05000354/FIN-2013002-01
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Finding | |
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| Title | A Technical Specification Surveillance Procedure for Remote Shutdown Panel Instrumentation was Inadequately Implemented |
| Description | A self-revealing NCV of very low safety significance of technical specification (TS) 6.8.1 and TS 3.3.7.4 resulted because PSEG did not properly perform the monthly TS surveillance requirement (SR) 4.3.7.4.1 which demonstrates operability of the remote shutdown system instrumentation and controls. Specifically, operators that performed the monthly surveillance did not identify that the reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) turbine bearing oil pressure low indication was inoperable and, as a result, PSEG did not take the action required within the TS allowed outage time. PSEGs immediate corrective actions included entering the issue into their corrective action program as notifications 20567832 and 20567743, replacing the failed relay and initiating an apparent cause evaluation (ACE). This finding is more than minor because it is associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability and reliability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, when tested, the RCIC turbine bearing oil pressure low indication on the remote shutdown panel (RSP) was inoperable, and this condition went undetected for approximately one month. In accordance with IMC 0609.04, Initial Characterization of Findings, and Exhibit 2 of IMC 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process for Findings At-Power, issued June 19, 2012, the inspectors determined that this finding is of very low safety significance (Green) because the performance deficiency was not a design or qualification deficiency, did not involve an actual loss of safety function, did not represent actual loss of a safety function of a single train for greater than its TS allowed outage time, and did not screen as potentially risk-significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. The NRC determined the finding had a cross cutting aspect in the human performance area associated with work practices procedural compliance, because PSEG did not ensure that personnel work practices support human performance, in that, a licensed reactor operator (RO) incorrectly documented HC.OPST.SV0001 as satisfactory. Additionally, the senior reactor operator (SRO) that reviewed the test did not identify the procedure performance error. |
| Site: | Hope Creek  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000354/2013002 Section 4OA3 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2013 (2013Q1) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71153 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | S Barr G Dentel J Laughlin F Bower E Burket S Ibarrola B Scrabeck |
| Violation of: | Technical Specification - Procedures Technical Specification |
| CCA | H.8, Procedure Adherence |
| INPO aspect | WP.4 |
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Finding - Hope Creek - IR 05000354/2013002 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Hope Creek) @ 2013Q1
Self-Identified List (Hope Creek)
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