05000346/FIN-2012002-04
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Inadequate Control of Locked High Radiation Area Key |
| Description | TS 5.7.2(a)(1) requires that High Radiation Areas with dose rates greater than 1.0 rem/hour at 30 centimeters from the radiation source or from any surface penetrated by the radiation, but less than 500 rads/hour at 1 meter from the radiation source or from any surface penetrated by the radiation be provided with a locked or continuously guarded door, gate, or other barrier that prevents unauthorized entry, and in addition, that the door and/or gate keys to these areas be maintained under the administrative control of the shift supervisor, radiation protection manager, or his/her designee. Contrary to this requirement, on February 15, 2012, licensee personnel failed to properly control the key to a Locked High Radiation Area vault storing a high integrity container loaded with primary resin. Specifically, a Radiation Protection (RP) technician checked out the subject key at the beginning of the work shift in order to access the Locked High Radiation Area vault for a planned evolution. At the end of the shift, the RP technician failed to return the key to the appropriate secure key storage cabinet, instead leaving it in an unsecured desk drawer. Several hours later when the key was identified as being missing, the RP technician, who had left the plant, was contacted and the key was recovered. At no point during the time the key was uncontrolled was the Locked High Radiation Area vault, which can only be accessed by the removal of a twenty-two ton cover, opened and improperly accessed.
The objective of the Occupational Radiation Safety Cornerstone of Radiation Safety is to ensure the adequate protection of the worker health and safety from exposure to radiation from radioactive material during routine civilian nuclear reactor operation. A key attribute of this objective is human performance, and specifically, procedure use and adherence. In accordance with NRC IMC 0612, Power Reactor Inspection Reports, Appendix B, Issue Screening, the inspectors determined that the violation was of more than minor significance in that it had a direct impact on this cornerstone objective. The licensees failure to appropriately control the key to a Locked High Radiation Area vault storing a high integrity container loaded with primary resin per established plant procedures resulted in the potential for unauthorized access to a High Radiation Area with a dose rate greater than 1.0 rem/hour at 30 centimeters from the radiation source or from any surface penetrated by the radiation, but less than 500 rads/hour at 1 meter from the radiation source or from any surface penetrated by the radiation. The licensee had entered this issue into their CAP as CR 2012-02489. Corrective actions planned or completed by the licensee include the performance of a formal apparent cause evaluation, enhancements to procedural controls for Locked High Radiation Area keys, and additional training for RP personnel. |
| Site: | Davis Besse  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000346/2012002 Section 4OA7 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2012 (2012Q1) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Or Safety |
| Identified by: | Licensee-identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | |
| Inspectors (proximate) | A Wilson C Brown D Kimble J Beavers J Cameron J Neurauter M Holmberg M Mitchell P Smagacz R Jones |
| INPO aspect | |
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Finding - Davis Besse - IR 05000346/2012002 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Davis Besse) @ 2012Q1
Self-Identified List (Davis Besse)
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