05000348/LER-2003-001, From Joseph M. Farley, Unit 1 Regarding Missing Safeguards Information Procedures
| ML031200346 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Farley  |
| Issue date: | 04/28/2003 |
| From: | Beasley J Southern Nuclear Operating Co |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| NL-03-0948 LER-03-001-00 | |
| Download: ML031200346 (4) | |
| Event date: | |
|---|---|
| Report date: | |
| 3482003001R00 - NRC Website | |
text
J. Barnie Beasley, Jr., P.E.
Vice President Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.
40 Inverness Center Parkway Post Office Box 1295 Birmingham, Alabama 35201 Tel 205.992.7110 Fax 205.992.0341 SOUTHERNA COMPANY Energy to Serve Your World' NL-03-0948 April 28, 2003 Docket No.:
50-348 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATIN: Document Control Desk Washington, D. C. 20555-0001 Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant - Unit 1 Licensee Event Report 2003-001-00 Missing Safeguards Information Procedure Ladies and Gentlemen:
Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant - Licensee Event Report (LER) No. 2003-001-00 is being submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 73 Appendix G paragraph I.(c).
This letter contains no NRC commitments. If you have any questions, please advise.
Sincerely, JBBIWAS/sdl
Enclosure:
cc:
Southern Nuclear Operating Company Mr. J. D. Woodard, Executive Vice President Mr. D. E. Grissette, General Manager - Plant Farley Document Services RTYPE: CFAO4.054; LC# 13775 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mr. L. A. Reyes, Regional Administrator Mr. F. Rinaldi, NRR Project Manager - Farley Mr. T. P. Johnson, Senior Resident Inspector - Farley
1-1"y
NR OM36US ULA EUAOYAPPROVED BY OMBNO. 3150-104 EXPIRES 6-30-2001 NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY
, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a digitstcharacters for each block) person Is not reqiired to respond to, the Information collection.
FACILITY NAME (1)
DOCKET NUMBER (2)
PAGE (3)
Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant - Unit 1 05000 348 1 OF 3
TnTLE(4)
Missing Safeguards Information Procedure EVENT DATE (5)
LER NUMBER (6)
REPORT DATE (7)
OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8) llFACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER SEQUENTIAL REV MO DAY YEAR YEAR I NUMBER NO MO DAY YEAR Farley Unit 2 05000364 03 31 2003 2003 001 0
04 28 2003 FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER OPERATING THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check all Ihat apply) (11)
MODE (9) 1 20.2201(b) 20.2203(aX3Xii) 5O.73(aX2XiiXB) 50.73(aX2XixXA)
POWER 20.2201(d) 20.2203(aX4) 50.73(aX2Xiii) 50.73(aX2Xx)
LEVEL(_IO)_____20.2203(aXl)
_ 50.36(CX1XiXA) 50.73(aX2XivXA)
_ 73.71(aX4) 20.2203(aX2Xi) 5_ 0.36(cXIXIiXA) 5O.73(aX2XvXA) 73.71(aX5) 20.2203(aX2Xii) 50.36(cX2) 50.73(aX2XvXB)
X OTHER 20.2203(aX2Xiii) 50.46(aX3Xii) 50.73(aX2XvXC)
Specify in Abstract below or in 20.2203(aX2XIv) 50.73(aX2XiXA)
_50.73(aX2XvXD)
NRC Forrn 366A 20.2203(aX2Xv) 50.73(aX2XiXB) 50.73(aX2xvii) 20.2203(aX2)(vi) 50.73(aX2XiXC) 50.73(aX2XviiiXA) 20.2203(aX3XI) 50.73(aX2Xii)(A) 50.73(aX2XviiiXB)
_UCENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)
NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code)
- 0. E. Grissette, General Manager Nucear Plant 334-899-5156 COMPLETE ONE LNE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)
C MANU-REPORTABLE COMPONENT MANU-REPORTABLE
CAUSE
SYSTEM COMPONENT FACTURER lTO EP
CAUSE
lSYSTEM COMPONENT FACTURER TO EPX SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)
EXPECTED IONiTH YEAR SUBMISSION YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATEk X
NO DATE (15)
ABSTRACT (Unfitto 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16)
This report is submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 73 Appendix G paragraph I.(c).
At 1625 on March 31, 2003, it was discovered that a controlled copy of a Safeguards Information (SGI) procedure, FNP SP-36 entitled "Plant Security Computer System and Central Alarm Station/Secondary Alarm Station Operations," was missing from the Central Alarm Station (CAS). At 1702, a one hour telephone notification of this event to the NRC Operations Center was made. A thorough search of all appropriate areas and all Security paper work for the month of March failed to locate the document. The last time the procedure was known to be in the CAS, prior to this event, was on March 3, 2003, at approximately 1200, when an FNP security officer remembered using it in the CAS. Interviews regarding the missing procedure were conducted with all personnel who entered the CAS from March 3, 2003 to March 31, 2003 without locating the procedure or producing any additional information regarding its location. It was determined that only SNC personnel had entered the CAS during this time period. The most likely cause of this event is failure to follow procedure.
The governing procedure states, "SGI is required to be under the control of an authorized individual while it is in use to preclude unauthorized disclosure to persons who do not have a need to know." Contrary to this, security personnel who have access to the CAS and associated procedures most likely used the procedure, mixed it with other paper work, and then inadvertently discarded it. As a compensatory measure, directives were issued to change the schedule and frequency of certain routine functions specified in FNP-0-SP-36. All plant site SGI procedures were inventoried and no others were determined to be missing. Changes to FNP-0-SP-36 to implement the intent of these directives have also been incorporated.
All Security officers will be retrained on procedural guidance applicable to preventing recurrence of this type of event prior to taking shift. Procedural enhancements to require additional authorization for removal of procedures containing Safeguards Information have been made.
NRC FORM 366 (1-2001)
(ff more space Is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 3684) (17)
Westinghouse - Pressurized Water Reactor Energy Industry Identification Codes are identified in the text as [XXI]
Description of Event
At 1625 on March 31,2003, during an annual review of procedures in the Central Alarm Station (CAS), it was discovered that a controlled copy of a Safeguards Information (SGI) procedure, FNP-0-SP-36 entitled "Plant Security Computer System and Central Alarm Station/Secondary Alarm Station Operations," was missing from the CAS. At approximately 1700 on March 31, 2003, interviews of all Security officers were initiated to determine the location of the procedure. Completion of these interviews at a later date failed to locate the procedure. It was determined that only SNC personnel had entered the CAS during this time period. At 1702 on March 31, 2003, a one hour telephone notification of this event to the NRC Operations Center was made. A thorough search of the CAS, all other Security posts, paper recycle bins in the area, the SGI cabinet in the Central Security Control facility, the Security Badging Office and Document Control, and all Security paper work for the month of March failed to locate the document. On April 1, 2003, a security officer reported using the procedure in the CAS on March 3,2003 without removing it from its binder or the CAS. Additional interviews regarding the missing procedure were conducted with all personnel who entered the CAS from March 3, 2003 to March 31, 2003 without locating the procedure or producing any additional information on its location.
Cause of Event
A root cause investigation determined that the most likely cause of this event was failure to follow procedure.
The governing procedure states, "SGI is required to be under the control of an authorized individual while it is in use to preclude unauthorized disclosure to persons who do not have a need to know." Contrary to this, security personnel who have access to the CAS and associated procedures most likely used the procedure, mixed it with other paper work, and then inadvertently discarded it.
Significance This event could have resulted in vulnerability of a safeguards system in that the details of the performance of routine security functions are contained in the procedure. However, this event is believed to be of minimal security significance because neither target sets nor defensive strategies are contained in FNP-0-SP-36 and because no evidence of malevolent intent was discovered in the investigation. Therefore, it would not have increased the probability of loss of the facility due to a threat.U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (1-2001)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
DOCKET (2)
FACILITY NYME (1)
NUMBER LER NUMBER (6)
PNGE (3)
FA T NE SEQUENTIAL REVISION IINUMBER NUMBER Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant Unit -1 05000348 jN3 OF 3
2003 001 00
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Corrective Action
As a compensatory measure, directives were issued to change the schedule and frequency of certain routine functions specified in FNP-0-SP-36.
Changes to FNP-0-SP-36 to implement the intent of these directives have been made.
All plant site SGI procedures were inventoried and no others were determined to be missing.
All Security officers, prior to taking shift, will be retrained on procedural guidance applicable to preventing recurrence of this type of event.
Additional Information
The following LERs have been submitted in the past three years on safeguards information:
LER 2001-001-00 (Shared) - "Safeguards Information Mishandled" dated January 26, 2001.