05000387/FIN-2011005-08
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Licensee-Identified Violation |
| Description | On November 2, 2011, PPL identified that the full scope of a CREOASS system TS SR was not being met due to procedural deficiencies. Specifically, TS SR 3.3.7.1.5 requires a logic system functional test (LSFT) to be performed using procedures SE- 159-200, SE-030-002A, and SE-030-002B. The CREOASS system is a two train system (each with 100 percent capacity), normally with one train in Auto-Lead, and the second train in Auto-Standby. The LSFT verifies that on an actual or simulated initiation signal, each CREOASS train starts and operates. However, between September 2004 and November 2011, the CREOASS system was only tested in the Auto-Lead position per PPL procedures. PPL entered TS SR 3.0.3, performed a risk assessment, and took corrective action to perform a review of all procedures to ensure all aspects of CREOASS testing are being fully met and updated SE-159- 200, SE-030-002A, and SE-030-002B to include testing of the CREOASS system in Auto-Standby. The issue was determined to be a violation of Susquehanna Unit 1 TS 5.4.1, Procedures, which requires that written procedures be established, implemented and maintained as recommended in RG 1.33, Revision 2, Appendix A, February 1978. RG 1.33, Appendix A, requires implementing procedures for each SR listed in TSs. The finding is more than minor because it was determined to be similar to example 3.d of IMC 0612, Appendix E, in that the failure to implement the TS SR as required is not minor if the surveillance had not been conducted. Additionally, the finding affected the procedure quality attribute of not ensuring the control room barrier is maintained and the Barrier Integrity cornerstone and its objective to provide reasonable assurance that physical design barriers protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. The finding was evaluated for significance using IMC 0609, Attachment 4, Phase 1 Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings. Since the finding only represented a degradation of the radiological barrier function provided for the control room, the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green). The issue was entered into PPLs CAP as CR 1487546 and 1488400. |
| Site: | Susquehanna  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000387/2011005 Section 4OA7 |
| Date counted | Dec 31, 2011 (2011Q4) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Barrier Integrity |
| Identified by: | Licensee-identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | |
| Inspectors (proximate) | A Rosebrook C Crisden D Schroeder E Miller J Furia J Greives J Noggle K Modes P Finney P Krohn R Fuhrmeister S Ibarrola T Fish W Schmidt |
| INPO aspect | |
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Finding - Susquehanna - IR 05000387/2011005 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Susquehanna) @ 2011Q4
Self-Identified List (Susquehanna)
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