05000296/LER-2008-001, Regarding Unanticipated Auto-Start of Emergency Diesel Generators

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Regarding Unanticipated Auto-Start of Emergency Diesel Generators
ML081890568
Person / Time
Site: Browns Ferry Tennessee Valley Authority icon.png
Issue date: 07/07/2008
From: West R
Tennessee Valley Authority
To:
Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
LER 08-001-00
Download: ML081890568 (6)


LER-2008-001, Regarding Unanticipated Auto-Start of Emergency Diesel Generators
Event date:
Report date:
Reporting criterion: 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(B), System Actuation

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii)

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x)
2962008001R00 - NRC Website

text

July 07, 2008 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 10 CFR 50.73 ATTN: Document Control Desk Mail Stop: OWFN, P1-35 Washington, D. C. 20555-0001

Dear Sir:

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY - BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT (BFN) -

UNIT 3 - DOCKET 50-296 - FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) 50-296/2008-001 The enclosed report provides details of an unanticipated auto-start of emergency diesel generators. TVA is submitting this report in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) as any event of condition that resulted in manual or automatic actuation of any system listed in paragraph 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(iv)(B). There are no commitments contained in this letter.

Sincerely, Original signed by R. G. West Site Vice President, BFN cc: See page 2

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 2 July 07, 2008 Enclosure cc (Enclosure):

Ms. Eva Brown, Project Manager U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (MS 08G9)

One White Flint, North 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, Maryland 20852-2739 Rebecca L. Nease, Branch Chief U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II Sam Nunn Atlanta Federal Center 61 Forsyth Street, SW, Suite 23T85 Atlanta, Georgia 30303-8931 NRC Resident Inspector Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant 10833 Shaw Road Athens, Alabama 35611-6970

NRC FORM 366 (9-2007)

NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (9-2007)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

(See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)

APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES 08/31/2010

, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.

1. FACILITY NAME Browns Ferry Unit 3
2. DOCKET NUMBER 05000296
3. PAGE 1 of 4
4. TITLE: Unanticipated Auto-Start of Emergency Diesel Generators
5. EVENT DATE
6. LER NUMBER
7. REPORT DATE
8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR SEQUENTIAL NUMBER REV NO.

MONTH DAY YEAR FACILITY NAME None DOCKET NUMBER N/A 05 05 2008 2008 - 001 - 00 07 07 2008 FACILITY NAME None DOCKET NUMBER N/A

9. OPERATING MODE
11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check all that apply) 5
10. POWER LEVEL 000 20.2201(b) 20.2201(d) 20.2203(a)(1) 20.2203(a)(2)(i) 20.2203(a)(2)(ii) 20.2203(a)(2)(iii) 20.2203(a)(2)(iv) 20.2203(a)(2)(v) 20.2203(a)(2)(vi) 20.2203(a)(3)(i) 20.2203(a)(3)(ii) 20.2203(a)(4) 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A) 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A) 50.36(c)(2) 50.46(a)(3)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C) 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B) 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D) 50.73(a)(2)(vii) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(x) 73.71(a)(4) 73.71(a)(5)

OTHER Specify in Abstract below or in (If more space is required, use additional copies of (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17) operated which generated a half scram on RPS Channel 3B. This coupled with the pre-existing RPS Channel 3A half scram provided the full reactor scram signal.

V. ASSESSMENT OF SAFETY CONSEQUENCES

The safety consequences of this event were not significant. All safety systems operated as required. Prior to the event, Unit 3 was in a shutdown condition with the control rods fully inserted.

The transient on the plant equipment was minimal. Therefore, TVA concludes that the health and safety of the public was not affected by this event.

VI. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

A.

Immediate Corrective Actions

Operations returned the effected equipment to the pre-event configuration in accordance with plant instructions.

B.

Corrective Actions to Prevent Recurrence (1)

The alignment issue with the STA switch was resolved. TVA will revise, as needed, the breaker maintenance program to improve reliability.

VII. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

A.

Failed Components None.

B.

Previous LERs on Similar Events None.

C.

Additional Information

Corrective action document for this report is PER 144272.

D.

Safety System Functional Failure Consideration:

This event is not a safety system functional failure according to NEI 99-02.

E.

Scram With Complications Consideration:

This event was not a complicated scram according to NEI 99-02.

VIII. COMMITMENTS

None.

(1) TVA does not consider the corrective action a regulatory requirement. The completion of the action will be tracked in TVA's Corrective Action Program.