05000287/LER-1983-002, Forwards LER 83-002/01T-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

Forwards LER 83-002/01T-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

ML20073C477
Person / Time
Site:	Oconee
Issue date:	03/25/1983
From:	Tucker H DUKE POWER CO.
To:	James O'Reilly NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
Shared Package
ML20073C479	List: 05000287/LER-1983-002, Forwards LER 83-002/01T-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl 05000287/LER-1983-002-01, /01T-0:on 830225,engineering Evaluation of Reactor Protective Sys Pump Power Monitor Test Revealed Failure to Have One Channel Tripped When Three Channels Operable.Caused by Deficient Procedures.Procedures Revised
References
NUDOCS 8304130185
Download: ML20073C477 (3)

LER-1983-002, Forwards LER 83-002/01T-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

Event date:
Report date:
2871983002R00 - NRC Website

text

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Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission i

Region II 101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30303 Subject: Oconee Nuclear Station Docket No. 50-287

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

Please find attached Reportable Occurrence Report R0-287/83-02. This report is submitted pursuant to Oconee Nuclear Station Technical Specification 6.6.2.1.a(2) which concerns an operation subject to a limiting condition for operation which was less conservative than the least conservative aspect of the limiting condition for operation established in the Technical Specifications, and describes an incident which is considered to be of no significance with respect to its effect on the health and safety of the public. My letter of March 11, 1983 addressed the delay in preparation of this report.

Very truly yours, fdE. VAffff

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Hal B. Tucker JCP/php Attachment cc: Document Control Desk U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 Mr. E. L. Conner, Jr.

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 Mr. J. C. Bryant NRC Resident Inspector Oconee Nuclear Station INPO Records Center Suite 1500 0FFKiTAT 00'ff'];

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Duke Power Company Oconee Nuclear Station b

3 port Number: R0-287/83-02 Report Date: March 25, 1983 Occurrence Date: February 25, 1983 Facility: Oconce Unit 3, Seneca, South Carolina Identification of Occurrence: Failure to meet Technical Specification requirements

~during Reactor Protection System Pump Power Monitor Tests.

ConditionsPrIortoOccurrence:

100% FP Description of Occurrence: On February 25, 1983, engineering evaluation revealed that certain test procedures required a condition that was in violation of Technical Specification Table 3.5.1-1,Part 9, Note (h). During the performance of the procedures for the Reactor Protective System (RPS) channels' pump power monitor instrument calibration that day, a channel was made inoperable but was not tripped as required by the Technical Specification table note. While testing all RPS pump power monitor channels, channel 3 began to perform erratically.

Before continuing, the conditions for operability were discussed, and through evaluation, it was discovered that the test procedures indeed allow for only three channels to be operable during testing but omit the requirement of Note (h) to have the fourth channel in the tripped state.

1 Apparent Cause/of Occurrence: The cause of this occurrence was a deficiency in procedure. The station procedure did not include the stipulation that the fourth

l channel be in the tripped state as required by Technical Specification Ttble 3.5.1-1, Part 9, Note (h). When Note (h) was added to the Technical Specification in 1981, the approval / review system was flawed in that it allowed this change to be incor-porated into the Specifications without incorporation into the affected procedures.

Analysis of Occurrence: During the testing, if the pump in the inoperable channel and one other pump had been lost, the reactor would have tripped on flux / flow imbalance.

Othcc RPS parameters which were operable that would have tripped the reactor as a result of loss of coolant pumps are Pressure-Temperature Trip and Reactor Coolant Pressure Trip. Hence, the health and safety of the public were not endangered.

Corrective Action

For the immediate corrective action, the channel was tripped to comply with the Technical Specifications. The watt transducer was replaced to correct the; problem with the channel. October 26, 1982, a change was made to a station directive to require that the responsible sections affected by a Technical Specification change provide a written response to the Station Licensing Engineer. The response will describe how the section will implement the Technical Specification change.

This is to ensure that the intent of the Technical Spec-ification changes is met, and has corrected the flaw that previously allowed for the existence,of the inadequate procedures that caused this occurrence.

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Report Number R0-287/83-02 Page 2 l

For changes affecting the Instrumentation and Electrical (I&E) Support Engineers, l

NRC approved changes will be checked by the engineer responsible for the system affected by the change.

Previously, the engineer responsible for the system affected would check the proposed change and make comments and changes of pro-cedures. The engineer responsible for Technical Specification change coordina-tion within the I&E support section would make comments about the approved l

Technical Specification change.

I&E procedures will be changed to trip the channel being tested as required by l

Technical Specifications.

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