05000354/LER-2005-008, Regarding Technical Specification Shutdown Due to B Suppression Chamber to Drywell Vacuum Breaker Not Closed
| ML053110266 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hope Creek |
| Issue date: | 10/27/2005 |
| From: | Massaro M Public Service Enterprise Group |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| LR-N05-0525 LER 05-008-00 | |
| Download: ML053110266 (4) | |
| Event date: | |
|---|---|
| Report date: | |
| Reporting criterion: | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications |
| 3542005008R00 - NRC Website | |
text
-Z.
PSEG Nuclear LLC P.O. Box 236, Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038-0236 PSEG LR-N05-0525 ATuclearLLC OCT 2 7 2005 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 LER 354/05-008-00 HOPE CREEK GENERATING STATION FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-57 DOCKET NO. 50-354 This Licensee Event Report entitled, "Technical Specification Shutdown Due to 'B' Torus to Drywell Vacuum Breaker Not Closed," is being submitted pursuant to the requirement of 1 OCFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(A).
Sincerely, Michael J. Mbssaro Plant Manager - Hope Creek Attachment BJT C
Distribution LER File 3.7 4Z--
95-2168 REV. 7/99
NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIO APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 0613012007 6-2004)
, the NRC may e fr ea not conduct or sponsor, and a person Is not required to respond to. the digits/characters for each block)
W-fi-
_ ^-6
- 3. PAGE Hope Creek Generating Station 05000354 1 OF 3
- 4. TITLE Technical Specification Shutdown Due to 'B' Suppression Chamber to Drywell Vacuum Breaker Not Closed
- 5. EVENT DATE
- 6. LER NUMBER
- 7. REPORT DATE
- 8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED R FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR SUEN R
N Y
FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 08 28 2005 2005 - 008 -
00 10 27 2005
- 9. OPERATING MODE
- 11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR§: (Check all that apply) 0 20.2201(b) 0 20.2203(a)(3)(i) 0 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C) 0 50.73(a)(2)(vii) 1 0 20.2201(d) 0 20.2203(a)(3)(ii) a 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A) 0 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 0 20.2203(a)(1) 0 20.2203(a)(4) 0 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B) 0 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) o 20.2203(a)(2)(i) 0 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A) 0 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 0 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)
- 10. POWER LEVEL 0 20.2203(a)(2)(ii) 0 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A) 0 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) 0 50.73(a)(2)(x) 0 20.2203(a)(2)(iii) l 50.36(c)(2) 0 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A)
E 73.71 (a)(4) 0 20.2203(a)(2)(iv) 0 50.46(a)(3)(ii) 0 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B) 0 73.71(a)(5) 100 0 20.2203(a)(2)(v) 0 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A) 0 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C) 0 OTHER 0 20.2203(a)(2)(vi) 0 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) 0 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)
Specify In Abstract below nr In NRr. Fnrm ARRA
- 12. LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER FACILITY NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER (Indude Area Code)
Brian Thomas, Licensing Engineer 856-339-2022CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANU-l REPORTABLE
CAUSE
SYSTEM COMPONENT MANU-REPORTABLE YS AB G0 ACTURER TO EPIX FACTURER TO EPIX X
lBF lVACB lG202 l
Y i
- 14. SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED 1.EXPECTED MONTH DAY YEAR SUBMISSION 0 YES (Ifyes, complete 15. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) 0 NO DATE ABSTRACT (Umit to 1400 spaces, Le., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines)
On August 28,2005, at 0325 hours0.00376 days <br />0.0903 hours <br />5.373677e-4 weeks <br />1.236625e-4 months <br />, the 'B' drywell to suppression chamber vacuum breaker {BF) indication was observed to cycle from closed to intermediate open. Attempts made to close the vacuum breaker from the control room and to establish a differential pressure between the drywell and suppression chamber were not successful.
Technical Specification 3.6.4.1.b states, "with one or more suppression chamber-drywell vacuum breaker not closed, close the vacuum breaker within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />; or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />." Due to the 'B' drywell to suppression chamber vacuum breaker not remaining closed, a plant shutdown was commenced at 1200 hours0.0139 days <br />0.333 hours <br />0.00198 weeks <br />4.566e-4 months <br />. At 1715 hours0.0198 days <br />0.476 hours <br />0.00284 weeks <br />6.525575e-4 months <br />, Operational Condition 3 was entered (HOT SHUTDOWN). On August 29, 2005, at 0933 hours0.0108 days <br />0.259 hours <br />0.00154 weeks <br />3.550065e-4 months <br />, Operational Condition 4 (COLD SHUTDOWN) was entered.
The cause of the 'B' drywell to suppression chamber vacuum breaker failure to remain closed is attributed to a loose locknut on the left hand side latch plate self-aligning screw. The 'B' vacuum breaker was repaired and inspection of the remaining suppression pool vacuum breakers was performed. Maintenance procedures will be revised and training will be provided to appropriate maintenance personnel.
This event is being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(A) "the completion of any nuclear plant shutdown required by the Technical Specifications.'
NRC FORM 366 (6-2004)
I
?_U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (1-2001)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
FACILITY NAME (1)
DOCKET (2)
LER NUMBER (6)
PAGE (3)
SEQUENTIAL REVISION T
NUMBER NUMBER Hope Creek Generating Station 05000354 2 OF 3 12005 008 00 l
TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)
PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION
General Electric - Boiling Water Reactor (BWR/4)
Suppression Chamber to Drywell Vacuum Breakers - {BF/-}*
- Energy Industry Identification System {EIIS) codes and component function identifier codes appear as {SS/CCC)
IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE Event Date: August 28, 2005 Discovery Date: August 28, 2005 CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE Hope Creek was in operational condition 1 with reactor power at approximately 100% prior to the shutdown. There was no other equipment out of service that contributed to this event.
DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE On August 28, 2005, at 0325 hours0.00376 days <br />0.0903 hours <br />5.373677e-4 weeks <br />1.236625e-4 months <br />, the 'B' drywell to suppression chamber vacuum breaker {BFNACBI indication was observed to cycle from closed to intermediate open. Attempts made to close the vacuum breaker from the control room and to establish a differential pressure between the drywell and suppression chamber were not successful. Technical Specification 3.6.4.1.b states, 'with one or more suppression chamber-drywell vacuum breaker not closed, close the vacuum breaker within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />; or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />." Due to the 'B' drywell to suppression chamber vacuum breaker not remaining closed, a plant shutdown was commenced at 1200 hours0.0139 days <br />0.333 hours <br />0.00198 weeks <br />4.566e-4 months <br />. At 1715 hours0.0198 days <br />0.476 hours <br />0.00284 weeks <br />6.525575e-4 months <br />, Operational Condition 3 was entered (HOT SHUTDOWN). On August 29, 2005, at 0933 hours0.0108 days <br />0.259 hours <br />0.00154 weeks <br />3.550065e-4 months <br />, Operational Condition 4 (COLD SHUTDOWN) was entered.
The 'B' drywell to suppression chamber vacuum breaker is a GPE CONTROLS model LD-240-447 vacuum breaker.
This event is being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(A) "the completion of any nuclear plant shutdown required by the Technical Specifications."
CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE The cause of the 'B' drywell to suppression chamber vacuum breaker failure to remain closed is attributed to a loose locknut on the left hand side latch plate self-aligning screw. This allowed the vacuum breaker latch plate to displace towards the magnet assembly causing a misalignment between the left and right hand side magnet assemblies when the valve pallet neared the full closed position. As a result of this misalignment, the magnetic force was not sufficient to fully close the valve. The apparent cause of the misalignment was the result of historical inadequate maintenance work practices in that the latch plate installation and verification were not performed correctly.
- 4.
.U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (1.2001)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
FACILITY NAME (1)
DOCKET (2)
LER NUMBER (6)
PAGE (3)
SEQUENTIAL REVISION lYEAR NUMBER NUMBER Hope Creek Generating Station 05000354 3 OF 3 2005 008 00
PREVIOUS OCCURRENCES
A review of past events at Hope Creek identified the following events associated with suppression chamber vacuum breakers: LERs 354/86-056, 354192-006, and 354/95-031. LER 354/86-056 reported a manual plant shutdown due to a design deficiency with the reactor building to suppression chamber vacuum breaker tubing for the differential pressure transmitter. LER 354/92-006 reported a manual plant shutdown due to the suppression chamber being inoperable when the bypass leakage test for the vacuum breakers failed. The probable causes of the increased leakage through the vacuum breakers were attributed to seal alignment, seal aging and pallet alignment. The alignment pins for the hinge arm were found to be sheared causing the pallet mis-alignment. LER 354/95-031 reported a manual plant shutdown as the result of the inability to establish initial test conditions to perform surveillance requirement 4.6.2.1 due to bypass leakage of the suppression chamber vacuum breakers. The apparent cause was that one or more of the suppression chamber vacuum breakers experienced bypass leakage. Corrective actions for these LERs were specific to the events and would not have prevented the current event from occurring.
SAFETY CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS
The misalignment of the 'B' suppression chamber to drywell vacuum breaker magnet assemblies impaired the ability of the vacuum breaker pallet to fully close without differential pressure between the suppression chamber and drywell compartments. An engineering review of the misalignment determined that the 'B' suppression chamber to drywell vacuum breaker would have closed for all licensing basis breaks for which pressure suppression is needed. Therefore, all eight suppression chamber to drywell vacuum breakers were available and capable of performing their design basis function.
Based on the above, there was no impact to the health and safety of the public.
A review of this event determined that a Safety System Functional Failure (SSFF) has not occurred as defined in Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 99-02. The 'B' drywell to suppression pool vacuum breaker was capable of performing its design basis function.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
- 1. The 'B' suppression chamber to drywell vacuum breaker was inspected, repaired and retested satisfactory.
- 2. The other seven suppression chamber to drywell vacuum breakers were inspected. The locknuts and self aligning screws for the latch plates for the 'A', 'D', 'E', 'F', 'G', and 'H' vacuum breakers were found to be properly tightened.
The locknuts and self aligning screws for the latch plate for the "C' vacuum breaker were found to be loose. The fasteners for all eight vacuum breakers were properly tightened and the as-left opening setpoints were tested satisfactory.
- 3. The two reactor building to suppression pool vacuum breakers were visually inspected. One vacuum breaker was satisfactory and the other vacuum breaker was found to have loose alignment screws. Repairs were made to the vacuum breaker
- 4.
Maintenance procedures HC.MD-ST.GS-0001,"Torus to Drywell Relief Valve 18-Month Testing, " and HC.MD-CM.GS-0002, "Drywell to Torus and Torus to Reactor Building Vacuum Relief Valve Overhaul," will be revised to include supervisory hold points for critical steps. In addition, procedure HC.MD-CM.GS-0002 will be revised to require validation and documentation for latch plate alignment and to ensure screws are properly secured.
- 5. Training will be provided to the appropriate maintenance personnel prior to the next refueling outage on the changes to procedures HC.MD-ST.GS-0001 and HC.MD-CM.GS-0002.
These actions are being tracked in accordance with PSEG's corrective action program.
COMMITMENTS
This LER contains no commitments.