05000410/LER-2018-001, For Nine Mile Point Unit 2, Auto Start of Division II Emergency Diesel Generator Due to Loss of Line 6
| ML18192B988 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Nine Mile Point  |
| Issue date: | 07/09/2018 |
| From: | Kreider R Exelon Generation Co |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| NMP2L2687 LER 2018-001-00 | |
| Download: ML18192B988 (5) | |
| Event date: | |
|---|---|
| Report date: | |
| Reporting criterion: | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(B), System Actuation |
| 4102018001R00 - NRC Website | |
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~ Exelon Generation NMP2L2687 July 9, 2018 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001 Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Unit 2 Renewed Facility Operating License No. NPF-69 Docket No. 50-410 10 CFR 50.73
Subject:
NMP2 Licensee Event Report 2018-001, Auto Start of Division II Emergency Diesel Generator Due to Loss of Line 6 In accordance with the reporting requirements contained in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), please find enclosed NMP2 Licensee Event Report 2018-001, Auto Start of Division II Emergency Diesel Generator Due to Loss of Line 6.
There are no regulatory commitments contained in this letter.
Should you have any questions regarding the information in this submittal, please contact Dennis M. Moore, Site Regulatory Assurance Manager, at (315) 349-5219.
Respectfully, Robert E. Kreider Jr.
Plant Manager, Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station Exelon Generation Company, LLC REK/RSP
Enclosure:
NMP2 Licensee Event Report 2018-001, Auto Start of Division II Emergency Diesel Generator Due to Loss of Line 6 cc:
NRC Regional Administrator, Region I NRC Resident Inspector NRC Project Manager
NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY 0MB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 03/31/2020 (04-2018)
, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.
a.Page Nine Mile Point Unit 2 05000410 1
OF 4
- 4. Title Auto Start of Division II Emergency Diesel Generator Due to Loss of Line 6
- 5. Event Date
- 6. LEA Number
- 7. Report Date
- 8. Other Facilities Involved I
Sequential I Rev Facility Name Docket Number Month Day Year Year Number No.
Month Day Year NA NA Facility Name Docket Number 05 10 2018 2018 -
001 00 7
9 2018 NA NA
- 9. Operating Mode
- 11. This Report is Submitted Pursuant to the Requirements of 10 CFR §: (Check all that apply)
D 20.2201(b)
D 20.2203(a)(3)(i)
D 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A)
D 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)
D 20.2201(d)
D 20.2203(a)(3)(ii)
D 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B)
D 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 4 D
D D
D 20.2203(a)(1) 20.2203(a)(4) 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)
D 20.2203(a)(2)(i)
D 50.36(c)(1 )(i)(A)
[gJ 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)
D 50.73(a)(2)(x)
- 10. Power Level D 20.2203(a)(2)(ii)
D 50.36(c)(1 )(ii)(A)
D 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A)
D 73.71 (a)(4)
D 20.2203(a)(2)(iii)
D 50.36(c)(2)
D 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B)
D 73.71 (a)(5)
D 20.2203(a)(2)(iv)
D 50.46(a)(3)(ii)
D 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)
D 73.77(a)(1) 000 D 20.2203(a)(2)(v)
D 50. 73(a)(2)(i)(A)
D 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)
D 73.77(a)(2)(i)
D 20.2203(a)(2)(vi)
D 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)
D 50.73(a)(2)(vii)
D 73.77(a)(2)(ii)
\\
D 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C)
D Other (Specify in Abstract below or in
E. METHOD OF DISCOVERY
This event was self-revealing during the performance of the relay testing when the Control Room Alarm was received F. SAFETY SYSTEM RESPONSES:
Following the loss of line 6 the Division 2 EOG actuated and operated per design.
II.
CAUSE OF EVENT
This event was directly caused by a protective relay that inadvertently actuated while technicians were pulling the relay connection plug. Pulling the relay connection plug is the risk elimination strategy for protective relaying to prevent actuation during testing. The relay actuated when the connection plug was removed. There is no industry operating experience associated with actuation of relays while pulling the connection plug. This is the industry accepted practice to prevent relay actuation.
Ill.
ANALYSIS OF THE EVENT
This event is reportable in accordance with 1 O CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), and 1 O CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A). The event caused a valid actuation of the Division II EOG, a safety system named in 1 O CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(B). The actuation was not part of a preplanned sequence during testing or reactor operation. There were no nuclear safety consequences associated with this event and all safety systems and balance of plant equipment operated as expected.
IV.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
V.
A. ACTION TAKEN TO RETURN AFFECTED SYSTEMS TO PRE-EVENT STATUS Operations responded in accordance with appropriate Special Operating Procedures and restored all impacted systems to pre-evenlstatus.
B. ACTION TAKEN TO PREVENT RECURRENCE Corrective actions include planning and scheduling changes being implemented to create additional mitigating barriers in addition to the removal of the connecting plug.
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
2018 -
A. FAILED COMPONENTS There were no failed components that contributed to this event B. PREVIOUS LERS ON SIMILAR EVENT:
There are no previous LERs for similar events.
SEQUENTIAL NUMBER 001 REV NO.
00 C. THE ENERGY INDUSTRY IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM (EIIS) COMPONENT FUNCTION IDENTIFIER AND SYSTEM NAME OF EACH COMPONENT OR SYSTEM REFERRED TO IN THIS LER:
Component IEEE 803 Function IEEE 805 S~stem Identifier Identification Emergency Diesel DG EK Generator Relay RLY FK D. SPECIAL COMMENTS:
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