05000397/FIN-2017008-01
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Finding | |
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Title | Operators Fail To Follow Reactor Scram Procedure |
Description | Green . The inspectors reviewed a self -revealed, non- cited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, Procedures, for the licensees failure to follow Procedure 3.3.1, Reactor Scram, Revision 62. Specifically, the licensee failed to trip the main generator per Procedure PPM 3.3.1, Step 6.2.9, although it was required for a load rejection scram. As a result, during the scram on December 18, 2016, the station vital electrical busses SM -7 and SM -8 transferred to the backup transformer (and to the Division 3 Diesel Generator in the case of bus SM -4), instead of to the preferred electrical source, the startup transformer. As immediate corrective actions, the licensee implemented operations Night Order 75 that reinforced training to trip the main generator on a reactor scram. The licensee entered this issue into the corrective action program as Action Request s 359059 and 361029. The failure to follow Procedure 3.3.1, Reactor Scram, Revision 62, was a performance deficiency. Th is performance deficiency was more than minor, and therefore a finding, because it adversely affected the human performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the performance deficiency result ed in a reduction in the offsite power sources available to supply safety -related busses . The inspectors performed the initial significance determination using NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Attachment 04, Initial Characterization of Findings, and Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At -Power, Exhibit 2, Mitigating Systems Screening Questions, dated June 19, 2012. The inspectors determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because: (1) the finding was not a deficiency affecting the design or qualification of a mitigating system; (2) the finding did not represent a loss of system and/or function; (3) the finding did not represent an actual loss of function of a single train for greater than its technical specification allowed outage time; and (4) the finding does not represent an actual loss of function of one or more non- technical specification trains of equipment designated as high safety -significant in accordance with the licensees maintenance rule program for greater than 24 hours. This finding had a cross -cutting aspect in the area of human performance, training, in that the licensee failed to provide training and ensure knowledge transfer to maintain a 3 knowledgeable, technically competent workforce and instill nuclear safety values. Specifically, the licensed operators did not understand the actions associated with the main generator in the scram procedure [H.9] |
Site: | Columbia ![]() |
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Report | IR 05000397/2017008 Section 4OA5 |
Date counted | Mar 31, 2017 (2017Q1) |
Type: | NCV: Green |
cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
Identified by: | Self-revealing |
Inspection Procedure: | IP 93812 |
Inspectors (proximate) | D Bradley G Kolcum M Haire R Deese |
Violation of: | Technical Specification - Procedures |
CCA | H.9, Training |
INPO aspect | CL.4 |
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Finding - Columbia - IR 05000397/2017008 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Columbia) @ 2017Q1
Self-Identified List (Columbia)
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