05000387/FIN-2012003-04
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Finding | |
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| Title | Improperly Performed Maintenance Impacts Secondary Containment |
| Description | A self-revealing Green NCV of TS 5.4.1, Procedures, was identified regarding PPLs conduct of maintenance during a Unit 1 refueling outage which impacted the operating unit, Unit 2. Specifically, improperly performed maintenance on a Unit 1 main stop valve (MSV) and outboard main steam isolation valve (MSIV) affected safety-related equipment to include the standby gas treatment system (SGTS) and Unit 2 secondary containment in an unplanned manner. PPL entered this issue in their CAP via CRs 1558764, 1558718, and 1560235 and performed a root cause analysis (RCA) on this. Improperly performed MSIV and MSV maintenance was a performance deficiency within PPLs ability to foresee and correct. This finding was considered more than minor because it was similar to IMC 0612, Appendix E, Examples 3.j and 3.k, in that a physical plant condition and subsequent engineering calculation resulted in a condition where there was reasonable doubt on the operability of a system or component, in this case secondary containment. Further, the performance deficiency affected the procedure quality and SSC and barrier performance attributes of the Barrier Integrity cornerstone and its objective to provide reasonable assurance that physical design barriers protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. In this case, lack of coordination resulted in a loss of reasonable assurance that secondary containment was operable. The issue screened to Green via IMC 0609, Attachment 4, since it did not represent a degradation of the barrier function of the control room, did not represent an actual open pathway in the physical integrity of reactor containment, and did not involve the actual reduction in function of hydrogen igniters in containment. The issue was determined to have a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance to plan and coordinate work activities, consistent with nuclear safety. In this case, the MSV and MSIV work activities were not coordinated amongst various departments to address the operational impact of sequence changes on plant configuration. |
| Site: | Susquehanna  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000387/2012003 Section 1R15 |
| Date counted | Jun 30, 2012 (2012Q2) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Barrier Integrity |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.15 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | T Burns S Hansell P Finney R Rolph H Gray P Krohn J Greives A Bolger |
| CCA | H.5, Work Management |
| INPO aspect | WP.1 |
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Finding - Susquehanna - IR 05000387/2012003 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Susquehanna) @ 2012Q2
Self-Identified List (Susquehanna)
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