05000354/LER-2013-005, Regarding Low-Low Set Safety/Relief Valve Pilot Solenoid Operated Valve Failed As-Found Testing

Regarding Low-Low Set Safety/Relief Valve Pilot Solenoid Operated Valve Failed As-Found Testing

ML13352A356
Person / Time
Site:	Hope Creek
Issue date:	12/17/2013
From:	Carr E Public Service Enterprise Group
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
LR-N13-0291 LER 13-005-00
Download: ML13352A356 (5)

LER-2013-005, Regarding Low-Low Set Safety/Relief Valve Pilot Solenoid Operated Valve Failed As-Found Testing

Event date:
Report date:
Reporting criterion:	10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function
3542013005R00 - NRC Website

text

PSEG Nuclear LLC P.O. Box 236, Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038-0236 DEC

• 7 2013 LR-N13-0291 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-001 Hope Creek Generating Station Unit 1 11SE:Ci Nuclear LLC 10CFR50.73 Renewed Facility Operating License No. NPF-57 Docket No. 50-354

Subject:

Licensee Event Report 2013-005-00 In accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), PSEG Nuclear LLC is submitting Licensee Event Report (LER) Number 2013-005-00, "Low-Low Set Safety/Relief Valve Pilot Solenoid Operated Valve Failed As-Found Testing."

If you have any questions or require additional information, please contact Mr. Paul Bonnett at (856) 339-1923.

There are no regulatory commitments contained in this letter.

Sincerely, Eric S. Carr Plant Manager Hope Creek Generating Station Attachment: Licensee Event Report 2013-005-00

DEC 1* 1 2013 LR-N13-0291 Page 2 of 2 cc:

W. Dean, Regional Administrator-Region I, NRC J. Hughey, Project Manager - US NRG NRC Senior Resident Inspector - Hope Creek (X24)

P. Mulligan, Manager, NJBNE P. Bonnett - Hope Creek Commitment Tracking Coordinator (H02)

L. Marabella - Corporate Commitment Tracking Coordinator (N21) 10CFR50.73

NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 10/31/2013 (10-2010)

Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request:

80 hours9.259259e-4 days <br />0.0222 hours <br />1.322751e-4 weeks <br />3.044e-5 months <br />. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the Records LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) and FOIA/Prlvacy Service Branch (T-5 F53), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by internet e-mail to infocollects@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used (See reverse for required number of to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to digits/characters for each block) respond to, the Information collection.

3. PAGE Hope Creek Generating Station 05000354 1

OF3

4. TITLE Low-Low Set Safety/Relief Valve Pilot Solenoid Operated Valve Failed As-Found Testing

5. EVENT DATE

6. LER NUMBER

7. REPORT DATE

8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED SEQUENTIAL REV FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR NUMBER NO.

MONTH DAY YEAR N/A FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 10 18 2013 2013

- 005 00 12 17 2013 N/A

9. OPERATING MODE

11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR§: (Check all that apply)

D 20.2201(b)

D 20.2203(a)(3)(i) 0 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C)

D 50.73(a)(2)(vii) 5 D 20.2201(d)

D 20.2203(a)(3)(ii)

D 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A)

D 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)

D 20.2203(a)(1)

D 20.2203(a)(4) 0 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B)

D 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)

D 20.2203(a)(2)(i)

D 50.36(c)(1 )(i)(A)

D so.73(a)(2)(iii)

D 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)

10. POWER LEVEL D 20.2203(a)(2)(ii)

D 50.36(c)(1 )(ii)(A)

D 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)

D 50.73(a)(2)(x)

D 20.2203(a)(2)(iii)

D so.36(c)(2)

D 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A)

D 73.71(a)(4)

D 20.2203(a)(2)(iv)

D so.46(a)(3)(ii)

D 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B)

D 73.71(a)(5) 0 D 20.2203(a)(2)(v)

D 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A)

D 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C) 0 OTHER D 20.2203(a)(2)(vi)

[8J 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)

D 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)

Specify in Abstract below or in

CAUSE OF EVENT

6. LER NUMBER YEAR I SEQUENTIAL I REVISION NUMBER NUMBER 2013 005 00

3. PAGE 3 OF3 The cause of the failure of solenoid valve (S/N 481) was determined to be a manufacturer's assembly error. The external vendor found that the anti-rotation pin that secures the adjustable plunger was not installed. Without the pin, the plunger was allowed to rotate and unthread until contacting the internal stop, which prevented the solenoid from picking up when energized. The solenoid coil was in good condition; there was no indication of an internal short. The SOV was reassembled with the plunger re-threaded in place. With the valve body installed back on the solenoid, the SOV could be operated. HCGS determined from the results of the failure analysis that the failure of this SOV occurred at some point during the operating cycle.

SAFETY CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS

The safety consequences of this occurrence are minimal. The basis of the Low-Low Set function is to ensure that the safety/relief valve discharges are minimized for a second opening of SRVs following any overpressure transient. This is achieved by automatically lowering the closing and opening setpoints of two SRVs. In this way, the frequency and magnitude of the containment blowdown duty cycle is substantially reduced. The failed SOV affected SRV-P; however, the SRV-H remained operable. With the SRV-H operable, the low-low set function remained available. Further, the SOV for the SRV-H was satisfactorily tested by NWS on October 18, 2013; therefore, SRV-H was capable of fulfilling its safety function. Sufficient redundancy is provided for the low-low set system such that failure of any one valve to open or close at its reduced setpoint does not violate the design basis.

The failure of the SOV did not impact the automatic safety valve function of the SRV-P based on SRV-P as-found pilot valve testing completed on November 22, 2013. SRV-P is an 1120 PSIG set pressure safety relief valve, which tested satisfactory in H1R18 with an as-found setpoint of 1152 PSIG (+2.9%).

SAFETY SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL FAILURE A review of this condition determined that a Safety System Functional Failure (SSFF) as defined in NEI 99-02, "Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guidelines," did not occur. This condition did not prevent the ability of a system to fulfill its safety function to either shutdown the reactor, remove residual heat, control the release of radioactive material, or mitigate the consequences of an accident.

PREVIOUS EVENTS A review of events at Hope Creek for the past five years was performed to determine if a similar event had occurred. No events involving the failure of the SOV associated with an SRV pilot valve was identified.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

1.

The solenoid operated valve associated with the SRV-P pilot valve was replaced.

COMMITMENTS

This LER contains no regulatory commitments.

NRG FORM 366 (10-2010)

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