05000334/LER-2005-001, Re Protection System Channel Delta Temperature Time Constant Switch Found Out of Position

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Re Protection System Channel Delta Temperature Time Constant Switch Found Out of Position
ML052140305
Person / Time
Site: Beaver Valley
Issue date: 07/28/2005
From: Pearce L
FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Co
To:
Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
L-05-131 LER 05-001-00
Download: ML052140305 (9)


LER-2005-001, Re Protection System Channel Delta Temperature Time Constant Switch Found Out of Position
Event date:
Report date:
Reporting criterion: 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications
3342005001R00 - NRC Website

text

FENOC FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company Beaver Valley Power Station PO. Box 4 Shippingport. PA 15077.0004 L. William Pearce Vice President 724-682-5234 Fax: 724-643-8069 July 28, 2005 L-05-131 Beaver Valley Pover Station, Unit No. 1 Docket No. 50-334 License No. DPR-66 LEER 2005-001-00 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 In accordance with Appendix A, Beaver Valley Technical Specifications, the following Licensee Event Report is submitted:

LER 2005-001-00, 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), "Protection System Channel Delta Temperature Time Constant Switch Found Out of Position."

Willim PCeSGRoe L. William Pearce Attachment c:

Mr. T. G. Colburn, NRR Senior Project Manager Mr. P. C. Cataldo, NRC Sr. Resident Inspector Mr. S. J. Collins, NRC Region I Administrator INPO Records Center (via electronic image)

Mr. L. E. Ryan (BRP/DEP)

Abstract

On June 9, 2005, a Beaver Valley Power Station (BVPS) Unit 1 control room operator questioned whether the Channel 1 OverTemperature Differential Temperature (OTDT) setpoint indicator in the Reactor Protection System was operating less dynamically than Channel 2 and Channel 3. A subsequent check of the Channel 1 lead/lag time constant modules in the instrument rack revealed that the leadAag switches for dynamic compensation module TM-1 RC-41 2E were in the OFF position, providing a lead time constant of zero seconds. BVPS Unit 1 Tech Spec 3.3.1.1 Table 3.3-1, Item 7 for OTDT requires that the value for Tau 1 (lead time constant) be greater than or equal to 30 seconds. This condition existed since the last maintenance surveillance procedure utilized on this Channel performed on June 1, 2005. The time that the Tau 1 was set at zero seconds exceeded the 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> Technical Specification allowed outage time.

Therefore, this was a condition prohibited by plant Technical Specifications, and is reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B). Channel 1 OTDT lead module switches were restored to their proper positions, and the Channel was returned to service. On June 7 and on June 9, Channel 3 OTDT had been removed from service for routine maintenance actions, which resulted in unknowingly entering Technical Specification 3.0.3 for 2 of 3 OTDT channels inoperable, which is also reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B).

The procedure preparation and review process regarding channel restoration was inadequate. The procedure validation was inadequate for the complexity of the change. The safety significance of the OTDT Channel 1 lead module being set to zero seconds between June 1 and June 9 at BVPS Unit 1 was very low.

NRC FORM 366 (6-2004)

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PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS (Continued)

Although a previous BVPS Licensee Event Report (Unit 2 LER 2003-001) involved a lag switch left with an incorrect value and corrective actions were taken to ensure that lag values are returned to service at their appropriate setpoints, these prior corrective actions were not directly applicable to BVPS Unit 1. This is due to differences in the protection systems' platform (i.e., 7100 for Unit 1 versus 7300 for Unit 2) and the method to return/verify lead/lag settings.

COMMITMENTS

There are no new commitments made by FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company (FENOC) for BVPS Unit No. 1 in this document.