05000313/FIN-2010003-06
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Failure to Follow Nuclear Instrumentation Procedure Results in an Automatic Reactor Trip |
| Description | The inspectors documented a self-revealing noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, for failure to follow Procedure OP-1304.032, Unit 1 Power Range Linear Amp Calibration at Power (NI Cal), Revision 32, which resulted in a Unit 1 automatic reactor trip. Specifically, while at 20 percent reactor power, the licensee failed to place the reactor demand station, and the diamond rod control stations, of the Babcock and Wilcox integrated control system, in manual during nuclear instrumentation calibrations, which resulted in automatic control rod withdrawal and reactor trip on high power. The licensee entered this issue into the corrective action program as Condition Report CR-ANO-1-2010-2056
The inspectors determined that the licensees failure to follow the nuclear instrumentation calibration procedure as written was a performance deficiency. Specifically, the licensee failed to properly implement Procedure OP-1304.032, Unit 1 Power Range Linear Amp Calibration at Power (NI Cal), Revision 32, and failed to place the integrated control system into manual while calibrating nuclear instrumentation detectors. The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the human performance attribute and directly affected the Initiating Events Cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical plant safety function during power operations, and is therefore a finding. Specifically, the failure to follow the nuclear instrumentation calibration procedure resulted in an actual reactor trip. The inspectors evaluated the significance of the finding using Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process, Phase 1 Worksheets, and determined that the finding was of very low safety significance because the finding did not contribute to both the likelihood of a reactor trip and the likelihood that mitigation equipment or functions would not be available. The finding was determined to have a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance, associated with work practices, H.4(c), in that the licensee failed to ensure supervisory and management oversight of work activities such that nuclear safety is supported. Specifically, the control room supervisor and the shift manager failed to provide adequate supervision for the nuclear instrumentation calibration activity which resulted in a reactor trip. |
| Site: | Arkansas Nuclear  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000313/2010003 Section 4OA3 |
| Date counted | Jun 30, 2010 (2010Q2) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Initiating Events |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71153 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | J Josey J Rotton N Greene A Sanchez D Stearns E Uribe G George J Clark |
| CCA | H.2, Field Presence |
| INPO aspect | LA.2 |
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Finding - Arkansas Nuclear - IR 05000313/2010003 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Arkansas Nuclear) @ 2010Q2
Self-Identified List (Arkansas Nuclear)
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