05000382/LER-2012-001, Regarding Technical Specification for Containment Fan Cooler Minimum Cooling Flow Not Met
| ML12066A053 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Waterford  |
| Issue date: | 03/05/2012 |
| From: | Jacobs D Entergy Nuclear South |
| To: | Document Control Desk |
| References | |
| W3F1-2012-0008 LER 12-001-00 | |
| Download: ML12066A053 (6) | |
| Event date: | |
|---|---|
| Report date: | |
| Reporting criterion: | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function |
| 3822012001R00 - NRC Website | |
text
Entergy Nuclear South Entergy Operations, Inc.
17265 River Road
Killona, LA 70057-3093
- zEritemv c:y djacob2entergy.com Donna Jacobs Vice President
- - Operations Waterford 3 10 CFR 50.73 W3FI -2012-0008 March 5, 2012 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001
Subject:
Licensee Event Report 2012-001-00 Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3 (Waterford 3)
Docket No. 50-382 License No. NPF-38
Dear Sir or Madam:
Entergy is hereby submitting Licensee Event Report (LER) 2012-001-00 for Waterford Steam Electric Station Unit 3. This report provides details associated with exceeding a Technical Specification allowed outage time.
Based on plant evaluation, it was determined that this condition is reportable under I 0 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) requirements.
This report contains no new commitments. Please contact William J. Steelman at (504) 739-6685 if you have questions regarding this information.
Sincerely,
t? ACLc DJ/WH
Attachment:
Licensee Event Report 201 2-001-00
W3F1-2012-0008 Page 2 cc:
Mr. Elmo E. Collins, Jr.
Regional Administrator U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region IV 1600 E. Lamar Blvd.
Arlington, TX 76011-4511 RidsRgn4MailCenter@nrc.gov NRC Senior Resident Inspector Waterford Steam Electric Station Unit 3 P.O. Box 822 Killona, LA 70066-0751 Marlone.Davis@nrc.gov Dean.Overland@nrc.gov U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Mr. N. Kalyanam Mail Stop O-07D1 Washington, DC 20555-0001 Kaly.Kalyanam@nrc.gov INPO Records Center lerevents@inpo.org
Attachment to W3F1-2012-0008 Licensee Event Report 2012-001-00
NRC FORM 366 (10-2010)
NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (10-2010)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
(See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)
APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES 10/31/2013
, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.
- 3. PAGE Waterford 3 Steam Electric Station 05000 382 1 OF 3
- 4. TITLE Technical Specification for Containment Fan Cooler Minimum Cooling Flow Not Met
- 5. EVENT DATE
- 6. LER NUMBER
- 7. REPORT DATE
- 8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR SEQUENTIAL NUMBER REV NO MONTH DAY YEAR 05000 FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 01 05 2012 2012 - 001 - 00 03 05 2012 05000
- 9. OPERATING MODE
- 11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check all that apply) 20.2201(b) 20.2203(a)(3)(i) 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C) 50.73(a)(2)(vii) 20.2201(d) 20.2203(a)(3)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 20.2203(a)(1) 20.2203(a)(4) 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 1 20.2203(a)(2)(i) 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)
- 10. POWER LEVEL 20.2203(a)(2)(ii) 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(x) 20.2203(a)(2)(iii) 50.36(c)(2) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A) 73.71(a)(4) 20.2203(a)(2)(iv) 50.46(a)(3)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B) 73.71(a)(5) 20.2203(a)(2)(v) 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C) 100 20.2203(a)(2)(vi) 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)
OTHER Specify in Abstract below or in Later, while investigating minor changes in CCW flow to CFC, it was recognized that the performance of the regulators were degrading and they were replaced. No actual equipment failure occurred.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
The IA regulator was replaced. Engineering evaluated the preventive maintenance strategy for valve CC-835 components and established a replacement frequency for the air regulators.
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE
The safety related functions of CFC, as part of the Containment Cooling System (CCS), are to:
a. remove heat from the containment atmosphere following a loss of coolant (LOCA) or secondary system pipe rupture or main steam line break (MSLB) inside containment, b. maintain an acceptable containment pressure and temperature, and c. limit off site radiation dose by reducing the pressure differential between containment atmosphere and external environment.
The safety portion of the CFC is designed with two separate trains each consisting of two fan coolers. One fan cooler in a train of CFC is required to remove heat from the reactor containment building following any LOCA at 100% power in conjunction with a train of the Containment Spray System (CSS)[BE]. This heat is transferred to the ultimate heat sink via CCW. The CFCs are also designed to mitigate the consequences of a MSLB in conjunction with the CSS. The heat removal capacity of each train of CFC in conjunction with a train of CSS is sufficient to lower the containment pressure from peak value to half the peak value in 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> following a design basis accident.
The air operated valves CC-835A and CC-835B control CCW flow to their respective CFC and go full open (fail open) upon receipt of a SIAS to assure adequate CCW flow to the fan coolers during the increased heat load resulting from an accident.
The ability of Train B CFC to perform it safety function was evaluated in CR-WF3-2009-3405 when the low CCW flow condition during normal operation was found. With only CFC B in operation, CCW flow was approximately 950 gpm. The changing flow rates when securing and starting CFC D also indicated that CC-835B was moving freely. On a SIAS, CC-835B will fail open to provide full flow to the CFC, as is tested on an 18 month basis.
The status of Train A CFC was evaluated for the time period. No maintenance was performed on Train A CFC, leaving the train fully functional.
Based on the demonstrated ability of Train A and Train B CFC to perform their safety functions, the safety significance of the Train B CFC low CCW flow during normal operations is negligible.
SIMILAR EVENTS
Corrective action program data for past three years was searched for low CCW flow to CFC conditions. No similar conditions of TS low CCW to CFCs were found.
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
Energy industry identification system (EIIS) codes are identified in the text within brackets [ ].