05000387/FIN-2014003-01
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Finding | |
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| Title | Failure to Identify Conditions Adverse to Quality due to Untimely Actions to Address Extent of Condition |
| Description | An NRC-identified Green NCV of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, "Corrective Action," was identified for PPL's failure to identify conditions adverse to quality by not implementing timely actions to address the extent of a previously identified inoperable condition. Specifically, when a reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) turbine exhaust line vacuum breaker failed its inservice test, PPL did not take timely actions in accordance with NDAP-QA-0702, Action Request and Condition Report Process, to test other valves that could be susceptible to the failure mechanism and, therefore, did not identify conditions adverse to quality in similar valves in a timely manner. PPL entered the issue into the corrective action program (CAP) as condition report (CR) 2014-17151 and tested all other susceptible valves. Additionally, degraded conditions that were identified were corrected prior to restoring the systems to service. The finding was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the structures, systems, and component (SSC) and barrier performance attribute of the Barrier Integrity cornerstone and affected its objective to provide reasonable assurance that physical design barriers protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. Inspectors determined the risk significance was bounded by the failure of the high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) turbine exhaust line vacuum breaker, which was stuck in a partially opened state. With the valve stuck in this state, failure of the redundant valve would have resulted in HPCI exhaust steam relieving directly to the suppression chamber air space affecting containment performance. The inspectors assessed the finding in accordance with IMC 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power, dated June 19, 2012, and determined the finding to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it did not represent a degradation of the barrier function of the control room, did not represent an actual open pathway in the physical integrity of reactor containment, and did not involve the actual reduction in function of hydrogen igniters in containment. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Problem Identification and Resolution, Resolution, because PPL did not take effective corrective actions to address issues in a timely manner commensurate with their safety significance. Specifically, despite properly identifying appropriate corrective actions while evaluating the extent of a condition adverse to quality, PPL failed to implement those actions in a timely manner resulting in the failure to identify and correct conditions adverse to quality in three similar valves. |
| Site: | Susquehanna  |
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| Report | IR 05000387/2014003 Section 1R15 |
| Date counted | Jun 30, 2014 (2014Q2) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Barrier Integrity |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.15 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | C Graves F Arner F Bower J Grieves N Floyd T Burns T Daun |
| Violation of: | 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion XVI |
| CCA | P.3, Resolution |
| INPO aspect | PI.3 |
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Finding - Susquehanna - IR 05000387/2014003 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Susquehanna) @ 2014Q2
Self-Identified List (Susquehanna)
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