05000334/FIN-2012003-02
Finding | |
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| Title | Inadequate Containment Isolation Valve Leakage Testing Procedure results in RCS piping Water Hammer |
| Description | A self-revealing Green NCV of License Condition 2.C.6.(2), Outside Containment Leakage Rate, was identified in FENOCs failure to perform adequate maintenance and restoration of the Unit 1 low head safety injection (LHSI) system. The inspectors determined the failure to adequately perform maintenance and restore the LHSI system to service is a performance deficiency that was within FENOCs ability to foresee and correct which contributed to the inoperability of the LHSI system in November 2010 and exceeding the outside containment leakage rate. FENOC entered this issue into their corrective action program as condition reports (CRs) 2010-85863, 2012-05832, and 2012-06658
This finding is more than minor because it affects the Mitigating Systems cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences and the Barrier Integrity cornerstone objective to provide reasonable assurance that physical design barriers (fuel cladding, reactor coolant system, and containment) protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. The inspectors and a Region I Senior Reactor Analyst (SRA) evaluated the finding using Phase 1, Initial Screening and Characterization worksheet in Attachment 4 to IMC 0609, Significance Determination Process. Per Table 4a, under the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone, the inspectors determined this finding was not a design or qualification deficiency resulting in a loss of functionality or operability, did not represent an actual loss of safety function of a system or train of equipment, and was not potentially risk-significant due to a seismic, fire, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. Accordingly, under the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone this finding screens as Green. However, under the Barrier Integrity Cornerstone, the inspectors determined this finding represented an actual open pathway in the physical integrity of reactor containment via a heat removal system and warranted a review per Appendix H, Containment Integrity Significance Determination Process. The inspectors and SRA determined that this finding is appropriately categorized as a Type A finding, per Appendix H, because the degraded relief valve adversely affects the operability of the LHSI system, a closed system which extends beyond the containment boundary. Based upon the above Mitigation System Cornerstone determination that this finding screens to Green (no significant increase in core damage frequency) and Table 4.1, that categorizes the faulted relief valve, that is connected to a small line (less than 1 to 2 inches in diameter) and connected to a closed system, as a condition that generally does not contribute to LERF, this finding screens per Appendix H, Figure 4.1, as very low safety significance. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Problem Identification and Resolution, Operating Experience, because FENOC failed to implement operating experience through changes to station procedures and equipment. |
| Site: | Beaver Valley  |
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| Report | IR 05000334/2012003 Section 1R20 |
| Date counted | Jun 30, 2012 (2012Q2) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.2 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | A Dugandzic C Crisden D Spindler E Bonney G Hunegs J Laughlin P Kaufman S Barber S Barr T Moslak T Ziev |
| CCA | P.5, Operating Experience |
| INPO aspect | CL.1 |
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Finding - Beaver Valley - IR 05000334/2012003 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Beaver Valley) @ 2012Q2
Self-Identified List (Beaver Valley)
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