05000313/FIN-2012005-01
From kanterella
Jump to navigation
Jump to search
Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Failure to Implement Adequate Design Change Controls for Permanent Removal of Service Water Check Valves SW-604A and SW-604B |
| Description | The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, which states, in part, that design changes, including field changes, shall be subject to design control measures commensurate with those applied to the original design. Specifically, from October 4, 2012, to November 8, 2012, the licensee failed to ensure that the design change, which directed the permanent removal of check valves SW-604A and SW-604B from the service water return lines of safety-related auxiliary building electrical rooms emergency chillers VCH-4A and VCH-4B, included the requisite evaluation of the initial design basis and mitigating safety system functions of these components. The licensee entered this issue into the corrective action program as Condition Report CR-ANO-1-2012-1681. The failure to ensure that safety-related system modifications were subject to design control measures commensurate with those applied to the original design for the removal of check valves SW-604A and SW-604B and replacement of these components with spool pieces was a performance deficiency. The finding is more than minor because it is associated with the design control attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone, and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Using Manual Chapter 0609, Attachment 4, Initial Characterization of Findings, and Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power, the finding was determined to have very low safety significance (Green) because the finding was a deficiency affecting the design or qualification of a mitigating component that did not affect the operability or functionality of the system. The inspectors determined that the finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with the component of decision making because the licensee failed to use conservative assumptions and adopt a requirement to demonstrate that the proposed action was safe in order to proceed rather than a requirement to demonstrate that it is unsafe in order to disapprove the action. Specifically, the licensee assumed that the check valves had no safety function without determining the actual design basis and mitigating safety system functions of these components. |
| Site: | Arkansas Nuclear  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000313/2012005 Section 1R07 |
| Date counted | Dec 31, 2012 (2012Q4) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.07 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | A Fairbanks A Sanchez C Osterholtz D Allen J Drake N Hernandez R Latta S Hedger T Buchanan T Farina W Schaup |
| CCA | H.14, Conservative Bias |
| INPO aspect | DM.2 |
| ' | |
Finding - Arkansas Nuclear - IR 05000313/2012005 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Finding List (Arkansas Nuclear) @ 2012Q4
Self-Identified List (Arkansas Nuclear)
| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||