05000313/FIN-2010003-01
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Failure to Follow Natural Emergencies Procedure to Control Site Missile Hazards During Severe Weather Warnings and Watches |
| Description | The inspectors identified a noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a for failure to follow Procedure OP-1203.025, Natural Emergencies, Revision 30. Specifically, on April 23, 2010, the licensee entered Procedure OP-1203.025 due to a tornado watch/warning and failed to identify and control potential missile hazards in and around the Unit 1 transformer yard. The licensee entered this issue into the corrective action program as Condition Report CR-ANO-C-2010-1003.
Failure of the licensee to assess and control potential missile hazards on site, in and around transformer yards was a performance deficiency. Specifically, the licensee failed to follow Procedure OP-1203.025, Natural Emergencies, Revision 30 and adequately secure missile hazards on site. The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the external hazards attribute and directly affected the Initiating Events Cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability while in shutdown or at power conditions, and is therefore a finding. Specifically, the failure of the licensee to secure missile hazards on site, especially around the safety related transformers increased the likelihood of a loss of power event that could result in upsetting plant stability. The inspectors evaluated the significance of the finding using Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process, Appendix G, Checklist 3, and determined the finding to be of a very low safety significance, Green, because the finding did not cause the loss of mitigating capability of core heat removal, inventory control, power availability, containment control, or reactivity control. The finding was determined to have a crosscutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution, associated with the corrective action program, P.1(d), in that the licensee failed to take appropriate corrective actions to address safety issues and adverse trends in a timely manner, commensurate with their safety significance and complexity. Specifically, the licensee failed to take effective corrective action from a previous NRC-identified issue, in that the corrective actions did not ensure that the control room operators had adequate guidance to asses and control potential missile hazards on site prior to the onset of severe weather. |
| Site: | Arkansas Nuclear  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000313/2010003 Section 1R01 |
| Date counted | Jun 30, 2010 (2010Q2) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Initiating Events |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.01 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | J Josey J Rotton N Greene A Sanchez D Stearns E Uribe G George J Clark |
| CCA | P.3, Resolution |
| INPO aspect | PI.3 |
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Finding - Arkansas Nuclear - IR 05000313/2010003 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Arkansas Nuclear) @ 2010Q2
Self-Identified List (Arkansas Nuclear)
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