In Modes 1, 2, and 3, Hope Creek
TS 3.4.2.1,
Safety Relief Valves, requires that 13 of the 14
SRVs open within +/-3 percent of the specified code safety valve function lift settings or else be in Mode 3 within
12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and in Mode 4 within the next
24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. Contrary to this requirement, between May 10 and May 11, 2011,
PSEG identified that six of the 14
SRVs were determined to have their as-found setpoints in excess of the TS allowable tolerance, thus leaving eight
operable SRVs. The pilot assembly for each of the 14
SRVs was replaced with a fully tested spare assembly. Additionally,
LER 05000354/2012-004-00 stated
PSEGs proposal to replace the
SRVs is being considered through the plant modification process.
PSEG entered this issue into their corrective action program as notification 20559112. The finding documents the inoperability of six
SRVs that did not result in a loss of system safety function based on engineering analyses that showed that postulated piping stresses would not exceed allowable limits. Therefore, this finding is of very low safety significance (Green) based on a
SDP issue screening, because the
SRVs would have functioned to prevent a reactor vessel over-pressurization. The LER associated with the event is documented in Section 4OA3.2.
