05000334/LER-2013-001, Regarding Manual Start of a Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump
| ML13337A171 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Beaver Valley |
| Issue date: | 11/27/2013 |
| From: | Emily Larson FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Co |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| L-13-378 LER 13-001-00 | |
| Download: ML13337A171 (4) | |
| Event date: | |
|---|---|
| Report date: | |
| Reporting criterion: | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation |
| 3342013001R00 - NRC Website | |
text
FENOC FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company Beaver Valley Power Station P.O. Box 4 Shippingport, PA 15077 Eric A. Larson Site Vice President 724-682-5234 Fax: 724-643-8069 November 27, 2013 L-13-378 10 CFR 50.73 ATTN: Document Control Desk U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001
SUBJECT:
Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit No. 1 Docket No. 50-334, License No. DPR-66 LER 2013-001-00 Enclosed is Licensee Event Report (LER) 2013-001-00, "Manual Start of a Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump." This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A).
There are no regulatory commitments contained in this submittal. Any actions discussed in this document that represent intended or planned actions are described for the NRC's information, and are not regulatory commitments.
If there are any questions or if additional information is required, please contact Mr. Brian F. Sepelak, Supervisor, Regulatory Compliance at 724-682-4282.
Si~r ly, Eric A. Larson Enclosure - LER 2013-001-00 cc:
Mr. W. M. Dean, NRC Region I Administrator Mr. D. I. Spindler, NRC Senior Resident Inspector Mr. J. A. Whited, NRR Project Manager INPO Records Center (via INPO Consolidated Event System)
Mr. L. E. Ryan (BRP/DEP)
UW
NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES 10/31/2013 (10-2010)
, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.
- 3. PAGE Beaver Valley Power Station Unit Number 1 05000334J 1 OF 3
- 4. TITLE Manual Start of a Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump
- 5. EVENT DATE
- 6. LER NUMBER
- 7. REPORT DATE
- 8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED MYEAR SEQUENTIAL IREV MFACILITNAME DOCKET NUMBER MONTH DAY YR NUMBER NO MONTH DAY YEAR None FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 9
30 2013 2013 - 001 - 00 11 27 2013 None
- 11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check all that apply)
E 20.2201(b)
[] 20.2203(a)(3)(i)
[] 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C)
[] 50.73(a)(2)(vii) 3 [
20,2201(d)
[E 20.2203(a)(3)(ii)
LI 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A)
El 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)
LI 20.2203(a)(1)
El 20.2203(a)(4)
EL 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B)
[E 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)
__ 20.2203(a)(2)(i)
[] 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A)
[] 50.73(a)(2)(iii)
EI 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)
- 10. POWER LEVEL [i 20.2203(a)(2)(ii)
El 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A)
Z 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)
L] 50.73(a)(2)(x)
[I 20.2203(a)(2)(iii)
El 50.36(c)(2)
EL 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A)
E] 73.71(a)(4) 0
[] 20.2203(a)(2)(iv)
[I 50.46(a)(3)(ii)
El 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B) 0l 73.71(a)(5) 0L 20.2203(a)(2)(v)
[: 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A)
El 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)
[I OTHER Specify in Abstract below or in
__ 20.2203(a)(2)(vi)
[l 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)
E:I 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)
Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes are identified in the text as [XX].
CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE Unit 1: Mode 3, Planned shutdown for a refueling outage.
There were no systems, structures, or components (SSCs) that were inoperable at the start of the event that contributed to the event.
DESCRIPTION OF EVENT
At approximately 0228 hours0.00264 days <br />0.0633 hours <br />3.769841e-4 weeks <br />8.6754e-5 months <br /> on September 30, 2013, during a planned shutdown of Beaver Valley Power Station (BVPS) Unit 1 for a refueling outage (1 R22), the "B" motor driven Auxiliary Feedwater (AFV) pump [BA] was manually started, while in Mode 3, due to lowering levels in the steam generators [SG]. The condensate pump recirculation flow control valve [FCV] had opened resulting in a reduction of the condensate flow to the steam generators and a decrease in the steam generator levels. The operators recognized that adequate feedwater flow was not available using the normal flow path of the condensate pump [P] through the bypass feedwater regulating valves [FCV] to the steam generators. In response to the lowering steam generator levels, the operators manually started the "B" motor driven AFW pump to restore the steam generator water levels. Following the start of the AFW pump, the steam generator levels were returned to their normal operating control band.
The lowest observed steam generator narrow range level from the plant computer data was 44.5 percent narrow range level (NRL), and occurred in the "C" steam generator. This was well above the AFW actuation setpoint of 19.6 percent (NRL). The heat sink capability was maintained at all times. The AFW System responded as expected. Steam generator blowdown and sample system isolations resulted from the start of the B motor driven AFW Pump, as designed.
Subsequent investigation revealed that the condensate flow control valve setpoint was out of calibration for single pump operation. Testing determined that the flow control valve did not respond as expected to the inputted flow signals. Additionally, the air pressure regulator to the pneumatic controller was found to be leaking air and was replaced.
CAUSE OF EVENT
The apparent cause of the steam generator level transient was the condensate pump recirculation flow controller being out of calibration. This caused the condensate recirculation flow control valve to open when it was not intended, diverting condensate flow away from the steam generators. Due to the dynamics of the system at the time of the event, a single condensate pump was unable to provide sufficient flow to the steam generators due to the loss of discharge pressure associated with the flow control valve opening.
ANALYSIS OF EVENT
The safety significance associated with the manual start of the "B" train AFW pump that occurred at BVPS Unit 1 on September 30, 2013 is considered to be very low. This is based on the successful start of the pump to restore the steam generator levels back to their normal control operating band and providing the necessary risk-significant heat removal functions to prevent or mitigate core damage and large early releases. All risk significant SSCs functioned as designed in response to the manual start of the AFW pump. The unit was safely shutdown for 1 R22 and in Mode 3 at the time of the event. Full shutdown defense-in-depth was available for the decay heat removal and RCS inventory functions, as well as the remaining key shutdown defense-in-depth safety functions. This event is being reported under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv) as a condition that resulted in the valid manual start of a system listed in (a)(2)(iv)(B)(6) - Auxiliary Feedwater.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
The controller for the condensate flow control valve was repaired and functionally checked during the 1 R22 refueling outage. The control scheme of these components is unique to the Unit 1 Condensate System, therefore, this condition does not apply to Unit 2.
PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS
A review found no prior BVPS Unit 1 and one Unit 2 event (listed below) within the previous three years involving the actuation of a safety system.
BVPS Unit 2 LER 2012-001-00 "Automatic Actuation of Standby Service Water Pump during Emergency Diesel Generator Test" CR 2013-15253