05000269/LER-1983-007, Forwards LER 83-007/01T-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

Forwards LER 83-007/01T-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

ML20072N703
Person / Time
Site:	Oconee
Issue date:	03/22/1983
From:	Tucker H DUKE POWER CO.
To:	James O'Reilly NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
Shared Package
ML20072N706	List: 05000269/LER-1983-007, Forwards LER 83-007/01T-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl 05000269/LER-1983-007-01, /01T-0:on 830303,manual Containment Isolation Valve CF-19 Discovered Open on All Three Units.Caused by Personnel Error Due to Inadequate Review for Procedure Approval.Valve Closed & Procedures Revised
References
NUDOCS 8304010590
Download: ML20072N703 (2)

LER-1983-007, Forwards LER 83-007/01T-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

Event date:
Report date:
2691983007R00 - NRC Website

text

2-9 DUKE POWER GoxuXsvP9,s., r; l'.O. Box 33180 : 7 (, (, g ;

,,a CHAHLOTrE, N.C. 28242 IIAL H. TUCKER TELEPHONE VME PRESIDENT (704) 373-4531 WtT4. EAR PINDDtTTION March 22, 1983 Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II 101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30303 Re: Oconee Nuclear Station Docket No.

50-269

Dear Sir:

Please find attached Reportable Occurrence Report R0-269/83-07. This report is submitted pursuant to Oconee Nuclear Station Technical Specification 6.6.2.1.a(2) which concerns an operation subject to a limiting condition for operation which was less conservative than the least conservative aspect of the limiting condition for operation established in the Technical Specifications, and describes an incident which is considered to be of no significance with respect to its effect on the health and safety of the public.

A task force has been formed to investigate the recent containment integrity violations and to identify additional corrective actions. Due to the generic implications of this occurrence, further investigation delayed the completion of this report. The resident inspector was advised of the delay of the report which was to have been submitted by March 17, 1983. We apciogize for this delay.

Very truly yours, B. %

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//

Hal B. Tucker JCP/php Attachment cc: Document Control Desk Mr. J. C. Bryant U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission NRC Resident Inspector Washington, D. C. 20555 Oconee Nuclear Station INPO Records Center Mr. E. L. Conner, Jr.

Suite 1500 Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation 1100 Circle 75 Parkway U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Atlanta, Georgia 30339 Washington, D. C. 20555 8304010590 030322

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Duke Power Company Oconee Wuclear Station Report Number: R0-269/83-07 Report Date: March 22, 1983 Occurrence Date: March 3, 1983 Facility: Oconee Units 1, 2, and 3, Seneca, South Carolina Identification of Occurrence: Manual containment isolation valve CF-19 (Core Flood) was found open on all three units.

Conditions Prior to Occurrence: Oconee 1: 100% Full Power Oconee 2: 100% Full Power Oconee 3:

100% Full Power Description of Occurrence: On March 3, 1983 at about 1300, as a result of a follow-up investigation performed due to the recent conern of the status of valves classified as manual containment isolation valves, it was discovered that valve CF-19 was required to be open by Oconee Technical Specifications, but was open, by procedure, on all three units. CF-19 is a manual containment isolation valve on the sample line from the Core Flood Tanks. All manual containment isolation valves are required by Technical Specifications to be closed for containment integrity. Therefore, containment integrity was technically violated.

Apparent Cause of Occurrence: Previously, a procedure change was approved to allow CF-19 to remain open. The reason for the change was to provide for easier sampling of the Core Flood Tanks. The cause of this incident is classified as personnel error since the Technical Specifications applications of opening the valve were overlooked during the usual review process for procedure approval.

Analysis of Occurrence: Valve CF-19 is a 1" manual containment isolation valve. The redundant isolation valves, CF-3 and CF-4, are normally closed electric operator valves. During the time CF-3 and CF-4 were open for sampling, positive control was maintained on these valves from the Control Room.

If an accident were to occur while these valves were open, the operator would have closed these valves from the Control Room. Additionally, the valves and the piping between the Reactor Building isolation valves are both safety related and seismic. Had an accident occurred, the integrity of the piping would not have been jeopardized and the containment would not have been breached at this penetration. The health and safety of the public were not endangered.

Corrective Action

Valve CF-19 was closed on all three units. All designated manual containment isolation valves were verified as being closed. The Core Flood procedure and the Reactor Building manual check list have both been changed to include CF-19 as a closed valve. Additionally, when it is required to open CF-19 above 200 F and 300 psig in the RCS, a man will be stationed at that valve. He will be in direct communication with the Control Room and will be directed to close the valve should an accident occur. A task force has been formed to review all recent containment integrity incidents and to identify

additional corrective actions

All qualified reviewers and superintendents will review this report.