05000317/LER-2002-002, Re Potential High Pressure Safety Injection Pump Run-Out Failure

Re Potential High Pressure Safety Injection Pump Run-Out Failure

ML021150108
Person / Time
Site:	Calvert Cliffs
Issue date:	04/18/2002
From:	Katz P Constellation Nuclear
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
LER-02-002-00
Download: ML021150108 (6)

LER-2002-002, Re Potential High Pressure Safety Injection Pump Run-Out Failure

Event date:
Report date:
3172002002R00 - NRC Website

text

Peter E. Katz Plant General Manager 1650 Calvert Cliffs Parkway Lusby, Maryland 20657 410 495-4101 Constellation Nuclear Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant A Member of the Constellation Energy Group April 18, 2002 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 ATTENTION:

SUBJECT:

Document Control Desk Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant Unit Nos. 1 & 2; Docket Nos. 50-317 & 50-318; License Nos. DPR 53 & DPR 69 Licensee Event Report 2002-02 Potential High Pressure Safety Injection Pump Run-out Failure The attached report is being sent to you as required under 10 CFR 50.73 guidelines. Should you have questions regarding this report, we will be pleased to discuss them with you.

Very truly yours, "I---I I

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PEK/TER/bjd Attachment cc:

R. S. Fleishman, Esquire J. E. Silberg, Esquire Director, Project Directorate I-1, NRC D. M. Skay, NRC H. J. Miller, NRC Resident Inspector, NRC R. I. McLean, DNR

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Abstract

On February 21, 2002, a potential high pressure safety injection (HPSI) pump run-out failure mode was determined to exist if a large break loss-of-coolant-accident (LOCA) occurred during reverse flow testing of HPSI pump discharge check valves. The test resulted in a plant configuration where the non-tested HPSI pump was aligned to both HPSI headers. If a large break LOCA had occurred during the test, the remaining operable HPSI pump would have supplied coolant to both headers. High pressure safety injection pump flow-rate would have increased and probably caused the pump to fail due to run-out.

High pressure safety injection pumps have been verified to operate satisfactorily at flow-rates up to 771 gpm. However, the increased flow-rate when injecting into two headers pushes the predicted flow above this value. It is not known at what flow-rate run-out failure of a HPSI pump would occur. This potential HPSI failure is caused by a procedural deficiency that has been present since startup.

The test procedure has been changed to ensure that the operable HPSI pump is only aligned to it's own header during this test.

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IV.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

Both STP's 0-65-1 and 2 have been revised to include a step to shut the HPSI header isolation valve, for the HPSI pump being tested, while a HPSI pump discharge check valve is being reverse flow tested. (1 -SI-654 for testing 13 HPSI pump; 1-SI-656 for testing 11 HPSI pump; 2-SI-654 for testing 23 HPSI pump; 2-SI-656 for testing 21 HPSI pump.) These procedural changes will prevent a HPSI pump from being aligned to two HPSI headers during future performance of STP 0-65-1 and 2.

V.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

A.

Affected Component Identification:

IEEE 803 IEEE 805 Component or System EIIS Funct System ID Reactor RCT Reactor Core System AC HPSI Pump AC HPSI Discharge Check Valve AC HPSI Cross-Connect Valve AC B.

Previous similar events

A review of Calvert Cliffs' Licensee Event Reports over the past several years has been performed. The review did not identify any similar reportable events.

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