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H.j.MME' ACCELERATED RIDS PROCESSING I
REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)
ACCESSION NBR:9503010362 DOC.DATE: 95/02/20 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET FACIL:50-316 Donald C.
Cook Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 2, Indiana M
05000316 AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION BEILMAN,T.P.
Indiana Michigan Power Co.
(formerly Indiana
& Michigan Ele F
BLIND,A.A.
Indiana Michigan Power Co.
(formerly Indiana
& Michigan Ele RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION
SUBJECT:
LER 95-001-00:on 950106,Unit 2 fir detection sys was made inoperable w/o compensated action due to personnel error.
Restored switch to "on" position
& completed test.
DISTRIBUTION CODE:
IE22T COPIES RECEIVED:LTR 2 ENCL 2 SIZE:
TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.
NOTES C
F RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME PD3-1 PD INTERNAL: AEOD/ESRD/RAB
~FILE CENTERS 02 NRR/DE/EELB NRR/DISP/PIPB NRR/DRCH/HHFB NRR/DRCH/HOLB NRR/DSSA/SPLB RES/DSIR/EIB EXTERNAL: L ST LOBBY WARD NOAC MURPHY,G.A NRC PDR COPIES LTTR ENCL 1
1 1
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1' 1
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RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME HICKMAN,J AEOD/SPD/RRAB NRR/DE/ECGB NRR/DE/EMEB NRR/DOPS/OECB NRR/DRCH/HICB NRR/DRSS/PRPB NRR/DSSA/SRXB RGN3 FILE 01'ITCO BRYCE,J H
NOAC POORE,W.
NUDOCS FULL TXT COPIES LTTR ENCL 1
1 1
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1 NOTE TO ALL"RIDS" RECIPIENTS:
PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTE! CONTACTTHE DOCUMENTCONTROL DESK, ROOM Pl-37 (EXT. 504-2083 ) TO ELIMINATEYOUR NA'ME FROM DISTRIBUTIONLISTS FOR DOCUMENTS YOU DON'T NEED!
FULL TEXT CONVERSION REQUIRED TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED:
LTTR 26 ENCL 26
Indiana Michigan Power Company Cook Nuclear Plant One Cook Place Bridgrnan, Ml 49106 616 465 5901 February 20, 1995 INDIANA NICHIGAN POWER United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Rockville, Maryland 20852 Operating Licenses DPR-74 Docket No. 50-316 Document Control Manager:
In accordance with the criteria established by 10 CFR 50.73 entitled Licensee Event Re ort S stem the following report is being submitted:
95-001-00 Sincerely, A. A. Blind Plant Manager
/mr Attachment lj c:
J.
B. Martin, Region III E.
E. Fitzpatrick P. A. Barrett R. F. Kroeger M. A. Bailey Ft.
Wayne NRC Resident Inspector J.
B. Hickman NRC J.
R. Padgett G. Charnoff, Esq.
D. Hahn INPO S. J.
Brewer 9503010362 950220 PDR ADOCK 05000316 S
PDR
NRC FORM 366 IS 92i
. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION LlCENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
(See reverSe fOr required number Of digitS/CharaCterS far eaCh blOCk)
PROVED BY OMB NO. 315~104 EXP (RES 5/31/95 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER
RESPONSE
O COMPLY VENT THIS INFQRMAtlON COLLECTCN 4EOUEST:
'".0 "PS FO~~
COMMENTS REGARtXNG BUIIEN ESTIMATE TQ THE INFORMADQN ANO RECORDS MANAGEMENTBRANCH (MNBB TTIeL U.S. NUCLEA REGULATORY CQMMISSCN WASHINGTON OC 20666~I. MO TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROrECT Oidooicek OFFCE OF MANAGEMENTANO BUDGET. WASHINGTON. CC 20600.
FACIUTYNAMElil DONALD C.
COOK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNIT 2 DOCKET NUMBER IT) 0S000 316 PAGE ITI 10F 3 UNIT 2 FIRE DETECTION SYSTEM MADE 'INOPERABLE WITHOUT COMPENSATORY ACTION DUE TO PERSONNEL ERROR.
EVENT DATE 5 MONTH DAY LER NUMBER 6 SEOUENtiAL NUMBER REVISION NUMBER I REPORT NUMBER 7 OAY YEAR OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED(8 OQCKET NUMBER FACIUTYNAME 05000 01 06 95 95 001 00 02 20 95 FACIlflvNAME DOCKET NUMBER 05000 OPERATING MODE (9)
POWER LEVEL (10) 100K 20.405(c) 50.73(a) (2) (iv) 50.73(a) (2) (v) 20A02(b) 20 405(a)(1)(i) 73.71(bl 73.71(cl 50.36(c) (1)
OTHER 50.36(c) (2) 50.73(a) (2) (i) 50.73(a) (2) (ii) 50.73(a) (2)(iii) 50.73(a) (2) (vii) 50.73(a) (2l(viii)(A) 50.73(al(2) (viii)(B) 50.73(a) (2) (x) 20A05(a)(1) (ii) 20.405(a) (1) (iii) 20.405(a) (1) (iv) 20.405(a) (1l(vl iseeeeY ul AeeINCI de~ end ~ TeII, NRC Form 066AI LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER 12 TELEPHONE NUMBER iincwoe Alee Coeel THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REOUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR i: ICheck one or morel 11
'"T.
P B
INTENANCE SUPERINTENDENT 616 466-2601 COMPLETE ONE UNE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT 13
CAUSE
SYSTEM REPORTABLE To Npres REPORTABLE COMPONENT MANUFACTURER TO NPROS SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED 14 YES FI Yee. camreeie EXPECTED SUBL0SSION DATE)
ABsTRAOT (Limitto 1400 spaces.
i.e. ~ approximately 15 single-spaced typewntten knes)
(16)
~ECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)
DAY YEAR On January 6, 1995 at 1112 hours0.0129 days <br />0.309 hours <br />0.00184 weeks <br />4.23116e-4 months <br /> it was discovered that the Unit 2 fire detection monitor panel switch (EZIS/ZC-HS) had been placed in the "off" position during the performance of a surveillance.
Zn the "off" position, visual and audible alarms associated with the Unit 2 fire detection zones will not alarm in the Control Room.
Zt was determined that the switch had been in the "off" position for approximately three hours, during which time all Unit 2 fire detection was inoperable without the appropriate compensatory measures being taken.
On January 26, 1995 it was determined that this event was reportable under 10CFR50.73(a)
(2) (i) (B), as operation prohibited by Technical Specifications.
The event is attributed to personnel error.
The switch was left in the "off" position in violation of the procedure being used to perform the surveillance.
If a fire had occurred during the period when the fixe detection system was inoperable, a "Fire System Actuation" or "C02 Header Pressurized" alarm would still have annunciated in the Control Room for the areas provided with fire suppression capabilities, alerting the Control Room to a fire in the monitored areas.
Routine security patrols and operator tours were also ongoing for areas without a fire suppression system.
Zn addition, multiple Unit 2 fire detection zones were being toured as a result of other fire protection concerns.
Based on this, the event did not represent a significant safety hazard and at no time was the health of safety of the public placed in jeopardy.
S4C FC4M $66 I6 921
HAC fORM SSSA [64(SI U.S. NUCLEAR AEGULATOAYCOMMISSION APPROVEO OM6 HO. 21600104 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION ESTIMArEO SVAOEH ~ EA RESPONSE tO COMPLY WTN 'S IHPOAMATION COI.LECTION REQVESt. SOO HAS POR<<RO COMMENTS REGAAOING SVAOEH ESTIMATE 'tO THE RECOROS AHO AEPOATS MANAGEMENT SRAHCH IP 6201. V.S, NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHING'tON OC 206$ 5. AHO TO THE PAPERWORK AEOUCTION PRO(SOT 121S001041 OPPICE OP MANAGEMENTAHO SUOGE't, WASHINGTON, OC 20SOS PACILII'VNAME 111 DONALD C.
COOK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT ONIT TEXT III~ PPPCP N nOuree. PW 444PPPAer HIICAvm 2064'411121 I COCKET HVMSEA 11I LEA NUMSEA ISI I
PAGE ISI
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) 6I9 I 5I OIOI 1 IOIO )0 I -Io" 0 l 3 Conditions Prior to the Occurrence Unit One was in Mode 1 at 100 percent power, Unit 2 was in Mode 1 at 100 percent power.
Descri tion of Event On January 6, 1995 at approximately 0815 hours0.00943 days <br />0.226 hours <br />0.00135 weeks <br />3.101075e-4 months <br />, the Unit 2 fire detection monitor panel switch (EZZS)/IC-HS) was taken to the "off" position by a technician performing a routine surveillance.
The technician then left the Control Room without restoring the panel alarm function.
The panel switch was in the HoffA position for approximately 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> before it was discovered at 1112 hours0.0129 days <br />0.309 hours <br />0.00184 weeks <br />4.23116e-4 months <br /> and restored to the "on" position.
The fire detection monitor panel switch (EZIS/ZC-HS) is a cut-out switch for the Pyrotronics fire detection system installed throughout the unit and in various site office buildings.
Zn the "off" position, visual and audible alarms associated.with the fire detection zones will not alarm in the Control Room.
During the 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> that the switch was in the AoffA position no visual or audible alarms could be received in the Control Room, causing the fire detection system to be inoperable without proper compensatory measures being taken.
Cause of Event
This event is attributed to personnel error.
The procedure for the surveillance being performed,
- 12 THP 6030. IMP.153, allows the monitor panel switch (EIZS/IC-HS) to be taken to the HoffA position momentarily to reset alarms at the panel.
However, the procedure also specifically states that the technician at the panel is responsible for ensuring that the Control Room alarm functions are restored prior to leaving the test panel unattended.
The technician placed the switch in the AoffA position and then exitect the Control Room.
A lack of understanding of the function of the switch contributed to this event.
It was not understood until after the event, while reviewing the applicable print, that placing the switch to AoffA would defeat all Unit 2 fire detection.
al sis of Event This event was determined to be reportable on January 26, 1995 pursuant to aOCFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) as operation prohibited by the plant's Technical Specification.
Technical Specification 3.3.3.8 requires that within one hour, an hourly fire watch patrol be established if more than one half. of the fire detectors in any fire detection zones are inoperable.
With the fire detection monitor alarm switch in the "off" position, all Unit 2 fire detection was inoperable.
HAC Pone SSSA ISSSI
NRC SORM ESSA losel U.5. NUCLEAR RKQULATORYCOMMISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT {LER)
TEXT CONTINuATION ArrROVEO OMS HO. 2150410$
ESTIM EO 4VROEH rER RESrONSE TO COMrLY WTH THIS IHSORMATION COLL'ECTION REQUEST: 500 HRS. fORWARO COMMENTS REQAROING SVROEN ESTIMATE TO TNE RKCORO5 AHO RKrORT5 MAHAQEMEHTSRANCH Ir 520I. V.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMI551ON. WASHIHQTOH. OC 20555. ANO TO THE rArERWORK REOUCTION rROJECT 1215041041. OffICE Of MANAGEMENTAHO KUOQET.WASHINGTON.OC 20502.
fACILITYHAMS 111 DONALD C.
COOK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNIT 2 COCKET NUMKER (2I YEAR LER NUMK~ R I~ I a ~ SSQUSNTIAL aA rrVM ta AtVrtlON NUMB A rAQK ISI TEXTN mare aaaaa e eeffaeerr.
rraa aaeaaanar HlIC farrrr 2SISA'tl I Ill o
5 o
o o 3Il 69 0 0 1
0 0 0
3 0
3 Anal sis of Event continued In the event of a fire, a "Fire System Actuation
" or
.RC02 Header Pressurized" alarm would still have annunciated in the Control Room for those areas provided with fire suppression capabilities.
Routine security patrols and operator tours were ongoing in the areas'onitored by the fire detection system but not having fire suppression capabilities.
In addition, multiple Un't 2 fire detection zones were being toured in support of other fire protection concerns.
Based on this, the event did not represent a significant safety concern.
At no time was the health or safety of the public jeopardized.
Corrective Action
Upon discovery, the switch was restored to the "on" position and testing was completed.
To prevent recurrence, labels have been placed on the control panel for each unit at the monitor switch.
The label cautions personnel against leaving the switch in the "off"position and states the results of leaving it in. that configuration, including the Technical Specification which must be entered.
Similar Events
'315/93-003-01 Failed Com onent 1dentification None HRC farra 254A 10451
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| 05000315/LER-1995-001-01, :on 950314,fire Stops Found Not Installed in Several Unit 1 Containment Cable Trays.Verified Thermistor Detection Strings Located in Affected Cable Trays |
- on 950314,fire Stops Found Not Installed in Several Unit 1 Containment Cable Trays.Verified Thermistor Detection Strings Located in Affected Cable Trays
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(8) | | 05000316/LER-1995-001, :on 950106,Unit 2 Fire Detection Sys Was Made Inoperable W/O Compensated Action Due to Personnel Error. Restored Switch to on Position & Completed Test |
- on 950106,Unit 2 Fire Detection Sys Was Made Inoperable W/O Compensated Action Due to Personnel Error. Restored Switch to on Position & Completed Test
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000316/LER-1995-002, :on 950223,reactor Trip Occurred from Steam Flow/Steam Feed Flow Mismatch Coincident W/Low Level in Sg. Caused by Transistor Failure & Blown Fuse.Defective Signal Controller Replaced |
- on 950223,reactor Trip Occurred from Steam Flow/Steam Feed Flow Mismatch Coincident W/Low Level in Sg. Caused by Transistor Failure & Blown Fuse.Defective Signal Controller Replaced
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000315/LER-1995-002-01, :on 950620,21,22 & 23,nine MSSVs Lift Settings Found to Exceed TS Limit.Caused by Mild Galling Between Disc & Nozzle Components.Eight of MSSVs W/Initial High Lift Setpoint Had Subsequent Lifts within TS Limit |
- on 950620,21,22 & 23,nine MSSVs Lift Settings Found to Exceed TS Limit.Caused by Mild Galling Between Disc & Nozzle Components.Eight of MSSVs W/Initial High Lift Setpoint Had Subsequent Lifts within TS Limit
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(8) | | 05000316/LER-1995-003, :on 950203,two Pressurizer Safety Valves Failed to Meet TS Required Surveillance Test Criteria.Partially Disassembled Valves 2-SV-45A & 2-SV-45C |
- on 950203,two Pressurizer Safety Valves Failed to Meet TS Required Surveillance Test Criteria.Partially Disassembled Valves 2-SV-45A & 2-SV-45C
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000315/LER-1995-003-01, :on 950714,RT Occurred Due to Turbine Trip on Loss of Condenser Vacuum.Caused by Broken Weld on 1 Inch Drain Trap Bypass for Steam Dump Valve 1-URV-110 Into a Condenser.Completed Weld Repair |
- on 950714,RT Occurred Due to Turbine Trip on Loss of Condenser Vacuum.Caused by Broken Weld on 1 Inch Drain Trap Bypass for Steam Dump Valve 1-URV-110 Into a Condenser.Completed Weld Repair
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000316/LER-1995-004, :on 950826,reactor Tripped.Caused by Turbine Trip on High Moisture Separator Reheater Level.Installed Temporary Mod,Removing Turbine Trip Function from Level Switches 2-MLS-418 & 2-MLS-420 |
- on 950826,reactor Tripped.Caused by Turbine Trip on High Moisture Separator Reheater Level.Installed Temporary Mod,Removing Turbine Trip Function from Level Switches 2-MLS-418 & 2-MLS-420
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000316/LER-1995-005-01, :on 950829,RT Occurred on High Negative Rate Resulted from Trip of Both CRD-MG Sets Due to mis-adjusted Voltage Regulators.Replaced CRD-MG Common Bus Overvoltage Relay Body |
- on 950829,RT Occurred on High Negative Rate Resulted from Trip of Both CRD-MG Sets Due to mis-adjusted Voltage Regulators.Replaced CRD-MG Common Bus Overvoltage Relay Body
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000315/LER-1995-005, :on 950728,lack of Communication During Bus Deenergization Resulted in Unexpected Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedpump Start.Pump Was Secured from Svc After Being Auto Started & Declared Inoperable |
- on 950728,lack of Communication During Bus Deenergization Resulted in Unexpected Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedpump Start.Pump Was Secured from Svc After Being Auto Started & Declared Inoperable
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | | 05000316/LER-1995-006-01, :on 950908,Unit 2 Reactor Thermal Power Trip Occurred.Caused by Cognitive Error by Operations Personnel. Surveillance Procedure Revised to Add Caution on Operation of Reactor Trip Breaker Control Switch |
- on 950908,Unit 2 Reactor Thermal Power Trip Occurred.Caused by Cognitive Error by Operations Personnel. Surveillance Procedure Revised to Add Caution on Operation of Reactor Trip Breaker Control Switch
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000315/LER-1995-006, :on 950825,containment Type B & C Exceeded LCO Value Due to Leakage of Post Accident Sample Line Check Valve & Ice Condenser Glycol Header Isolation Valve Pressure Relief Check Valve.Evaluated Event |
- on 950825,containment Type B & C Exceeded LCO Value Due to Leakage of Post Accident Sample Line Check Valve & Ice Condenser Glycol Header Isolation Valve Pressure Relief Check Valve.Evaluated Event
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000315/LER-1995-007, :on 950825,Conax Seal Assemblies on Rv Post- Accident Vent SVs 1-NSO-21 & 1-NSO-23 Found Loose.Missing Ferrules for 1-NSO-21 & 1-NSO-23 Replaced.Determined Event Not Reportable & LER 95-007-00 Cancelled |
- on 950825,Conax Seal Assemblies on Rv Post- Accident Vent SVs 1-NSO-21 & 1-NSO-23 Found Loose.Missing Ferrules for 1-NSO-21 & 1-NSO-23 Replaced.Determined Event Not Reportable & LER 95-007-00 Cancelled
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000316/LER-1995-007-01, :on 950912,required Hourly Firewatch Tour for Unit 2 4 Kv Switchgear Complex Not Completed.Caused by Personnel Error.Shift Security Supervisor Directed to Include Active Fire Watch Tours |
- on 950912,required Hourly Firewatch Tour for Unit 2 4 Kv Switchgear Complex Not Completed.Caused by Personnel Error.Shift Security Supervisor Directed to Include Active Fire Watch Tours
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(B) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(8) | | 05000315/LER-1995-008, :on 950918,spent Fuel Pool Exhaust Sys Was Made Inoperable by Loss of Auxiliary Bldg Integrity During Fuel Movement W/O Compensatory Actions Being Taken.Immediately Stopped Fuel Movement |
- on 950918,spent Fuel Pool Exhaust Sys Was Made Inoperable by Loss of Auxiliary Bldg Integrity During Fuel Movement W/O Compensatory Actions Being Taken.Immediately Stopped Fuel Movement
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000316/LER-1995-008-01, :on 950905,inadequate Procedural Guidance Resulted in Autostart of Essential SW Pump on Unexpected ESF Signal.Event Was Evaluated & Determined to Be of No Safety Significance |
- on 950905,inadequate Procedural Guidance Resulted in Autostart of Essential SW Pump on Unexpected ESF Signal.Event Was Evaluated & Determined to Be of No Safety Significance
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000316/LER-1995-009, :on 940402 Conditions Occurred Outside Design Basis Due to Personnel Error in Aligning ESF Fans for Surveillance Testing.Restarted Filter Exhaust Train |
- on 940402 Conditions Occurred Outside Design Basis Due to Personnel Error in Aligning ESF Fans for Surveillance Testing.Restarted Filter Exhaust Train
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000315/LER-1995-009-01, :on 950913,fire Protection Compensatory Actions Incorrectly Established.Caused by Personnel Error.Continuous Fire Watch Patrol Established & Personnel Counselled.W/ |
- on 950913,fire Protection Compensatory Actions Incorrectly Established.Caused by Personnel Error.Continuous Fire Watch Patrol Established & Personnel Counselled.W/
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000315/LER-1995-010, :on 951020,inadequate Communication Resulted in Unexpected ESF Actuation.Completed Repairs to 1NRI-36 & Declared Detector Operable |
- on 951020,inadequate Communication Resulted in Unexpected ESF Actuation.Completed Repairs to 1NRI-36 & Declared Detector Operable
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000315/LER-1995-011, :on 950912,west Centrifugal Charging Pump Was Inoperable Due to Inability to Meet Design Basis Requirements for Six Months as Result of Personnel Error. Recalibrated Relay 1-51-TA8 |
- on 950912,west Centrifugal Charging Pump Was Inoperable Due to Inability to Meet Design Basis Requirements for Six Months as Result of Personnel Error. Recalibrated Relay 1-51-TA8
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000315/LER-1995-012, :on 951207,manual RT Conservatively Initiated Due to Increased Main Turbine Vibration.Revised Procedure for Removing MSRs from Svc |
- on 951207,manual RT Conservatively Initiated Due to Increased Main Turbine Vibration.Revised Procedure for Removing MSRs from Svc
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000315/LER-1995-400, :on 950704,TS 3.0.3 Was Entered on Loss of Injection Capability Due to Personnel Error During Performance of Surveillance.Restored RHR Valves |
- on 950704,TS 3.0.3 Was Entered on Loss of Injection Capability Due to Personnel Error During Performance of Surveillance.Restored RHR Valves
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(8) |
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