05000305/FIN-2012009-05
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Finding | |
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Title | Failure to Ensure Correct Criterion Used for Time Critical Operator Actions to Prevent a Steam Generator Overfill |
Description | The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance and an associated Non-Cited Violation (NCV) of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, for the licensees failure to ensure consistent criterion was used in OP-KW-ORT-MISC-014, Validation of Time Critical Operator Actions, Revision 2 (i.e., the Operations procedure) to validate the time-critical operator actions for Break Flow Termination. Specifically, the licensee failed to ensure the Break Flow Termination criterion (i.e., the time frame when the primary-to-secondary flow in the ruptured steam generator (SG) is required to be stopped) was consistent with the criterion contained in CN-CRA-03-16, Kewaunee Power Station Supplemental Steam Generator Tube Rupture Margin to Overfill Analysis, Revision 0 (i.e., the calculation). The licensee entered this finding into their Corrective Action Program as CR492485, 2012 CDBI TCA Validation Criteria Does Not Agree with Engineering Basis Document, dated October 19, 2012. The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the Mitigating Systems cornerstones attribute of procedure quality and affected the cornerstones objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, during the performance of the steam generator tube rupture (SGTR) design basis event scenario on the licensees simulator, the inspectors noted the operators did not terminate the primary-to-secondary break flow within the time frame assumed in design calculation. Therefore, the inspectors concluded there was reasonable doubt that adequate margin existed to ensure SG overfill would have been prevented during an actual SGTR design basis event. The inspectors determined the finding could be evaluated using the Mitigating Systems Screening questions in Exhibit 2 of IMC 0609 and concluded the finding screened as having very low safety significance (Green). The inspectors did not identify a cross-cutting aspect associated with this finding because the finding was not representative of current performance. |
Site: | Kewaunee ![]() |
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Report | IR 05000305/2012009 Section 1R21 |
Date counted | Dec 31, 2012 (2012Q4) |
Type: | NCV: Green |
cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
Identified by: | NRC identified |
Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.21 |
Inspectors (proximate) | N Valos D Szwarc G Hausman C Baron G Skinner A Stone I Hafeez |
INPO aspect | |
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Finding - Kewaunee - IR 05000305/2012009 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Kewaunee) @ 2012Q4
Self-Identified List (Kewaunee)
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