05000413/LER-1992-001, :on 920107,secured Upper Containment Unit Fan 1C to Allow for One Containment Air Pressure Release Instead of Normal Two Per Shift.Caused by Inappropriate Action. Changes to Procedures Proposed

:on 920107,secured Upper Containment Unit Fan 1C to Allow for One Containment Air Pressure Release Instead of Normal Two Per Shift.Caused by Inappropriate Action. Changes to Procedures Proposed

ML20092C162
Person / Time
Site:	Catawba
Issue date:	02/06/1992
From:	Futrell R, Mccollum W DUKE POWER CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
LER-92-001, LER-92-1, NUDOCS 9202110313
Download: ML20092C162 (13)

LER-1992-001, on 920107,secured Upper Containment Unit Fan 1C to Allow for One Containment Air Pressure Release Instead of Normal Two Per Shift.Caused by Inappropriate Action. Changes to Procedures Proposed

Event date:
Report date:
4131992001R00 - NRC Website

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Dakt heer Coinpany inli MW"O Catuu ba Nudrar statiort 4800 Concord Ed

- lurk.S C 1970 DUKEPOWER February 6, 1992 Doc 4tment Control Desk U. _ S. Nuclear hogulatory Conuniccion Washington, D. C.

20555 Oubject: Cat.awba liuclear Station Docket No. 50-413 LER-413/92-001 Gentlemen:

Attached la Licensee Event Report 413/92-001 concerning TECllNICAL SPECIFICATION VIOLATION DUE TO IMPROPERLY PERFORMED UPPER CONTAINMENT TEMPERATURE SURVEILIANCE.

This event was considered to be of no significance with recpoet to the health and safety of the public.

Very truly yours, g

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- W. R. McCollum

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- Station Manager

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Mr. S. D, Ebneter M & M Nuclear Insurers Regional-Administrator, Region lI 1221 Avenues of the Americas U. S. Nuclear Regulator Commission New' York, tW 10020 101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900 Atlanta, GA 30323 R. E. Martin INPO Records Center U. S. Nuclear. Regulatory Commission Suite 1500

. Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation 1100 Circlo 75 Parkway Washington, D. C.

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On Janaary 7, 1992, Unit 1 was in Mode 1, Power Operation. Containment Ventilation (VV) System Upper _ Containment Unit Fans (llCVU) 1B and IC were both in cervice. At 0440 hours0.00509 days <br />0.122 hours <br />7.275132e-4 weeks <br />1.6742e-4 months <br />, Control Room operators securea UCVU 1C to allow for one containment air pressure release through the Containment Addition and Release (VQ) System instead of the normal two per shift.

Fan 1C was returned to service on January 12, 1992,.at 1935 hours0.0224 days <br />0.538 hours <br />0.0032 weeks <br />7.362675e-4 months <br />. During this time period, Technical Memorandum 11-29 was in effect which stated that the cables for the

' temperature indications for Fans IB and IC could possibly be reversed and both fans must either be on or off for the average temperature data to be valid.

This data is used to perform required Daily Surveillance item #12 of procedure PT/1/A/4600/02A to fulfill Technical Specification requirements.

All daily surveillances between January 7, 1992 and January 12, 1992, were performed; however,.the. data used in the calculations was inaccurate. This incident is attributed to Inappropriate Action in that action was not taken to follow

- information stated in T6chnical Memorandum 11-29.

A contributing cause to the incident was due to an Installation Deficiency in that inst ruments IVVRD 5140 and IVVRD 5150 were installed in the reverse locations.

Corrective Actions

. included a correct realignment of the fans in service, placing tags on the on/off_ switches in the Control Room and proposed changes to the affected procedures.

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.The Unit 1 Containment Ventilation [E1IS:VA) (VV) System ventilates and cools

- the Control Rod Drive Mechanism [EIIS:66), the Incore Instrumentation Room, Lower and Upper Containment [EIIS: PEN) areas of Unit 1.

The Uppcr Containment Ventilation portion of the VV System consists of four, 33-1/3 percent capacity

- nir handling units (IA, IB,.1C, and-1D) and four Upper Containment Return Air Fans [EIIS:BLO). A non-safety related leg of the Nuclear Service Water [EIIS:BI) (RN) System supplies water to the cooling coils of the air handling units and-is thermostatically controlled to maintain 90 degrees F.

The air handling unit and return air fans for each train (1A, IB, IC, and 1D) are controlled by' selector switches [EIIS:XIS) located in the Control Room (C/R).

The switches for the Upper Containment Ventilation (Air Handling) Units (UCVU) also allow the operator to select either normal or maximum cooling. Maximum cooling bypasses the normal thermostat [EIIStXI) control of temperature. All eight fans start automatically on " blackout" power [EIIS:JX). The Upper containment-Cooling System performs no function during a LOCA and is not

- Nuclear _ Safety.Related.

The Containment Air Release and Addition System [EIIS:VA) (VQ) System provides a means of controlling the containment pressure between 0.25 psig and -0.25 psig during normal plant operations including startup and shutdown transients.

Technical Specification.(T/S) 3.6.1.4 mandates that the primary containment internal pressure shall be maintained between -0.1 and +0.3 psig. 'The release of air pressure to maintain this limit is normally required one to two times per shift.

Section 9.4.~6Jof-the Final Safety Analysis Report-(FSAR) and System LDescriptions state that-during " normal" plant operation, three of the four 33-1/3 percent capacity fan-coil units with their respective return air fans are required to operate to maintain conditions.

The remaining one fan-coil unit and associated return air fan is on standby - The Upper Containment Return Air Fans are normally run in the AUTO position ~1n the C/R. With this arrangement, these fans will automatically start when its respective UCVU is started. A cooling water throttling valve for each fan-coil unit is automatically

- controlled by return air thermostats set to maintain the upper compartment at

- 90 degrees F.

Technical Specifications 3.6.1.5, Containment Systems Air Temperature, and 4.6.1.5;1,' Surveillance Requirements, specify that the primary containment average air temperature shall be maintained between 75 degrees F and 100 degrees F in the containment upper compartment while in Mode 1 and between 60 degrees F and 100 degrees F while in Modes 2, 3, or 4.

The upper compartment average air temperature is obtained by the arithmetical average of the ambient air temperature monitoring stations located at an elevation of approximately 653. feet in the upper containment near the inlet of each operating UCVU.

Temperature readings are obtained at least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, on night shift

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If the containment-

- average air temperature does not conform to the specified limits, the plant-must restore the temperature to the specified limits within tight hours or be

- in at least HOT STANDBY within the next six hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following thirty hours.

The Control Room Operators (CRos) utilize the Operator Aid Computer (OAC)

_ (EIIS:IMOD]- to perform the necessary calculations as required por surveillance requirements specified in procedure PT/1/A/4600/02A.

Computer point P1500 is the average output based on the average of all analog points read for each operating ventilation train. The "A" (Analog) points correspond to the

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. respective "D!' (Digital) points which indicate to the OAC which units are running. The points that correspond to the specific UCVU Fan trains are as follows:

1A (D3548, A1178), la (D3549, A1226), 1C (D3550, A1455), and ID

'(D3430, A1449).

The UCVU Fans involved in this incident are IB_and IC.

When the OAC is out of service or otherwise unavailable, procedure PT/1/A/4600/09, Loss of Operator Aid Computer,-in used by the CRO to document T/S requirements normally' performed by the OAC.

The C/R " Balance of Plant Operator" normally 1

is.the responsible Operations (OPS) person who must verify the average

' temperature of point.P1500 is within the T/S limitations and signs off item 12 of Enclosure 13.1 of procedure PT/1/A/4600/02A.

- The' Technical Memorandum (T/M) Program, as specified in Operations Management Procedure (OMP) 2-5,-is used by OPS to provide enhancements to an existing procedure or provide _ temporary instructions in the absence of a procedure;

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however, they chall not-conflict with or be used as a permanent replacement for operating procedures.

It must not prevent an existing procedure from being.followed, and when being used as a supplement to a procedure, it must not be-in the non-con arvative direction. T/Ms are to be used only on a temporary short term basis. The OPS Unit Manager is responsible for writing the Work List and normally for issuing T/Ms.

He is also responsible for revjewing T/Ms_to ensure they are deleted when no longer needed or reissued prior to their-expiration date if they are still-needed. The CRO must review the T/M logbook prior to each shift change and' sign the_ appropriate turnover shoot, such as the '.' Balance of Plant Operator Turnover Sheot" from OMP 2-22, Shift Turnover.

T/M 11-29, Revision 0, was issued on December 31, 1991 stating there was a possibility of rolled (reversed) cables on IB and 3C Upper Containment temperature leads. The T/M suggested that IVVTT5140 may actually be reading the temperature for 1C UCVU, and that IVVTT5150 may be reading the inlet to IB UCVU, instead of the reverse. The immediate concern was that with this condition, the Daily Surveillance (PT/1/A/4600/02A), which uses computer point

~P1500 to average the temperatures for the units which are running, could be invalid.

For the average to be valid, both 1B and 1C m'ast either be both on or off. The T/M stated, "Please ensure one of these cases is true prior to NXC Form JetA (64h :

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.sa, we,, m.nin doing the Daily Surveillance item #12" and specified a Problem Investigation Process (PIP) was being generated to pursue final confirmation and correction of the it em.

The " Upper Containment Ventilation Unit Startup and Normal Operation" are specified on Enclosure 4.1 of procedure OP/1/A/6450/01, Containment Ventilation (VV) System. The calibration of the VV System is performed using procedure Ip/1/B/3172/03, Containment Ventilation Systems (VV) Upper Containment Cooling System.

Design drawings CN-1576-2.0 (Flow Diagram of Conta.inment Ventilation System (VV)], CN-1499-01.11-00 (Instrument Locations Reactor Building and Doghouse El. 565'-3" and above), CN-1784-02.05 [ Connection Diagram Containment Ventilation System (VV) Miscellaneous Devices), Unit 1 Instrument and Control (I&C) List, etc., all show instruments CN1VVTT5140 and CNIVVRD5140 to be a<;sociated with Upper Containment B Air Temperature and instruments CN1VVTT5150 and CNIVVRD5150 to be associated w.ith Upper Containment C Air Temperature.

Each Resistance Temperature Device (RTD) is located over the respective Steam Generator (S/G) [EIIS:HX) at El. 652' and located at a 29' radius according to these drawings.

The cable to IVVRD5140 (at 176 degrees) is IVV676 and the cable to IVVRD5150 (at 180 degroec) is IVV20.

The power sources for the corresponding switches in the C/R are 1MXP-F04C for VV UCVU 1B and 1MX0-F04C for VV UCVU IC, All of the Upper Containment Ventilation Unit Fan Switches (IA, 1B, 1C, and ID) are located on the back panel of Main Control Board 1MC3 in the C/R.

EVENT DESCRIPTION

Prior to September 1, 1991, both Unit 1 and 2 were in Mode 1, at 100% power.

There had been problems with both Train 1A and IB temperature indications on the Upper Containment Ventilation Unit Fans. Work Requests (W/Rs) 559820PS and 561870PS were issued to investigate and repair the problems. W/R 559820PS was written to investigate and repair VV Upper Containment Train B temperature indication since Train B was reading approximately 6 degrees F higher than Train A.

On September 1, 1991, Instrument and Electrical (IAE) personnel compared gauge 1VVP5140 to computer point A1226 (the temperature indication analog point for UCVU Fan 1B) and found that both were indicating a temperature of approximately 95 degrees F.

Train A indication was approximately 91 degrees F.

On September 3, 1991, a string check on IVVLP5140 was performed using Enclosure 11.1.9 of procedure IP/1/B/3172/03.

After the string check was performed, Component Engineering Services (CES), IAE and OPS personnel continued to discuss the data. With Unit 2 Refueling Outage approaching, the problem was not given a high priority.

Unit 2 Refueling Outage U2EOC4 started on October 17, 1991, and the Unit returned to 100% power NRC Foem 366A 1649)

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hith the Unit 2 outage complete, attention was once again given to the problem concerning the temperature indications for UCVU Train B.

On December 31, 1991, IAE personnel discussed the indication discrepancy with OPS.

IAE went into Upper Containment to take an ambient temperature measurement at the RTD to substantiate its indication. Upon approaching the RTD, IAE personnel observed that the instrument wan not tagged but by utilizing the cable number (1VV20), it was possible to identify the RTD as IVVRD5150.

IVVRD5150 should have been located at 652', 180 degrees (above C S/G). The RTD being sought by IAE was IVVRD5140, which chould have been located at 652', 176 degrees (above b S/C), but was found at 180 degreen above C S/G tagged as IVVRD5140. Not being sure of which RTD was correct, ambient temperatures were taken adjacent to each one, with a reading of 92.2 degreen F at the unmarked probe and 92.6 degrees F at the probe marked 1VVRD5140. The reading at the latter was within 1 degrees F of the indicated temperature on gauge IVVP5140.

lAE discussed the findings with CES engineers, who suggested that the probe tagged IVVRD5140 should be heated to verify it was indeed wired to IVVTT5140 and provided indication on IVVP5140.

When IAE heated RTD IVVRD5140, the indication for IVVP5140 rose.

This confirmed the suspicion that the RTDs (5140 and 5150) had been installed in the wrong locations.

IAE discussed the findings with OPS personnel and then wrote PIR 1-C92-0008 to document the incident.

At the same time IAE entered Upper Containment to check out the RTDs, OPS issued T/M 11-29, Rev. O, which stated that there were "possible rolled cables" un JB and IC Upper Containment temperature leads that suggested IVVTT5140 may actually be reading the temperature for IC UCVU and that IVVTT5150 may actually be reading the temperature for 1B UCVU.

OPS stated that the immediate concern was that this condillon would possibly invalidate data used by computer point P1500, which averages the temperatures for the ventilation units which are in service and is used to document containment temperature on the Daily Surveillance procedure, PT/1/A/4600/02A.

OPS stressed the importance of having both la and 1C in service or both out of service for the average to be valid.

Between December 31, 1991 and January 7, 1992, CROs continued to have the correct UCVU Fan IB, 1C alignment (both in service or both out of service).

llowever, on January 7, 1992, at 0440 hours0.00509 days <br />0.122 hours <br />7.275132e-4 weeks <br />1.6742e-4 months <br />, UCVU Fan IC was removed from service with UCVU Fan IB remaining in service.

This alignment existed until January 12, 1992, at 1935 hours0.0224 days <br />0.538 hours <br />0.0032 weeks <br />7.362675e-4 months <br />, when UCVU Fan 1C was returned to service.

At this tjme, the CRos realized the existing condition of UCVU Fans IB and 1C was no longer conforming to T/M 11-29.

PIR 1-C92-0005 was written to document the incident.

Subsequent corrective actions included placing the correct alignment of fans in service, placing tags on the on/of f switches in the C/R (using Removal and Restoration Tag # 12-17) to ensur; the correct fans were running, and proposing a restricted procedure changes for PT/1/A/4600/02A and N CC Form 3e6A (5491

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During this timeframe (January 7, 1992 to January 12, 1992),

- Unit 1 Daily Surveillance item #12, Primary Containment Upper Compartment Average Air Temperature on Enclosure 13.1 of procedure PT/1/A/4600/02A, was being performed on each night shift; however, the data used in the OAC calculations was invalid.

On January 13, 1992, CES personnel initiated Station Problem Report (SPR)

CNPR-06076 stating that - the Upper Containment Temperature RTDs 1WRD5140 and IVVRD5150 were found to be installed in the incorrect locations.

The SPR is now being evaluated by the Instrument and Electrical Engineering (IEE)

Department.

The proposed resolution is to revise the I&C List, OAC program and associated description, and other documentation to reflect the "As-Built" configuration in-the plant.

1on January 35, 1992, OPS personnel issued Revision 1 of T/M 11-29 to confirm the fact that the cables to 1WTT5140 and 1WTT5150 were indeed rolled and consequently led to the temperature indications reading the opposite UCVU Fan.

CONCLUSION This. incident.has been attributed to a root cause of Inappropriate Action due to improperly following a T/M and a contributing cause of Installation Deficiency in that-instruments.1WRD5140 and 1WRD5150 were installed in the reverse locations.in the Upper Containment.. There is an additional situation involving the timeframes concerning this incident.

Prior to December 31,

'1991, there was:an unknown period of time that Unit I has been running with the condition. Most personnel interviewed in OPS feel this questionable status condition could have existed beginning from the original installation of these instruments-prior to the initial Unit-1 criticality in early 1985.-

Normally, the night shift-" Balance of the Plant Operator" performs item 12, Primary Containment Upper Compartment. Average Air Temperature on Enclosure 13.1 of procedure PT/1/A/4600/02A between 2000 and 2300 hours0.0266 days <br />0.639 hours <br />0.0038 weeks <br />8.7515e-4 months <br />. -Since this step required OAC computer point P1500 to average the air temperature at the

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inlet of each " operating" upper containment. ventilation unit, the T/M 11-29 specification of. requiring either both Fans 1B and IC to be in service or both to be-out of service at the same time was critical to the. calculation.

Between December 31, 1991 and January 7, 1992, the correct UCVU fan alignment

. existed in accordance with T/M 11-29; therefore, data input for computer point p1500 was valid. The CROs did the required Daily Surveillance between January 7i 1992~and January-12, 1992, per PT/1/A/4600/02A, but the data related to the calculation was inaccurate since IB was in service and 1C was not in service

=during this time.

Conversations with OPS C/R personnel involved during this time period,-revealed that the T/M logbook was reviewed as required at each shift change; however, they said they just failed to follow the specific

. instructions in T/M 11-29.

OPS CRO A said he read the Memorandum but on that

- particular night he did not think he had a problem with the fans and NXC Perm 3e6A (649)

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consequently did not look at the switches.

OPS CRO B said he reviewed the

- Memorandum because he wanted to cut the number of air pressure release times thru VQ System from-two to one on his shift, since the pressure was at.2 psig at the time. CRO B stated that the Operator at the Controls (OATC) and Balance of the Plant Operator usually do not have the time to go outside of the C/R " horseshoe". Therefore, since he had not heard of a problem with any of.the UCVU fans on his shift, Operator B did not personally go to the back side of panel 1MC3 and look at the fan selector switches to verify the position of the switches for IB and IC.

OPS CR0 C said he could not remember any specific details concerning this incident during the particular shift he was-working at the tirne.

When IAE confirmed-that the cables for IVVRD5140 and IVVRD5150 were indeed reversed on December 31, 1991, the suspicion that OPS had identified in T/M 11-29, Rev, 0, concerning the "possible rolled cables" was confirmed. T/M 11-29, Rev. 1, was not issued until January 15, 1992.

Since T/Ms are reviewed during each shift change by the CRos, it is vital that any revision to a T/M should be distributed in a timely manner.

This would be especially critical on T/S items necessary to perform a Daily Surveillance requirement.

In this case; however, the " confirmation" of the rolled cables did not change the OPS action requirement specified in both Rev. O and Rev. 1 of T/M 11-29.

It has not been determined exactly who actually cut off Fan 1C at 0440 hours0.00509 days <br />0.122 hours <br />7.275132e-4 weeks <br />1.6742e-4 months <br />, on January 7, 1992. The fan unit may not have been switched off if the danger tags had been placed on the selector switches at the time the rolled cable situation was " confirmed",-as documented by PIR 1-C92-0008, instead of relying solely on each CRO to remember the specific instructions within T/M 11-29.

(The danger tag stickers were placed on the relector switches on January 12,

- 1992, after PIR 1-C92-0005 was written.

The revision to procedure OP/1/A/6450/01, including the note requiring that both UCVU Fans IB and 1C be operating simultaneously or both be off, is being

- prepared at this time. This revision will remain in the procedure until the resolution to SPR #CNPR-06076 has been implemented.

The proposed resolution of SPR #CNPR-06076, due the week of January 27, 1992, is to revise the I&C List, OAC program and associated description and'other documentation to reflect the actual "As-Built" conditions.

This will alleviate the existing situation with the computer point data that feeds input for point P1500 to obtain the average air temperature in the Primary Containment Upper Compartment.

The restricted changed to Daily Surveillance procedure PT/1/A/4600/02A has been determined to be unnecessary at this time per discussion with personnel in the OPS Support Group.

This decision is based on the amount of time required in revisions to other related procedures

- if PT/1/A/4600/02A was revised, and the relative short amount of time that would be required if the OAC computer analog points were reversed.

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.us<* weu,. m s,.,u m asaco,-seu eon During the subsequent inveistigation of this incident, it was discovered that aomo of the terminology involving the digital pojnts in Section 2.3.8 of the OAC Documentation Manuals and the Electrical System Doucription for VV System could be misleading. For instanco, the analog pointo for lit and 3C temperature indications are A1226 and A1455, respectively.

Theco points represent the temperature reading from the HTDs which are located at the inlet to each Upper Containmont Ventilation Unit Fan 3D and 10, recpoetively. The digital points, which toll when the f an units are in service are for the Upper Containment Return Air Fan (UCRht> 1B and IC, rocpoclively. CROs confirm por proceduro OP/1/A/6450/01 that the selector switch for those ians ara "normally" set in the AUTO position, which means when the UCVU fan la put into service, the roopective UCRAF is automatically put into service.

However, 11 the selector switch for the UCRAF was switched to the ON or OFF position, the UCVU could still be independently operated. During thin type of alignment, tho OAC history for those digital pointo would be inconclusive and it could not be proven that the analog point was taking temperature readings from an

" operating" ventilation unit (required por T/8 4.6.1.5.1).

This innuo will be ovalunted and action taken, if needed, t ensure that valid temperaturo readings are tak.n1 under all conditions.

It was also found that during this investigation that drawing CN-1499-01.11-00, which indicatt' mtrument locations in the Reactor Building, shown the correct location at abola for RTDs IVVRD5120 (item 2, quadrant 0 degrees -

90 degrees), IVVRDt (item 39, quadrant 270 degreen - 360 degroes) and IVVRD5140 (Atem 2, q, 3 rant 90 degreen - 100 degroos), but the description and label for IVVRD5150 19 incorrect (item bl,-quadrant 180 degroon - 270 degroes). This item will be corrected as part of the implementation of tho

).

.tholution of SPR ll CNPR-06076.

The Operating Exporlonce Program (CEp) databaso review of the last 24 months has revealed throo Licensoo Event Reports (LERo) that have been ulmilar incidents. LER 413/91-014 involven an improperly applied calculation whilo LERp 413/91-020 and 413/92-002 involves failure to adhere to the roouiremontu of a T/M. This incident la conaldered to be a recurring event, since the acceptance critoria involved in each incident was invalid. This is the third incident involving failure to adhere to the requirements of a T/M. Operations management will review existing controls for the T/M program and take action to strengthen them, propound changes include plunu to reduce the overall number of T/Ms, strict requirements for sotting expiration dates, and higher levels of management approval for extension of expiration datos, IGC fee 306A 1649).

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tsaiw m u n o.,,naneu.ano,e,amaemn COBRECTIVE ACTIONS SUBEEQUENT 1)

W/Rs.559020PS and 561070PS were written to investigate and repair the temperaturo indication problems with the VV Upper Containment Train AB and 1A, respectavoly.

2) 1AE personnel compared gaugo IVVP5140 to comp'ater point A1226 to find both indicated a temperature of approx 11natoly 9b degrt os P, and performed a string check of IVVLp5140 por proceduro Ip/1/B/3172/03 (per W/R 559820PS) in September, 1991.

3) 1AE took anblent temperature measuroments at RTDs, traced cables, and heated up the probo at IVVRD5140 to provo it was located at the wrong locatic.n (por W/R 559020PS) on December 31, 1991.

p1R 1-C92*0008 was written by IAE personnel-to doca wnt thin problem.

4)

OPS peruc,nnel issued T/M 11-2';, Rov. O, to warn CROs of "ponsible rolled cablos",oncerning temperaturo loads JVVTT5140 and IVVTT5150 on December 31, 1991. OPS Assued Rev. 1 of T/M 11-29 on January, 15; 1992, after " confirmation" of the rolled cables by 1AE's investigation of the problem in the plant.

5)

PIR 1-C92-0005 was written by OPS on January 12, 1992 to document the time period in the C/R where T/H 11-29 specifications were not followed, from 0440 hours0.00509 days <br />0.122 hours <br />7.275132e-4 weeks <br />1.6742e-4 months <br /> on January 7, 1992 to 1900 hours0.022 days <br />0.528 hours <br />0.00314 weeks <br />7.2295e-4 months <br /> on January 12, 1992.

4 6)

The correct.VV UCVU fan alignment was mado by CROs and danger tags (stickern) woro placed on.colector switches for VV UCVU IB and IC fans in the C/R on panel IMC3 on January 12, 1992. OPS also proposed procodure changos as a result of the " confirmation" of the rolled cables.

~7)

SPR llCNPR-06076 was written on January 13, 1992 by CES personnel to document the incidont and proposed a resolution to correct the rolled cablo situation.

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PLANNED t

3) planned restrictivo change to proceduro OP/1/A/6450/01 by OPS Support Group personnel to add a noto prior to Stop 2.2. on Enclosuro 4.1 to make sure that both control switches for VV UCVU 1D and VV UCVU 2C must be placed in the same position to ensure survollianco point P1500 is valid. This rostrictivo change will remain in offect until the resolution of SPR #CNPR-06076 has been implemented.

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2)

SPR #CNPR-06076 is to bo tenolved by IEE personnol.

The proposed resolution.is to mako design drawings, 1&C List, OAC program and associated description match "An-Built" conditions.

3)-

- OPS management will review OMP 2-5 and make revisions to strengthen the management controls over the process of using T/Ms.

4 4)

The use of Upper Containment Return Air Fan digital points an l

Indication of Uppor Containment Vont11ation Units operation will be evaluated and action taken, as needed, to ensure that valid t

temperaturo readings are.taken under all conditions.

5)

IAE personnel will replace the missing tog on instrwnont I

3VVRD5150.

SAFETY ANALYS1Q

- The Containment Ventilation System providos adequate capacity to assure-that 4

proper temperaturo levels arr. maintained in the containment under normal operating conditions.

Sufficient rodundancyzis included to assure propor oporation of_the system with one activo component out of service by the use of-foui'33-1/3 percent capacity ventilation units. The system is arranged wholly in the uppor and lower containment cc..partments eliminating the need of ductwork penetrating the divider barrier thus enhancing the barrier integrity.

The Containment Ventilation System is not considered an engincored safety feature (Safoty Relatod) and no crodit is taken for the operation of any VV System subsystem or component in analyzing the consequences of an accident.

.There are no C/R status lights to indicate the statun of the system; however, thoro are indicating lightn near_the switches controlling the fans and damper to-Indicate the fan or damper status in the C/R.

j While in Mode 1 status,- T/S 3.6.1.5 specifies that-the primary Containment-Upper Compartment average air temperaturo shall be maintained between 75 degrees F and 300 degrees F.

During tho winter months of the year the temperature stays in the lower portjon of this rango, and in tho summer months CC f ore 306 16491 4

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Catawba Nuclear Station. Unit 1 0 l6 l0 l0 l0 l 4l1 l3 912 0 l ($ 1 0l0 Il 1 0F j lt nri en uc e m.., ne, of the year the temperatura in the upper portion of this rango.

During

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.o thin timo of the year, the icv supply to the Upper Containment in isolated to prevont the temperature from falling below 75 degrees F.

i OPS and Systems Engineering personnel have concluded that obtainable past data history shown that au four UCVU fan temperaturo indicationa are almost always consistently within juct a few degrees of each other durint, normal operation of the plant'whethor the UCVU fans have been in service or shutdown.

Thoro havo been no significant heat loads recorded in the past and none at thu present that have shown a tendency to heat up one compartment's area significantly over any other compartment.

During the timo period involved in this LER (January 7-12, 1992), all four temperature indications for the UCVU fan units were reading approximately the samo at 77 degrees P (based on data from the thermocouples near each fan). Whether VV UCVU Fena IU or iC were running or notJdoes not apparently affect the temperature indications at the probes for each quadrant..The area temperatures have consintently been within a few degroen of each other, both during this time period and in the unknown length of timo period prior to Decenibor 31, 1991. Tho OAC temperature averaging program would be expected to give representativo resulto.

For thin reason, OPS and System Engineering do not consider thin an opornbility concern and Upper Containment temperaturon would havo remained within the grounds of

- the Safety Analysis Report.

The health and safoty of the public were unaffected by this incident.

f I

t felt Form 304416491 i

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