05000387/FIN-2011005-02
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Inadequate Operability Assessment of Suppression Pool Spray |
| Description | An NRC-identified Green NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, occurred when PPL did not perform an adequate operability assessment for a failed suppression pool (SP) spray flow indicator in accordance with Nuclear Department Administrative Procedure (NDAP)-QA-0703, Operability Assessments and Requests for Enforcement Discretion, Revision 15. The issue was entered into PPLs CAP as Condition Report (CR) 1478716. The finding is more than minor because it was similar to example 3.j in IMC 0612, Appendix E, Examples of Minor Issues in that an error in a calculation is not minor if the error results in reasonable doubt on the operability of the system or component. In this case, the error made in evaluating the operability of the SP spray mode of residual heat removal (RHR) operation resulted in the system subsequently being declared inoperable. Additionally, the error affected the structures, systems and components (SSCs) and barrier performance attribute of the Barrier Integrity cornerstone objective to provide reasonable assurance that physical design barriers (fuel cladding, reactor coolant system (RCS), and containment) protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. Specifically, one subsystem of SP spray was declared inoperable, constituting 62.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> of subsystem unavailability. The finding was evaluated for significance using IMC 0609, Attachment 4, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings. Since the finding was not a degradation of the barrier function of the control room against smoke or toxic gas, did not represent an actual open pathway of the physical integrity of containment, and did not involve an actual reduction in function of hydrogen ignitors in the reactor containment, the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green). This finding is related to the CCA of Problem Identification and Resolution (Pl&R) - CAP because PPL did not thoroughly evaluate problems such that the resolutions address the causes and extent of conditions, to include properly classifying, prioritizing and evaluating for operability. Specifically, PPL failed to appropriately evaluate the effect that an instrumentation failure had on the operability of the SP spray subsystem. |
| Site: | Susquehanna  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000387/2011005 Section 1R15 |
| Date counted | Dec 31, 2011 (2011Q4) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Barrier Integrity |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.15 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | A Rosebrook C Crisden D Schroeder E Miller J Furia J Greives J Noggle K Modes P Finney P Krohn R Fuhrmeister S Ibarrola T Fish W Schmidt |
| CCA | P.2, Evaluation |
| INPO aspect | PI.2 |
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Finding - Susquehanna - IR 05000387/2011005 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Susquehanna) @ 2011Q4
Self-Identified List (Susquehanna)
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