05000382/LER-1996-001, :on 951107,TS 3.0.3 Entered Due to SIT Levels Reading High.Caused by Poor Work Practices.Cr Staff Immediately Lowered SIT Levels Until within Specified Range for Compliance W/Tss
| ML20134L523 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Waterford  |
| Issue date: | 11/16/1996 |
| From: | Dugger C, Laque J ENTERGY OPERATIONS, INC. |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| LER-96-001, LER-96-1, W3F1-96-0172, W3F1-96-172, NUDOCS 9611210060 | |
| Download: ML20134L523 (9) | |
| Event date: | |
|---|---|
| Report date: | |
| Reporting criterion: | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability |
| 3821996001R00 - NRC Website | |
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= Entergy Extergy Oper;tions, Inc.
Po. Box B x"' ".'^ 'o ee Tel 504-464-3120 Charlos M. Dugger General Managoi Plant Operations Waterford 3 W3F1-96-0172 A4.05 PR November 16,1996 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555
Subject:
Waterford 3 SES Docket No. 50-382 License No. NPF-38 Reporting of Licensee Event Report Gentlemen:
Attached is Licensee Event Report Number LER-96-001-01 for Waterford Steam Electric Station Unit 3. This revision documents more accurately the number of times when Safety injection Tank levels exceeded Technical Specification limits and by how much those limits were exceeded. This Licensee Event Report is submitted in accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B).
Very truly yours, C.M. Dugger General Manager r
Plant Operations
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CMD/WDM/tjs Attachment
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9611210060 961116 PDR ADOCK 05000382 8
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Reporting of Licensee Event Report (LER 96-001-01)
W3F1-96-0172 Page 2 November 16,1996 cc:
L.J. Callan, NRC Region IV C.P. Patel, NRC-NRR A.L. Garibaldi J.T. Wheelock - INPO Records Center R.B. McGehee N.S. Reynolds NRC Resident Inspectors Office Administrator - LRPD I
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NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION '
APPROVED BY OMB NO. 31504104 C3 EXPIRES 04/30/98 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY Wf7H THIS MANDATORV NFORMATION CDU.ECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. REPORTED LESSONS LEARNED AWE LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
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RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH IT8 F331, U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION.
(see reverse for required number of WASHNGTON, DC 205540001, AND TO THE PAPERWORl( REDUCTION PROJECT Q154 i
digits / characters for each block) 24), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.
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,Acurynaut m uoc m wuumit m Pace m WATERFORD STEAM ELECTRIC STATION UNIT 3 05000 382 1 OF 6 mum REVISION 1 TO ENTERING TECH. SPEC. 3.0.3 DUE TO SIT LEVELS READING HIGH EVENT DATE (5)
LER NUMBER (6)
REPORT DATE (7)
OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)
FACluTY NAME DOCKET NUMBER SEQU IAL REMS MONTH DAY YEAR TEAR MONTH DAY YEAR qg N/A 05000 f ACluTY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 11 07 95 96 ~
006 ~ 01 11 16 96 N/A 05000 OPERATING THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 6: (Check one or more) (11)
MODE (9) 1 20.2201(b) 20.2203(aH2)(v)
X 50.73(a)(2)(i) 50.73(a)(2)(vin) 20.2203(aH1) 20.2203(nH3)(i) 50.73(a)(2)(ii) 50.73(aH2)(x) l POWER LEVEL (10) 100 20.2203(aH2Hi) 20.2203(aH3Hn) 50.73c H2Hiii) 73.71 20.2203(a)(2)(n) 20.2203(a)(4) 50.73(a)(2)(iv)
OTHER 20.2203(a)(2)(ni) 50.36(c)(1) 50.73(a)(2Hv)
Sp ci Ab rect below 20.2203(a)(2)(iv) 50.36(c)(2) 50.73(a)(2)(vii)
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)
NAME TELLPHONE NUMBER lirioluce Area Codel J.M. LAQUE, SUPERINTENDENT.. SYSTEM ENGINEERING (504) 739-6630 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)
R ORTAB E R "
CAUSE
SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER
CAUSE
SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER 0 NPR SUPPLIMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)
WNM OAY MAR EXPECTED YES SUBMISSION NO (if yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE).
X DATE (15) j ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 eingle spaced typewntten knes) (16)
On November 7,1995, it was discovered that incorrect assumptions had been used in the Safety injection Tank (SIT) level transmitter calibration calculations (Refer to LER 95-005-00, j
dated 12/4/95). Charts were prepared for use by the Operations staff, to correlate actual wide and narrow range SIT levels with control board indications. Additionally, the instrumentation was re-calibrated in order to make the indication devices transparent to any errors in the transmitter calibrations. Subsequent to an independent review by ABB-CE, some calculation input assumptions were changed. On January 11,1996, during installation of a Temporary Alteration to correct the level indications, Technical Specification 3.0.3 was entered for approximately fourteen minutes, when it was determined that the Safety injection Tanks (SIT) 18 and 2B narrow range control board level indications were reading approximately 1% higher than the upper Technical Specification allowed value of 83.8%. The SIT's were immediately drained to within Technical Specification allowed values and declared operable. T.S. 3.0.3 was then exited. The root cause for this condition is attributed to changing calibration calculation input assumptions without prior consideration of the impact to indicated SIT levels. This event l
did not compromise the health and safety of the public.
NRC FORM 368 14951
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REQUIRED NUMBER OF DIGITS / CHARACTERS FOR EACH BLOCK BLOCK NUMBER OF TN NUMBER DIGITS / CHARACTERS 1
UP TO 46 FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 3 IN ADDIT TO 05000 3
VARIES PAGE NUMBER 4
UP TO 76 TITLE 5
EVENT DATE PER B OCK 7 TOTAL 2 FOR YEAR 6
LER NUMBER 3 FOR SEQUENTIAL NUMBER 2 FOR REVISION NUMBER 7
REPORT DATE 2 PER BLOCK UP TO 18 -- FACILITY NAME 8
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8 TOTAL - DOCKET NUMBER 3 IN ADDITION TO 05000 9
1 OPERATING MODE 10 3
POWER LEVEL I
OF 10 UR CHECK BOX THAT APPLIES W TO 50 FOR NAME 12 LICENSEE CONTACT 14 FOR TELEPHONE CAUSE VARIES 2 FOR SYSTEM 13 4 FOR COMPONENT EACH COMPONENT FAILURE 4 FOR MANUFACTURER NPRDS VARIES CHECK BOX THAT APPLIES
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15 EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE 2 PER BLOCK
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$U.S. NUCLEAR RE20LATORY COhA4BSSION wesi LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAhE nl DOCKET LER NUhmER (6)
PAGE (3)
NU R NUMB l
WATERFORD STEAM ELECTRIC STATION UNIT 3 382 96 - 001
- - 01 2
6 TEXT lit more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) n1)
REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE On January 11,1996, at 1400, it was determined that the Safety injection Tanks (SIT) 18 and 2B (Ells Identifier BP-TK) narrow range level indications (Ells Identifier NA-BP-LI) were approx.1% higher than the upper Technical Specification allowed value of 83.8% When it was noted that the levels were higher than the Technical Specification allowed, the SIT's were declared inoperable and Technical Specification 3.0.3 was entered. The SIT's were immediately drained to within Technical Specification allowed values and then declared operable. Technical Specification 3.0.3 was then exited at 1414 hours0.0164 days <br />0.393 hours <br />0.00234 weeks <br />5.38027e-4 months <br />. This is reportable as a Technical Specification prohibited operation or condition under the provisions of 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B).
INITIAL CONDITIONS At the time this condition was identified, Waterford 3 was operating in MODE 1 at approximately 100 percent power. There was no major equipment out of service specific to this event and no Technical Specification Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCOs) were in effect specific to this event at the time this condition was discovered.
EVENT DESCRIPTION
On November 7,1995, it was discovered that an incorrect density value for borated water and an inconsistent temperature assumption had been used in the SIT level transmitter calibration calculations (Refer to LER 95-005, dated 12/4/95). As an immediate corrective action, charts were prepared to correlate actual wide and narrow range SIT levels with indicated levels. This chart also included compensations for all errors identified in the Safety injection Tank narrow range calibration calculation.
As part of the corrective action for Condition Reports 95-1126 and 95-1144, which were generated to investigate inconsistencies or errors in the calibrations performed on Rosemount differential pressure type transmitters, the instrumentation loop was re-calibrated to compensate for all errors introduced in the SIT narrow range level loops.
MC FORM 3004 M86)
.U.G. NUCLEAR REaULATORY COMMISSION MOSI LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION FACalJTY NAME (1)
DOCKET LER NUMBER (6)
PAGE (3)
NU R NUM 0 00 WATERFORD STEAM ELECTRIC STATION UNIT 3 96 - 001 - 01 3
6 TEXT (11 more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)
This also made the indication devices transparent to any errors in the transmitter calibrations. As part of this effort, the calculations were sent to ABB-CE for independent review and verification. In the discussions with ABB-CE and in the development of the revised SIT level calculation, certain input criteria and assumptions were changed. Below is a listing of the changes:
Previous Calculation Current Calculation Process Temperature 120 degrees F 115 degrees F Process Pressure 624.7 psig 612.5 psig SlT Botation 2300 ppm 2200 ppm impulse Leg Borated Water Demin. Water (Assumed)
(Assumed)
Solution Specific Gravity Calc. Method W3 method ABB-CE Method it is important to note that, although the input assumptions and values were changed to more accurately reflect the conditions seen by the level transmitters, the original instrumentation calibration calculation was not incorrect. The new assumptions provided by ABB-CE were better suited for the system conditions.
As part of the corrective actions for this event, Temporary Alteration 95-022 was installed to correct the induced error in the SIT level transmitters. The Temporary Alteration consisted of a recalibration of the Process Analog Control (PAC) portion of the SIT level instrumentation loop within their allowable limits. The Process Analog Control portion of the loop is located outside of the Containment, therefore this Temporary Alteration would preclude personnel from receiving the radiation exposure and heat stress associated with entering the Containment at power. It should be noted, however, that the local level transmitters will be recalibrated and the Temporary Alteration removed, when the transmitters can be accessed without undue exposure, at a later date.
NRC 70RM 306A M951
1 NRC FORM 348A-UA NUCLEAR REaULATORY CnumamON M88 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION FACIUTY NAhE 0) l DOCKET LER NUhmER (6)
PAGE (3)
I382 muMn E
WATERFORD STEAM ELECTRIC STATION UNIT 3 96 -- 001 01 4
6 TEXT (It more space is required, une additional copies of NRC Form 366A) 0 7)
During the installation of Temporary Alteration 95-022, when the first instrument loop was recalibrated, the Control Room staff noticed that the SIT level did not drop the expected approximate 2.5% but actually dropped approximately 1.0 %. After consultation with engineering personnel it was concluded that the indication difference was due to the revised calibration calculation input assumptions. The majority of the difference was a result of changing an input assumption to demineralized water in the impulse leg of the transmitter vice borated water. With this new information, Operations personnel determined that the actual water levels in SITS 1B & 2B were approximately 1% over the Technical Specification limits. Technical Specification (TS) 3.0.3 was entered and the levels in SITS 1B and 2B were immediately lowered to an acceptable level. Technical Specification 3.0.3 was then exited.
l CAUSAL FACTORS The root cause for this event is attributed to poor work practices in that, when the i
calibration calculation input assumptions were changed it was not identified that the data in the charts / tables provided to the Operations staff would also be affected.
IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE MEASURES The control room staff immediately lowered the SIT levels until they were within specified ranges for compliance with Technical Specifications.
Temporary Alteration 95-022 was installed to correct the induced error in the SIT level transmitters. The Process Analog Control portion of the level measurement loops were recalibrated, thus allowing the level measurement loops to respond normally.
ACTIONS TO PoAVENT RECURRENCE The event was reviewed with personnel of the Calibration Task Force, assembled pursuant to the corrective actions of LER 95-05-00, to stress the need to identify all I
affected equipment prior to revising assumptions.
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COhMSSION M
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NARE (1)
DOCKET LER NUhWER (6)
PAGE(3) 05000 OF WATERFORD STEAM ELECTRIC STATION '.? NIT 3-382 96 001 - 01 5
6 TEXT (N more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17l This_ event was reviewed with Engineering personnel as part of Engineering Suppert Personnel (ESP) Continuing Training stressing the need to identify all affected equipment and procedures prior to revising calculation assumptions.
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE
On August 15,1995, ABB/CE issued a new Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) Safety -
nalysis to Waterford, ST-95-0468, to aid with a Technical Specification submittal which requests permission to expand the Waterford 3 Safety injection tank level and pressure Technical Specification ranges. The analysis, which analyzed the SIT's for the worst case conditions, used for its major design inputs a Minimum level of 36.1%, Maximum level of 87.5%, Minimum pressure 558.7 psia, and Maximum pressure of 695.7 psia.
l This analysis concluded that, over the ranges of level and pressure and for the worst l
case conditions of maximum level and minimum pressure, the ECCS performance for l
the SIT's is acceptable.
In summary, due to changes in input assumptions for the calibration calculations for SIT narrow range levels, two (2) SITS were found to be approximately 1.0% above the Technical Specification allowable limit of 83.8%. The appropriate LCOs were entered and the SIT levels were brought into the limits and the LCOs were exited within fourteen minutes. A review was conducted of Control Room Technical Specification j
logs between November 7,1995, when operators were provided with charts to correlate
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actual SIT levels with indicated values, and January 11,1996, when Temporary Alteration 95-022 was installed and Technical Specification 3.0.3 was entered. This I
review revealed that the maximum amount the actual level exceeded the Technical Specification limit was less than 1.1 percent. An analysis performed by ABB/CE in support of Waterford 3's Technical Specification level change request, indicates that there is an additional margin of greater than 2.0 percent over the maximum SIT level reached during that time period. There were 51 occasions when the actual level, considering all uncertainties, exceeded the Technical Specification maximum limit. On 20 of those occasions, there was one tank with an actuallevel greater than the me =u mm m
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eU.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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1401ll LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION FACil3TY NAME (1)
DOCKET LER NUMBER (6)
PAGE (3)
I NU B R NUM 05 WATERFORD STEAM ELECTRIC STATION UNIT 3 2
96 -- 001 01 6
6 TEXT (11 more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)
Technical Specification limit. On 31 occasions, two tanks exceeded the Technical Specification limit simultaneously. While Technical Specification limits were exceeded, the ABB/CE analysis limits were not, therefore Waterford 3 was not placed in an unanalyzed condition. The ECCS performance for the SIT's for both a small break l
LOCA and a large break LOCA would remain acceptable. The SIT's could have performed their safety function without compromising the health and safety of the
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public.
SIMILAR EVENTS
There have been no similar events reported as LERs at Waterford 3.
NAC FORM 308A 148til