05000382/LER-2019-006, (Waterford 3), Unplanned Loss of Both Trains of Broad Range Gas Monitors Results in a Condition That Could Have Prevented Fulfillment of a Safety Function

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(Waterford 3), Unplanned Loss of Both Trains of Broad Range Gas Monitors Results in a Condition That Could Have Prevented Fulfillment of a Safety Function
ML19235A260
Person / Time
Site: Waterford Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 08/23/2019
From: Wood P
Entergy Operations
To:
Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
W3F1-2019-0055 LER 2019-006-00
Download: ML19235A260 (5)


LER-2019-006, (Waterford 3), Unplanned Loss of Both Trains of Broad Range Gas Monitors Results in a Condition That Could Have Prevented Fulfillment of a Safety Function
Event date:
Report date:
Reporting criterion: 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii)

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x)

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)
3822019006R00 - NRC Website

text

Entergy Operations, Inc.

17265 River Road Killona, LA 70057-3093 Tel (504) 464-3786 Paul Wood Manager, Regulatory Assurance 10 CFR 50.73 W3F1-2019-0055 August 23, 2019 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001 The enclosed report is being sent pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73.

This letter contains no new regulatory commitments.

If you have any questions or require additional information, please contact the Regulatory Assurance Manager, Paul Wood, at (504) 464-3786.

Respectfully, Paul Wood PW/jkb

Subject:

Licensee Event Report (LER) 2019-006-00 Unplanned Loss of Both Trains of Broad Range Gas Monitors Results in a Condition that Could Have Prevented Fulfillment of a Safety Function Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3 (Waterford 3)

NRC Docket No. 50-382 Renewed Facility Operating License No. NPF-38

Enclosure:

cc:

Waterford 3 Licensee Event Report 2019-006-00 NRC Region IV Regional Administrator NRC Senior Resident Inspector - Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3 NRR Project Manager

ENCLOSURE W3F1-2019-0055 Entergy Operations, Inc.

Waterford 3 Licensee Event Report 2019-006-00

NRC FORM 366 (04-2018)

NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (04-2018)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

(See Page 2 for required number of digits/characters for each block)

(See NUREG-1022, R.3 for instruction and guidance for completing this form http://www.nrc/gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/sr1022/r3/)

APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 03/31/2020

, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.

1. FACILITY NAME Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3
2. DOCKET NUMBER 05000382
3. PAGE 1 OF 3
4. TITLE Unplanned Loss of Both Trains of Broad Range Gas Monitors Results in a Condition that Could Have Prevented Fulfillment of a Safety Function
5. EVENT DATE
6. LER NUMBER
7. REPORT DATE
8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR SEQUENTIAL NUMBER REV NO.

MONTH DAY YEAR FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 06 25 2019 2019 -

006

- 00 08 23 2019 FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER
9. OPERATING MODE
11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check all that apply) 1 20.2201(b) 20.2203(a)(3)(i) 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 20.2201(d) 20.2203(a)(3)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 20.2203(a)(1) 20.2203(a)(4) 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A) 20.2203(a)(2)(i) 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(x)
10. POWER LEVEL 20.2203(a)(2)(ii) 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A) 73.71(a)(4) 100 20.2203(a)(2)(iii) 50.36(c)(2) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B) 73.71(a)(5) 20.2203(a)(2)(iv) 50.46(a)(3)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C) 73.77(a)(1) 20.2203(a)(2)(v) 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D) 73.77(a)(2)(i) 20.2203(a)(2)(vi) 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) 50.73(a)(2)(vii) 73.77(a)(5)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C)

OTHER Specify in Abstract below or in F.

SAFETY EVALUATION The objective of the Chemical Detection System during postulated accidents is to provide the capability to alarm and initiate a toxic gas detection signal in the event of a toxic gas event. For each train, the toxic gas detection signal is generated by either the chlorine detection monitor or the BRGM. BRGM A and B generate the signal for detection of a broad range of gases including ammonia. On detection of toxic gas, the toxic gas detection signal initiates control room isolation.

In this event, both BRGMs were inoperable, therefore causing a loss of safety function until the control room was isolated per TS 3.3.3.7.3. There are no other available systems or components that perform the same function as the Broad Range Gas Monitoring System. There were no toxic gas releases in the vicinity of Waterford 3 during the 13 minutes that both BRGM were inoperable. Therefore, no actual consequences to general safety of the public, nuclear safety, industrial safety or radiological safety were experienced during this event.

G.

PREVIOUS OCCURRENCES

A review of Waterford 3 condition reports for previous similar events over the past 3 years was performed.

LER 2018-002-00: Unplanned Loss of a Train of Control Room Outside Air Intake Radiation Monitors Results in a Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications. This condition was identified during an extent of condition review in response to LER 2018-001, "Failure to Enter Limiting Condition of Operation Action Statement due to Lack of Procedure Guidance Results in a Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications," to determine if there were other instances of misapplication of Surveillance Requirement 4.0.1 leading to a reportable condition.

On May 18, 2016, both BRGMs were declared inoperable and the Control Room required manual isolation in accordance with TS 3.3.3.7.3. The event was not reported in an Emergency Notification or a Licensee Event Report. CR-WF3-2019-6317 was generated to document the missed report.