Generator Main Feedwater Isolation valve (1CF-42) failed and the valve closed.
As a result, the Operators manually tripped the reactor.
This event was caused by the equipment failure of the valve actuator for 1CF-42.
The plant response to the reactor trip remained within the limits of the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report.
Corrective actions for this event included replacing the actuator for valve 1CF-42.
NRC FORM 366 (7 2001)
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LER 414/01-003 described a Unit 2 reactor trip that resulted from low reactor coolant flow when the 2D reactor coolant pump 6900 VAC feeder breaker opened in response to a protective relay actuation caused by an electrical fault internal to the pump motor.
LER 413/03-001 described a Unit 1 reactor trip that resulted from a turbine trip.
The turbine trip was due to steam generator high level.
The root cause of this event was determined to be an inadequate understanding of the digital feedwater control system response to a common impulse line hydraulic interaction.
LER 413/03-005 described a Unit 1 trip that resulted when the two out of four trip logic for OTdT was satisfied.
One channel of OTdT was previously tripped because of a reactor coolant system hot leg temperature detector failure. The second channel trip was caused by the failure of the pressurizer pressure loop power supply card.
The specific causes of the four events were unrelated.
Therefore, this event was determined to be non-recurring in nature.
Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes are identified in the text as [EIIS: XX].
The valve failure is an EPIX program reportable equipment failure.
This event does not reflect a manual reactor trip with a loss of secondary heat removal capability as monitored by the NRC performance indicator.
Main Feedwater and Auxiliary Feedwater systems remained available.
Condenser vacuum and condenser steam dump valves controlled reactor coolant system temperature throughout the event.
This event did not involve a Safety System Functional Failure.
There were no releases of radioactive materials, radiation exposures, or personnel injuries associated with this event.