05000316/LER-2002-004, Re Unanticipated Start of the Turbine Drive Auxiliary Feedwater Pump
| ML020870262 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Cook  |
| Issue date: | 03/15/2002 |
| From: | Joseph E Pollock Indiana Michigan Power Co |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| LER 02-004-00 | |
| Download: ML020870262 (5) | |
| Event date: | |
|---|---|
| Report date: | |
| Reporting criterion: | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function |
| 3162002004R00 - NRC Website | |
text
Indiana Michigan Power Company 500 Circle Drive Buchanan, Ml 49107 1395 INDIANA MICHIGAN POWER March 15, 2002 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 Operating Licenses DPR-74 Docket Nos. 50-316 Document Control Manager:
In accordance with the criteria established by 10 CFR 50.73 entitled Licensee Event Report System, the following report is being submitted:
LER 316/2002-004-00: "Unanticipated Start of the Turbine Drive Auxiliary Feedwater Pump" The following commitment was identified in this submittal:
Procedures 01 (02) -OHP-4021-001-003 will be revised to include a statement in an appropriate form prior to the steps to initiate the manual trip from less than 22% that it is expected that the TDAFP will auto start.
Should you have any questions regarding this correspondence, please contact Mr. Gordon P. Arent, Manager, Regulatory Affairs, at 616/697-5553.
Sincerely, Joseph E. Pollock Site Vice President RM/pae Attachment
C:
G. P. Arent A. C. Bakken L.
Brandon K. D. Curry J. E.
Dyer, Region III R. W. Gaston S. A.
Greenlee T. P.
Noonan R. P. Powers M. W. Rencheck R.
Whale NRC Resident Inspector Records Center, INPO
NaC Forn 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES 7-31-2004 (7-2001)
, the NRC digits/characters for each block) may notconduct or sponsor, anda person is notrequired to respond to, the information collection.
- 3. PAGE Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant Unit 2 05000-316 1 of 3
- 4. TITLE Unanticipated Start of the Turbine Drive Auxiliary Feedwater Pump
- 5. EVENT DATE
- 6. LER NUMBER
- 7. REPORT DATE
- 8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED SEQUENTIAL REVISION FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR NUMBER NUMBER MONTH DAY YEAR IFACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 01 19 2002 2002 004 00 03 15 2002
- 9. OPERATING MODE 5
l1. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check all that apply) 20.2201 (b) 20.2203(a)(3)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B) 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)
- 10. POWER LEVEL 00 20.2201 (d) 20.2203(a)(4) 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 50.73(a)(2)(x) 20.2203(a)(1) 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A)
X 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) 73.71 (a)(4) l 20.2203(a)(2)(i) 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A) 73.71 (a)(5) 20.2203(a)(2)(ii) 50.36(c)(2) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B)
OTHER 20 Specify in Abstract below 20.2203(a)(2)(iii) 50.46(a)(3)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C) or in
Abstract
At 00:01 hours on 01/19/02, in preparation for a Unit 2 refueling outage, Operations shift personnel initiated a planned manual reactor trip of Unit 2 from 22% power per procedure 02-OHP-4021-001-003, Revision 15, "Power Reduction."
Shortly thereafter, an automatic start of the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump (TDAFP) occurred as a result of a valid low level indication in the steam generators.
Due to a lack of written procedural guidance in the "Power Reduction" procedure, the automatic start of the TDAFP was determined to be an "unanticipated" engineered safety feature (ESF) actuation.
Steam generator levels rapidly recovered.
Operators secured the TDAFP and throttled the flows from the motor driven auxiliary feedwater pumps in accordance with plant procedures for reactor trip response and recovery.
Reactor coolant system cooldown and depressurization proceeded normally.
During the trip, pressurizer level shrank lower than procedurally anticipated, resulting in a reactor coolant system letdown isolation.
At 07:56 on 01/19/02, the Shift Manager made an eight hour, non-emergency notification to the NRC (EN 38640) per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) for an unanticipated ESF actuation.
The cause of this event was inadequate procedural guidance.
Corrective actions will include revision of the applicable shutdown procedure to ensure operators are alerted to the potential for an automatic start of the TDAFP.
NRC FORM 366 (7-2001)U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (7-2001)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION
- 6. LER NUMBER 3.-1 YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant Unit 2 05000-316 NUMBER NUMBER 2
2002 004 00
- 17. TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Fonn (366A)
Conditions Prior to Event
Unit 1 -
100 percent power Unit 2 -
22 percent power
Description of Event
At 00:01 hours on 01/19/02, in preparation for a Unit 2 refueling outage, Operations shift personnel initiated a planned manual reactor trip of Unit 2 from 22% power per procedure 02-OHP-4021-001-003, Revision 15, "Power Reduction."
Shortly thereafter, an automatic start of the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump (TDAFP) occurred as a result of valid low level indication in the Steam Generators.
Prior to commencing the unit shutdown, a "pre-job" brief was held with the operating crew.
During the pre-job briefing, it was discussed that the TDAFP may start (an expected condition).
Due to a lack of written procedural guidance in the "power reduction" procedure, the automatic start of the TDAFP was later determined to be an "unanticipated" engineered safety feature (ESF) Actuation, in accordance with the guidance contained in NUREG-1022, Revision 2, Paragraph 3.2.6.
Steam Generator levels rapidly recovered.
Operators secured the TDAFP and throttled flows from the motor driven auxiliary feedwater pumps in accordance with plant procedures for reactor trip response and recovery.
Reactor Coolant System (RCS) cooldown and depressurization proceeded normally.
During the trip, pressurizer level shrank lower than procedurally anticipated, resulting in a reactor coolant system letdown isolation.
The operating crew recovered from the letdown isolation in accordance with approved plant procedures.
At 07:56 on 01/19/02, the Shift Manager made an eight hour, non-emergency notification to the NRC (EN 38640) in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) for an unanticipated ESF actuation.
Cause of Event
Procedure 02-OHP-4021-001-003 did not clearly state that an automatic start of the TDAFP was anticipated.
Prior to the conduct of the unit shutdown, a pre-job briefing was held with the operating crew.
During this pre-job briefing it was discussed that the TDAFP may start (an expected condition).
The procedure should have included a notification about the TDAFP in the procedure prior to the steps to initiate the manual trip from less than 22%.
Such notification should have indicated that a significant drop in Steam Generator water level was expected as a result of the reactor trip and that the TDAFP may auto-start.
This would have fully documented that such a TDAFP auto-start was expected and preplanned, and thus would not be reportable if it occurred.U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (7-2001)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION
- 6. LER NUMBER
- 3. PAGE YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant Unit 2 05000-316 NUMBER NUMBER 3 of 3 2002
-- l004 00
- 17. TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form (366A)
Analysis of Event
Although the automatic start of the TDAFP was not specifically called out as an expected occurrence after manual reactor trip from 20% power in procedure 02-OHP-4021-001-003, the drop in steam generator narrow range level instrumentation to less than 21% and the subsequent automatic start of the TDAFP were reasonably expectable occurrences following a reactor trip.
The system performed as designed.
Prior to the conduct of the unit shutdown a pre-job briefing was held with the operating crew.
During this pre-job briefing it was discussed that the TDAFP may start (an expected condition).
Aside from procedural recognition that the TDAFP may automatically start, no changes need to be made to the procedure to prevent this ESF actuation.
Accordingly, there were no actual nuclear, radiological, or industrial safety consequences because of this event.
Corrective Action
Procedures 01(02)-OHP-4021-001-003 will be revised to include a statement in an appropriate form prior to the steps to initiate the manual trip from less than 22%
that it is expected that the TDAFP may auto start.
Previous Similar Events
None.