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. Zi-CX&mTEo D1 1BUTIQN DEMONsTz oN SVrrzx REGULATOR NFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)
ACCESSION NBR:9002260258 DOC.DATE: 90/02/12 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET L:50-316 Donald C.
Cook Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 2, Indiana 6
05000316 H.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION LMAN,T.P.
Indiana Michigan Power Co. (formerly Indiana
& Michigan Ele BLIND,A.A.
Indiana Michigan Power Co. (formerly Indiana s Michigan Ele RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION
SUBJECT:
LER 90-001-00:on 900112,unplanned ESF actuation from contact of control circuit wires due to inadequate work preparation.
W/8 ltr.
DISTRIBUTION CODE:
ZE22T COPIES RECEIVED:LTR j ENCL SIZE:
TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (LER),incident Rpt, etc.
NOTES:
RECIPIENT ZD CODE/NAME PD3-1 LA GIITTERiJ.
I NAL: ACRS MICHELSON ACRS WYLIE AEOD/DSP/TPAB DEDRO NRR/DET/EMEB9H3 NRR/DLPQ/LHFBll NRR/DOEA/OEABll NRR/DST/SELB 8D NRR DST SPLB8D1
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Indiana Michigan Power company Cook Nuclear Plant P,O. Box 458 Bridgman. i'll 49106 616 465 5901 3~3iMABA "33iQllfGQi~J
~W' February 12, 1990 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Rockville, Maryland 20852 Operating License DPR-74 Docket No. 50-316 Document Control Manager:
In accordance with the criteria established by 10 CFR 50.73 entitled, Licensee Event Re ortin
- System, the following report is being submitted:
90-001-00 Sincerely, g.g ~
A.A. Blind Plant Manager AAB:clw Attachment CC:
D.H. Williams, Jr.
A.B. Davis, Region III M.P. Alexich P.A. Barrett J.E.
Borggren R.F. Kroeger NRC Resident, Inspector J.G. Giitter, NRC R.C. Callen G. Charnoff, Esp.
Dottie Sherman, ANI Library D.
Hahn INPO S.J.
Brewer/B.P.
Lauzau 9002260258 900212 PDR ADQCN, 050003kb S
PNU
~Ez2 lf(
NRC FORM 368 (64)9)
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT ILER)
APPROVED OMB NO. 31604)104 EXPIRES: 4I30/92 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER AESPONSE TO COMPI.Y WTH THIS INFOAMATION COLLECTION REGUESTI 50.0 HRS. FOAWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENTBRANCH (P4)30), U.S. NUCLEAR AEGULATORYCOMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPEAWOAK REDUCTION PROJECT (3(500104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENTAND BUDGET.WASHINGTON.0020503.
FACILITYNAME I'l D. C.
COOK NUCLEAR PLANT - UNIT 2 DOCKET NUMBER (2) o 5
o o
o PAGE 3
i oFO UNPLANNED ESF ACTUATION (EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR START DUE TO SENSED DEGRADED VOLTAGE FROM CONTACT OF CONTROL CIRCUIT WIRES DUE TO INADE UATE WORK PREPARATION EVENT DATE (5)
MONTH OAY YEAR YEAR LER NUMBER (6)
SSOUSNTIAL iACC NUMSSII REPORT DATE (7(
YEAR NUMSSII MONTH OAY DOCKF7 NUMBFA(S) 0 5
0 0
0 FACILITYNAMES OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED(8) 0 1
1 9
0 0
0 0
1 0
0 021 2 9 0
0 5
0 0
0 OPE RATING MODE (9I POWER LEYEL 0 0 r'Py'. 6'9$
.'~
re(...rye 20.402 (6I 20AOS (s ll1)(II 20.405( ~(ill(QI 20.405(s IIIIIIIII 20.405(s I(II(Iv) 20AOS( ~l(1l(vl 20.405(c) 5036(c)(II 50.36 (v) (2) 50.73(sl(2)(I) 60.73(sl(2) ISI 50.73(sl(2) IIIII LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12I 60,73(sl(2) (Ivl 50,73(al(2)(vl 50,73(sl(2)(vSI 50.73(s )(21( villI (AI 50.73(s) (2)(v(6)(8) 50.73(s) (2) (s I THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT T0 THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR (I: IChacc ona or mora of tna followfnpi (11 73.71(SI 73.71(c)
OTHEA ISpccify in Atrttrcct Osiow snd In trit, HRC Form 366AI NAME T.
P.
BEILMAN MAINTENANCE DEPARTMENT SUPERINTENDENT AREA CODE TELEPHONE NUMBER COMPLETE ONE LINE FOA EACH COMPONENT FAILURE OESCAISEO IN THIS REPORT (13)
CAUSE
SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFA(r TVAER "66~)Q EPORTABLE r
""'"" ~....N gf
CAUSE
SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFAC.
TURER EPOATABLE TO NPRDS IWÃ@WA SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED l14)
YES IIIysr, cornplats EXPECTED 3(I64IISSIOH DATE)
ABSTRACT ILlmltto f400 rpcccr, Is., approiimatrly fiftrcn rlnplc.roice ryprwrincn llnsti IISI EXPECTED SV 8 MI SS ION DATE (151 MONTH DAY YEAR On January 12, 1990 at 0612 hours0.00708 days <br />0.17 hours <br />0.00101 weeks <br />2.32866e-4 months <br /> while Unit 2 was in Mode 5, an unplanned En-gineered Safety Features (ESF) actuation (B Train Emergency Diesel Generator start due to sensed degraded voltage) occurred during calibration of time delay relays for the Degraded Voltage, undervoltage relay circuits for Technical Specification 4.3.2.1.1, Table 4.3-2,Item S.b.
These time delay relays serve to delay the opening of the ESS bus tie breaker when degraded voltage conditions (but not loss of voltage) exist in excess of two minutes while power is being fed from normal offsite power.
Although the offsite power is tied to the ESS bus only during unit shut'down, present Technical Specifications require the relay circuits to be operable in Modes 1 through 4.
While a technician was lifting leads to defeat the automatic breaker opening function of the circuit, the lead accidentally contacted an adjacent
- lead, com-pleting the circuit and causing the breaker to open.
The normal offsite power to the ESS bus was lost, which consequently started the Emergency Diesel Generator.
r Personnel were instructed to disable the circuit by an appropriate method of knife switch opening, lifting wires at terminal blocks or protecting wires on terminals of close proximity before lifting wires on the time delay relay to be tested.
This instruction will be incorporated into the time delay relay testing procedure before its next use.
NAC Form 366 (64)9))6$%
US. NUCLEAR REGULATORYCOMMISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION APPAOVEO OMB NO. 31504')04 EXP IR ES: 4/30/92 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER
RESPONSE
TO COMPLY WTH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION AEQUESTI 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND AEPOATS MANAGEMENTBRANCH IP$30). U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATOAYCOMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO 1ME PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT
)31500104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENTAND BUDGET, WASHINGTON,OC 20503.
FACILITYNAME )1)
D.
C.
COOK NUCLEAR PLANT - UNIT 2 DOCK ET NUMBE R l2)
YEAR LER NUMBER )6)
SE DUENTIAL.@j NUMBSA REVISION NUMBBA PAGE )3)
TEXT//fmore 4/receit rer/owed. ote odd/dont/NRC Fomt 36/54'tl l)TI 0
5 0
0 0
3
]
9 0 0 0 1
00 02 OF 0
3 Conditions Prior To Occurrence Unit One in Mode 1 (100 percent reactor thermal power).
Unit Two in Mode 5 (cold shutdown).
Descri tion of Event On January 12, 1990, routine calibrations were being performed on time delay relays (EIIS/EK-2) per Technical Specification (T.S) 4.3.2.1.1, Table 4.3-2, Item S.b.
These time delay relays serve to delay the opening of the ESS bus tie breaker (EIIS/EB-BKR) when degraded voltage conditions (not loss of voltage) exist in excess of two minutes while power is being fed from normal offsite power (EIIS/EA) during Modes 1 through 4.
Technicians were making preparations to calibrate the fourth and final relay by lifting wires to defeat the automatic breaker opening function of the circuit.
As the wire was being lifted, it contacted an adjacent terminal, completing the circuit to cause an immediate opening of the tie breaker and resulting in a loss of voltage on the ESS bus (EIIS/EB).
Consequently, at 0612 hours0.00708 days <br />0.17 hours <br />0.00101 weeks <br />2.32866e-4 months <br />, the Emergency Diesel Generator (EIIS/EK) was automatically started.
Cause of the Event
The following actions were all contributors to this event:
1.
Temporary insulation that could have been placed over terminals of close proximity on the time delay relay could have prevented an inadvertent short.
2.
The wiring on the terminals that were inadvertently,shorted could have been lifted at the panel terminal strip that is more accessible and has greater clearance between the terminals.
3.
Failure of the holding screwdriver such that it let go of the screw prematurely and caused the wire being removed to touch the terminal below it.
NRC Fono 366A )6$9)(6'89) o U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORYCOMMISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVED 0MB NO. 3)500104 EXPIRES: 4/30/92 ESTIMATED BU4DEN PER
RESPONSE
TO COMPLY WTH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST/ 50.0 H46. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENTBRANCH (F830), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555. AND TO 1NE PAPERWORK 4EOUCTION PROJECT (31500)04).
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENTAND BUDGET, WASHINGTON,DC 20503.
FACILITYNAME (1)
D.
C.
COOK PLANT - UNIT 2 TEXTllfmo/o opoco ls /ooo/Iod, oso id~/VRC %%dmI 36649/ (12)
DOCKET NUMBER (2)
YEAR 31 690 LER NUMBE4 (6)
SsauaNTIAL NUM664 0 0 1
.:3:jj REVISION
'NN NUMSEII 0 0 PAGE (3) 0 3o'0 Anal sis of Event This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv) as an event that resulted in an unplanned automatic actuation of an Engineered Safety Feature.
All automatic actions were verified to have occurred properly as a result of the Engineered Safety Features actuation.
Based on the above, it is concluded that the event did not constitute an unreviewed safety question as defined in 10 CFR 50.59(a)(2) nor did it adversely impact the health and safety of the public.
Corrective Action
Immediate corrective actions involved Operations personnel implementing plant procedures to verify proper response of the automatic protection system and to assess plant conditions for initiation of appropriate recovery actions.
Personnel were instructed to disable the circuit by an appropriate method of knife switch opening, lifting vires at terminal blocks or protecting wires on terminals of close proximity on the time delay to be tested.
This instruction vill be incorporated into the time delay relay testing procedure before its next use.
Failed Com onent Identification None.
Previous Similar Events
There were no previous similar events identified which involved starting of the Emergency Diesel Generator caused by contact of energized wires due to personnel error.
NRC Form 368A (689)
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| 05000315/LER-1990-001-01, :on 900225,pyralarm Fire Detection Zone for Elevation of Auxiliary Bldg Declared Inoperable.Caused by Personnel Error.Fire Watch Dispatch Notified & Continuous Fire Watch Posted |
- on 900225,pyralarm Fire Detection Zone for Elevation of Auxiliary Bldg Declared Inoperable.Caused by Personnel Error.Fire Watch Dispatch Notified & Continuous Fire Watch Posted
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(o)(2) | | 05000316/LER-1990-001, :on 900112,unplanned ESF Actuation Occurred During Calibr of Time Delay Relays for Degraded Voltage. Caused by Lack of Insulation on Wiring.Personnel Instructed to Disable Circuit by Method of Knife Switch |
- on 900112,unplanned ESF Actuation Occurred During Calibr of Time Delay Relays for Degraded Voltage. Caused by Lack of Insulation on Wiring.Personnel Instructed to Disable Circuit by Method of Knife Switch
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(s)(2) | | 05000315/LER-1990-002-01, :on 900327,two Fire Doors Blocked from Closing W/O Compensatory Actions Required by Plant Tech Spec.Caused by Personnel Error.Personnel Counseled & Retrained on Constraints of Tech Specs 3.7.10 |
- on 900327,two Fire Doors Blocked from Closing W/O Compensatory Actions Required by Plant Tech Spec.Caused by Personnel Error.Personnel Counseled & Retrained on Constraints of Tech Specs 3.7.10
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(e)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(s)(2)(v) 10 CFR 50.73(s)(2) | | 05000316/LER-1990-002, :on 900108,two MSIVs Exhibited Closing Time in Excess of Tech Spec 3.7.1.5 Limit of 5 S.On 900109 & 10, Confirmed That Excessive Condensation Collected on Vent Side.Caused by Inadequate Insulation |
- on 900108,two MSIVs Exhibited Closing Time in Excess of Tech Spec 3.7.1.5 Limit of 5 S.On 900109 & 10, Confirmed That Excessive Condensation Collected on Vent Side.Caused by Inadequate Insulation
| | | 05000316/LER-1990-003-01, :on 900214,identified That Valve Allowing Purging of Train B Special Particulate Open During Operation of Monitor.Caused by Faulty Logic Circuit in Sping Startup Process.Procedures Revised |
- on 900214,identified That Valve Allowing Purging of Train B Special Particulate Open During Operation of Monitor.Caused by Faulty Logic Circuit in Sping Startup Process.Procedures Revised
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(e)(2) | | 05000315/LER-1990-003, :on 900410,pyralarm Fire Detection Zone Rendered Inoperable When Detection Control Panel Permeated by Steam & Water from Blowdown Sys Safety Valve.Caused by Personnel Error.Roving Fire Watch Posted |
- on 900410,pyralarm Fire Detection Zone Rendered Inoperable When Detection Control Panel Permeated by Steam & Water from Blowdown Sys Safety Valve.Caused by Personnel Error.Roving Fire Watch Posted
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(e)(2) | | 05000315/LER-1990-004-01, :on 900508,reactor Operator Inadvertently Started Containment Recirculation Fan Instead of Hydrogen Recombiner During Surveillance Test.Caused by Inadequate Work Practice.Condenser Restored |
- on 900508,reactor Operator Inadvertently Started Containment Recirculation Fan Instead of Hydrogen Recombiner During Surveillance Test.Caused by Inadequate Work Practice.Condenser Restored
| 10 CFR 50.73(e)(2)(iv) | | 05000315/LER-1990-004, :on 900508,inadvertent Operation of Wrong Control Switch Occurred Due to Personnel Error |
- on 900508,inadvertent Operation of Wrong Control Switch Occurred Due to Personnel Error
| 10 CFR 50.73(o)(2)(iv) | | 05000316/LER-1990-004-01, :on 900611,reactor Tripped from Power Range, Neutron Flux,High Negative Rate Signal.Probably Caused by Drop of Two or More Control Rods.Preventive Maint Program for Rod Control Sys Will Be Enhanced |
- on 900611,reactor Tripped from Power Range, Neutron Flux,High Negative Rate Signal.Probably Caused by Drop of Two or More Control Rods.Preventive Maint Program for Rod Control Sys Will Be Enhanced
| | | 05000315/LER-1990-005-01, :on 900724,grace Period Requirement of 25% of 18 Month Surveillance Interval for Tech Spec Exceeded.Caused by Incorrect Entry Into Computerized Schedular Program. Schedule Reprogrammed |
- on 900724,grace Period Requirement of 25% of 18 Month Surveillance Interval for Tech Spec Exceeded.Caused by Incorrect Entry Into Computerized Schedular Program. Schedule Reprogrammed
| | | 05000316/LER-1990-005, :on 900621,missed Ac Electrical Power Source Breaker Alignment Surveillance.Caused by Personnel Error. Personnel Reinstructed |
- on 900621,missed Ac Electrical Power Source Breaker Alignment Surveillance.Caused by Personnel Error. Personnel Reinstructed
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(e)(2)(v) | | 05000316/LER-1990-006, :on 900625,failure of Facility Main Steam Safety Valves to Meet Tech Spec Lift Setpoint Requirements. Caused by Incompatibility of Required Setpoint Tolerance & Repeatability.Tech Spec Change Requested |
- on 900625,failure of Facility Main Steam Safety Valves to Meet Tech Spec Lift Setpoint Requirements. Caused by Incompatibility of Required Setpoint Tolerance & Repeatability.Tech Spec Change Requested
| 10 CFR 50.73(e)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(e)(2)(v) 10 CFR 50.73(e)(2)(5) | | 05000315/LER-1990-006-01, :on 900730,confirmed That Inadequate Emergency Lighting Placed Plant in Condition Not Covered by Emergency Procedures.Caused by Failure to Review Changes to Emergency Remote Shutdown Procedures |
- on 900730,confirmed That Inadequate Emergency Lighting Placed Plant in Condition Not Covered by Emergency Procedures.Caused by Failure to Review Changes to Emergency Remote Shutdown Procedures
| 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000316/LER-1990-007, :on 900717,accumulated Leakage Found While Performing Type B & C Leak Rate Tests on Containment Penetrations Exceeded Tech Spec 3.6.1.2.b.Caused by Degradation of Isolation Valve Seating Svcs |
- on 900717,accumulated Leakage Found While Performing Type B & C Leak Rate Tests on Containment Penetrations Exceeded Tech Spec 3.6.1.2.b.Caused by Degradation of Isolation Valve Seating Svcs
| | | 05000315/LER-1990-007-01, :on 900802,determined That Condition Exists in Violation of App a of BTP 9.5-1 Due to Lack of Fireproofing Matl on Exposed Structural Steel.Caused by Inadequate Work Practices.Structure Covered |
- on 900802,determined That Condition Exists in Violation of App a of BTP 9.5-1 Due to Lack of Fireproofing Matl on Exposed Structural Steel.Caused by Inadequate Work Practices.Structure Covered
| 10 CFR 50.73(e)(2) | | 05000316/LER-1990-008-02, :on 900807,when Seal Matl Removed for Lab Analysis,Portions Found Badly Degraded.Cause Not Determined. Safety Evaluation Performed Concluding That Degraded Barrier Seals Did Not Represent Safety Threat |
- on 900807,when Seal Matl Removed for Lab Analysis,Portions Found Badly Degraded.Cause Not Determined. Safety Evaluation Performed Concluding That Degraded Barrier Seals Did Not Represent Safety Threat
| 10 CFR 50.73(e)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(s)(2) | | 05000315/LER-1990-008, :on 900619,discovered That Isolation Relay Circuitry for Low Header Pressure Auto Start Switch for Essential Svc Water Pumps Installed Incorrectly.Caused by Design Errors.Plant Mod Packet Initiated |
- on 900619,discovered That Isolation Relay Circuitry for Low Header Pressure Auto Start Switch for Essential Svc Water Pumps Installed Incorrectly.Caused by Design Errors.Plant Mod Packet Initiated
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(B) 10 CFR 50.73(e)(2) | | 05000315/LER-1990-009-01, :on 900821,discovered Outer Door to Stated Drumming Room Unlatched & Lock on Internal Extreme High Radiation Area Gate Unlocked.Caused by Personnel Error.Gate Locked & Personnel Counseled |
- on 900821,discovered Outer Door to Stated Drumming Room Unlatched & Lock on Internal Extreme High Radiation Area Gate Unlocked.Caused by Personnel Error.Gate Locked & Personnel Counseled
| | | 05000316/LER-1990-009-02, :on 900921,potential Loss of Control Room HVAC Noted During Postulated Fire W/O Conpensatory Action.W/ |
- on 900921,potential Loss of Control Room HVAC Noted During Postulated Fire W/O Conpensatory Action.W/
| 10 CFR 50.73(e)(2)(v) | | 05000315/LER-1990-009, Informs of Plan to Change Fire Protection Commitment to Reroute CR HVAC Power Cables Following Condition Identified in LER 90-009,dtd 901019.Justification to Support Cancellation of Subj Commitment Encl | Informs of Plan to Change Fire Protection Commitment to Reroute CR HVAC Power Cables Following Condition Identified in LER 90-009,dtd 901019.Justification to Support Cancellation of Subj Commitment Encl | | | 05000316/LER-1990-010-01, :on 901005,plant Determined to Be Outside Design Basis Due to Polar Crane Hoist Downgrading |
- on 901005,plant Determined to Be Outside Design Basis Due to Polar Crane Hoist Downgrading
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(e)(2) | | 05000315/LER-1990-010, :on 900824,discovered That Routing Cable Associated W/Unit 1 Low Shutdown Indication Panels Not in Compliance w/10CFR50,App R.Minor Plant Mod Initiated to Provide Encl (Wrapped) Around Subj Conduit |
- on 900824,discovered That Routing Cable Associated W/Unit 1 Low Shutdown Indication Panels Not in Compliance w/10CFR50,App R.Minor Plant Mod Initiated to Provide Encl (Wrapped) Around Subj Conduit
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(s)(2) | | 05000316/LER-1990-011-01, :on 901010,ESF Actuation Signal on hi-hi SG Level Received,Due to Personnel Error |
- on 901010,ESF Actuation Signal on hi-hi SG Level Received,Due to Personnel Error
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(s)(2) | | 05000315/LER-1990-011, :on 901004,steam Generator Pressure Channel Check Surveillance Missed |
- on 901004,steam Generator Pressure Channel Check Surveillance Missed
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000316/LER-1990-012-01, :on 901212,reactor Tripped as Result of steam-to-feedwater Flow Mismatch & One turbine-driven Main Feedwater Pump Tripped Due to Erroneous Actuation of Thrust Bearing.Bearing Bench Calibr |
- on 901212,reactor Tripped as Result of steam-to-feedwater Flow Mismatch & One turbine-driven Main Feedwater Pump Tripped Due to Erroneous Actuation of Thrust Bearing.Bearing Bench Calibr
| | | 05000315/LER-1990-012, :on 901015,failed to Comply W/Tech Spec When Fire Watch Posting Miscommunicated |
- on 901015,failed to Comply W/Tech Spec When Fire Watch Posting Miscommunicated
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(e)(2)(9) | | 05000315/LER-1990-013, :on 901017,18 & 19,11 of 20 Main Steam Safety Valve Lift Setpoints Out of TS Specified Range.Caused by Setpoint Drift.Valves Reset to Acceptable Values & Retested Satisfactorily |
- on 901017,18 & 19,11 of 20 Main Steam Safety Valve Lift Setpoints Out of TS Specified Range.Caused by Setpoint Drift.Valves Reset to Acceptable Values & Retested Satisfactorily
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | | 05000316/LER-1990-013-01, :on 901215,during Tech Spec Surveillance,Plant Battery Declared Inoperable When Single Cell Voltage Decreased Below Test Limit.Caused by Improper Setpoint. Setpoints Verified & Corrected as Needed |
- on 901215,during Tech Spec Surveillance,Plant Battery Declared Inoperable When Single Cell Voltage Decreased Below Test Limit.Caused by Improper Setpoint. Setpoints Verified & Corrected as Needed
| 10 CFR 50.73(r)(2) | | 05000315/LER-1990-014, :on 901025,access to Extreme High Radiation Area Not Controlled in Accordance W/Tss.Caused by Personnel Error.Door Locked to Prevent Unauthorized Entry |
- on 901025,access to Extreme High Radiation Area Not Controlled in Accordance W/Tss.Caused by Personnel Error.Door Locked to Prevent Unauthorized Entry
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(e)(2) | | 05000315/LER-1990-015, :on 901102,discovered Containment Type B & C Leakage Exceeded L.C.O. Value Due to Degradation of Isolation Valve Seating Surfaces.Seat Was Lapped & Disc Was Replaced |
- on 901102,discovered Containment Type B & C Leakage Exceeded L.C.O. Value Due to Degradation of Isolation Valve Seating Surfaces.Seat Was Lapped & Disc Was Replaced
| | | 05000315/LER-1990-016, :on 901221,determined That Two of Three Safety Valves Had Lift Settings Outside TS 4.4.3 Acceptance Criteria.Possibly Caused by Steam Cutting in Disc Insert & Nozzle.Valves Satisfactorily Tested |
- on 901221,determined That Two of Three Safety Valves Had Lift Settings Outside TS 4.4.3 Acceptance Criteria.Possibly Caused by Steam Cutting in Disc Insert & Nozzle.Valves Satisfactorily Tested
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) |
|