05000313/FIN-2009005-09
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Licensee-Identified Violation |
| Description | Title 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, requires, in part, measures to be established to assure that applicable regulatory requirements and the design basis, as defined in 10 CFR 50.2 and as specified in the license application, for those components to which this appendix applies are correctly translated into specifications, drawings, procedures, and instructions. Contrary to the above, the licensee approved nonconservative engineering calculations for two safety-related, motor-operator valve actuators where the adapter plate bolts were not included in the seismic and weak link engineering calculation, and eight safety-related, motor-operated valve actuators whose adapter plate installed bolts were smaller than those included in the applicable seismic and weak link engineering calculations. Specifically on September 11, 2009, during the performance of a postmaintenance test valve stroke for valve 2CV-4821-1, the 5/16-inch yoke to adapter plate fasteners failed during an over thrust event. Extent of condition review identified that valve 2CV-4820-2 seismic and weak link analysis did not include the adapter plate fasteners, and the seismic and weak link analysis for the following valves included adapter plate fasteners that were larger than what was actually installed in the field: Valves 2CV-3850-2, 2CV-0711-2, 2CV-0716-1, 2CV-8233-1, 2CV-5672-1, 2CV-5673-1, CV-2806, and CV-5611. This was licensee identified because the initial failure was discovered during postmaintenance testing of valve 2CV-4821-1, and the subsequent extent of condition review from the licensees corrective action process identified additional valves that were affected. Using NRC Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process, Phase 1 Worksheets, Mitigating Systems Cornerstone, the finding was determined to have very low safety significance because it did not represent an actual loss of safety function and did not screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic initiating event. The issue was entered into the licensees corrective action program as Condition Report CR-ANO-2-2009-2554 |
| Site: | Arkansas Nuclear  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000313/2009005 Section 4OA7 |
| Date counted | Dec 31, 2009 (2009Q4) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | Licensee-identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | |
| Inspectors (proximate) | A Sanchez G Werner J Clark J Josey M Haire M Shannon N O'Keefe R Azua S Rotton T Farnholtz |
| INPO aspect | |
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Finding - Arkansas Nuclear - IR 05000313/2009005 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Arkansas Nuclear) @ 2009Q4
Self-Identified List (Arkansas Nuclear)
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