On May 12, 2002, during the conduct of routine surveillance testing of the Unit 1 Ice Condenser, conducted in accordance with Technical Specification (TS) , 4.6.5.3.1 . b .3 , the Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant identified ice condenser door 15R failed its 40 degree opening force portion of the test.
The failure of ice condenser door 15R was due to incorrectly adjusted tension springs.
The springs were adjusted and ice condenser door 15R was successfully restested in accordance with TS 4.6.5.3.1 . b . 3 .
All remaining ice condenser doors were successfully tested and remained OPERABLE.
Analysis has demonstrated that the failure of one door did not render the ice condenser INOPERABLE. T Therefore, it has been determined that the failure of ice condenser door 15R had minimal safety significance. |
05000-315 2002 004 00 17. TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form (366A) Conditions Prior to Event Unit 1 - 0 percent power Unit 2 - 100 percent power
Description of Event
During performance of 12-MHP-4030-010-003, "Ice Condenser Lower Inlet Door Surveillance," Section 4.3, "Forty Degree Force Test," bay 15, door 15R (the right door), failed the opening force portion of the test. This test is performed to fulfill the surveillance testing requirements specified in Technical Specification (TS) 4.6.5.3.1.b.3.
The actual average opening force for door 15R was 7.458 pounds (lb). The established acceptance criteria for opening force is less than 6.625 lb. This door failed to meet the opening force requirement as specified in the surveillance procedure. This equates to an opening torque of 212.6 inch-pounds, in excess of the specified by TS.
The remaining TS surveillance requirements for the ice condenser doors were met.
Cause of Event
The Unit 1 ice condenser lower inlet doors were exempted from the requirement to perform the 40-degree force test surveillance as a result of Emergency License Amendment 265 for Unit 1, until this outage. During the performance of the 40-degree door test, which utilized the methodology developed during the Unit 2 refueling outage U2C13, door 15R exceeded the opening force criteria specified within the surveillance procedure.
An engineering evaluation concluded that this failure was directly attributable to the fact that during the extended shutdown, the door springs tension were set with the doors being held open with the previous 40 degree testing tool, which had been found to not position the door at the correct opening angle.
17. TEXT (if more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form (366A)
Analysis of Event
The Unit 1 Ice Condenser System, including the ice condenser doors, was refurbished prior to the previous operating cycle. For the identified condition, the potential impact of the failure of ice condenser door 15R was a failure to meet TS requirements. Given an assumed failure of both ice condenser doors in a specific bay to meet the 40-degree test opening force requirements, the ice condenser remained available to perform its design function. Analytical results have demonstrated that several ice condenser doors could fully fail to open upon demand without impacting the function of the ice condenser. As such, the Unit 1 ice condenser remained OPERABLE. Therefore, this event would not have adversely impacted the plant's ability to mitigate the consequences of an accident and therefore had minimal safety significance.
Corrective Actions
The springs for ice condenser door 15R were adjusted and the door was successfully retested in accordance with the requirements of TS 4.6.5.3.1.b.3.
Previous Similar Events
Michigan Power (I&M), to establish operability of the ice condenser doors was flawed.
Based on this discovery, I&M, was granted a one time exemption from the testing requirements of TS 4.6.5.3.1.b.3 until the unit entered an outage of sufficient duration that would facilitate the testing of the doors. Upon testing of the doors I&M identified that door 15R was incorrectly adjusted. Therefore the corrective actions established in LER 50-315/2002-001-00 could not have prevented the condition that is documented in this LER.
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| 05000315/LER-2002-001, Re Failure to Perform Ice Condenser Door Testing in Accordance with Technical Specifications | Re Failure to Perform Ice Condenser Door Testing in Accordance with Technical Specifications | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000316/LER-2002-001, Containment Isolation Valve Alignment Error During Local Leak Rate Testing | Containment Isolation Valve Alignment Error During Local Leak Rate Testing | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | | 05000315/LER-2002-002, Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valves Inoperable Due to Control Switch Position | Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valves Inoperable Due to Control Switch Position | | | 05000316/LER-2002-002, Technical Specification 3.9.4.c Was Violated During Core Alteration | Technical Specification 3.9.4.c Was Violated During Core Alteration | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | | 05000315/LER-2002-003 | Main Steam Safety Valves Exceed Allowable Lift Setpoints | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | | 05000316/LER-2002-003, Re Battery Inoperable for Longer than Allowed by Plants Technical Specification | Re Battery Inoperable for Longer than Allowed by Plants Technical Specification | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | | 05000315/LER-2002-004 | Unit 1 Ice Condenser Lower Inlet Door Test Failure | | | 05000316/LER-2002-004, Re Unanticipated Start of the Turbine Drive Auxiliary Feedwater Pump | Re Unanticipated Start of the Turbine Drive Auxiliary Feedwater Pump | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System | | 05000315/LER-2002-005, Manual Trip Due to Trip of East Main Feedwater Pump on June 14, 2002 | Manual Trip Due to Trip of East Main Feedwater Pump on June 14, 2002 | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation | | 05000316/LER-2002-005, On May 12,2002 Unit 2 Tripped Due to Instrument Rack 24-Volt DC Power Supply Failure | On May 12,2002 Unit 2 Tripped Due to Instrument Rack 24-Volt DC Power Supply Failure | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation | | 05000316/LER-2002-006, Regarding Reactor Trip Due to Low Condenser Vacuum | Regarding Reactor Trip Due to Low Condenser Vacuum | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000315/LER-2002-006, Switchyard Fire Results in Violation of Technical Specification 3.0.5 | Switchyard Fire Results in Violation of Technical Specification 3.0.5 | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | | 05000316/LER-2002-007, Re Technical Specification 3.8.1.1 Allowed Outage Time Exceeded | Re Technical Specification 3.8.1.1 Allowed Outage Time Exceeded | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | | 05000315/LER-2002-007, Technical Specification 3.3.3 1 Required Special Report for Inoperable Radiation Monitors | Technical Specification 3.3.3 1 Required Special Report for Inoperable Radiation Monitors | | | 05000315/LER-2002-008, Failure to Complete Unit Shutdown as Required by Technical Specification 3.6.5.1 | Failure to Complete Unit Shutdown as Required by Technical Specification 3.6.5.1 | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications |
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