05000311/LER-1981-041, Forwards LER 81-041/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

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Forwards LER 81-041/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl
ML20009G112
Person / Time
Site: Salem PSEG icon.png
Issue date: 07/09/1981
From: Uderitz R
Public Service Enterprise Group
To: Grier B
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
Shared Package
ML20009G113 List:
References
NUDOCS 8108030338
Download: ML20009G112 (3)
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LER-1981-041, Forwards LER 81-041/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl
Event date:
Report date:
3111981041R00 - NRC Website
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~O PSEG Public Service Electric and Gas Company 80 Park Plaza Newark, N.J. 07101 Phone 201/430-7000 July 9, 1981 Mr. Boyce H. Grier Director of USNRC Office of 7.nspection and Enforcement Region 1 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406 E

Dear Mr. Grier:

LICENSE NO. DPR-75 DOCKET NO. 50-311 REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE 81-41/03L Pursuant to the requirements of Salem Generating Station Unit No. 2 Technical Specifications, Section 6.9.1.9.b, we are submitting Licensee Event Report for Reportable Occurrence 81-41/03L.

This report is required within thirty (30) days of the occurrence.

Sincerely yours, R.

A. Uderitz General Manager -

Nuclear Production CC:

Director, Office of Inspection i

and Enforcement (30 copies)

Director, Office of Management Information and Program Control (3 copies)

[$$

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810803033s s10709 PDR ADOCK 05000311 S

PDR The Energy People 95 2001 (350M) 4 80

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Report Number:

81-41/03L Report Date:

July 9, 1981 Occurrence Date:

6-12-81 Facility:

Salem Generating Station, Unit 2 Public Service Electric and Gas Company Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

Residual Heat Removal Suction Relief Valve Actuation and Failure To Fully Reset.

This report was initiated by Incident Report 81-189.

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:

Mode 4 - Rx Power 0 - Unit Load 0 MWe DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

During Unit cooldown to Mode 5 while Reactor Coolant system degas-sing operations were in progress with 21 and 24 Reactor Coolant pumps, and while 21 and 22 Residual Heat Removal pumps were in service, and the Reactor Coolant system was at 300oF and 340 psig, the Residual Heat Removal system suction piping relief valve (2RH3) lifted and relieved to the Pressurizer Relief Tank at 0105 hours0.00122 days <br />0.0292 hours <br />1.736111e-4 weeks <br />3.99525e-5 months <br />, June 12, 1981.

Residual Heat Removal pumps 21 and 22 were removed from service and the isolation valves to the Residual Heat Removal

' tem (2RH1 and 2RH2) were closed.

The Reactor Coolant system depressurization transient was terminated at 0210 hours0.00243 days <br />0.0583 hours <br />3.472222e-4 weeks <br />7.9905e-5 months <br />, the Residual Heat Removal system was returned to service and at that time 2RH3 appeared to be reseated.

Reactor Coolant system pres-sure was increased to 335 psig.

At 0355 hours0.00411 days <br />0.0986 hours <br />5.869709e-4 weeks <br />1.350775e-4 months <br />, the Reactor Coolant system leakrate to the Pressurizer Tank was identified at 13 gpm.

Action Statement 3.4.7.2.b was entered.

Reactor Coolant system pressure was reduced to 280 psig to again reseat 2RH3, at 0549 hours0.00635 days <br />0.153 hours <br />9.077381e-4 weeks <br />2.088945e-4 months <br />, June 12, 1981, the Unit entered mode 5 and Action Statement 3.4.7.2.b was terminated.

This constituted operation in a degraded mode in accordance with-Technical Specification 6.9.1.9.b.

DESIGNATION OF APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:

Equipment failure.

Relief valve (2RH3) failed to reseat completely following actuation.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:

Technical Specification 3.4.7.2.b requires that with any reactor coolant system leakage greater than the limits specified, excluding pressure boundary leakage from reactor coolant system pressure isolation valves, reduce the leakage rate to within limits within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> or be in at least hot standby within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in cold shutdown within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

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LER 81-41/03L July 9, 1981

CORRECTIVE ACTION

The lift setting on relief valve (2RH3) was adjusted to 375 psig and tested.

Upon the return of the Unit to service (2RH3) performed satisfactory.

FAILURE DATA:

Crosby Valve and Gage Co.

Prepared By J.

J.

Espey IW /'

W s

Mana'ger'- Salem Generating Station

~

SORC Meeting No.

81-58 l

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