05000269/LER-1983-010, Forwards LER 83-010/01T-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

Forwards LER 83-010/01T-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

ML20069K336
Person / Time
Site:	Oconee
Issue date:	04/15/1983
From:	Tucker H DUKE POWER CO.
To:	James O'Reilly NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
Shared Package
ML20069K338	List: 05000269/LER-1983-010, Forwards LER 83-010/01T-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl
References
NUDOCS 8304260309
Download: ML20069K336 (3)

LER-2083-010, Forwards LER 83-010/01T-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

Event date:
Report date:
2692083010R00 - NRC Website

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DUKE Powsn GOMPAh'Y P.O. box 33180 CHARLOTrE. N.C. 28242 HAL B. TUCKER retrenose vice permanswv (704) 373-4534

= = ^= - c = April 15, 1983 7,$

$W s

r0 Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator 3 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 7 'h Region II g 7 ',

101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900 ..

-Atlanta, Georgia 30303 -

.c Re: Oconee Nuclear Station -

Docket No. 50-269

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

Please find attached Reportable Occurrence Report R0-269/83-10. This report is submitted pursuant to Oconee Nuclear Station Technical Specification 6.6.2.1.a(2) which concerns an operation subject to a limiting condition for operation which was less conservative than the least conservative aspect of the limiting condition for operation established in the Technical Specifica-tions, and describes an incident which is considered'to be of no significance with respect to its effect on the health and safety of the public. My letter of March 30,1983 addressed the delay in preparation of this report.

Very truly yours, O r es Hal B. Tucker JCP/php Attachment cc: Document Control Desk U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 i

INPO Records Center l Suite 1500 1100 Circle 75 Parkway Atlanta, Georgia 30339 7-Mr. J. C. Bryant i NRC Resident Inspector Oconee Nuclear Station i

Mr. E. L. Conner, Jr.

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 3gy%7 8304260309 830415 __ - g ;2_;

PDR ADOCK 05000269 s PM

Duke Power Company Oconee Nuclear Station Report Number: R0-269/83-10 Report Date: April 15, 1983 Occurrence Date: March 17, 1983 Facility: Oconee Unit 1, Seneca, South Carolina Identification of Occurrence: The Unit 1 Emergency Hatch Inner Door was found opened.

Conditions Prior to Occurrence: Oconee 1 - 100% Full Power Description of Occurrence: On March 17, 1983, plant technicians entered the Emergency Hatch through the outer door to perform the Reactor Building Emergency Lock Leak Rate Test. After completing testing and leaving the Emergency Hatch area through the outer door, the outer hatch door was closed and due to personnel error the inner hatch door was inadvertently opened. During the performance of the test as well as after, the Emergency Hatch inner / outer door open statalarm in the control room was actuated. At the time of the incident, the statalarm was considered to be inoperable and a work request was written to have it checked.

As a result, upon completion of the Air Lock Test, the operators did not acknow-ledge that the air lock had not been returned to normal. At approximately 0930 on March 21, 1983 it was visually verified that the inner door was open approxi-mately 6 to 10 inches, which violates Technical Specification 3.6.3.(a). See Attachment 1 for a drawing of the Emergency Hatch.

Apparent Cause of Occurrence: The apparent cause of this incident has been classified as a personnel error and defective procedures. The person involved in the closing of the hatch door positioned the pointer on the handwheel outside the "both doors closed and latched" indication marks. The procedure used to perform the Leak Rate Test did not include a step to close the outer door. There was no step in the procedure to perform an independent verification to assure both doors are properly closed. The indicator lig!*s on the outside of the outer hatch door were not labeled and one of the two lights was not working.

The light covers for both lights were missing. The statalarm was checked on March 18, 1983 and determined to be working satisfactorily. On March 21, 1983, in preparation for investigating the door limit switches, the inner door was found open 6 to 10 inches.

Analysis of Occurrence: During the time that the inner door was open 6 to 10 inches, the outer door was closed. The design of the inner / outer Emergency Hatch is such that only one door can be open at a time. Thus, if entry into the Emergency Hatch area through the outer door was attempted, while the inner door was open, the inner door would have closed first prior to opening the outer door. Operation with an Emergency Hatch door inoperable does not impair the integrity of the containment, since either door will meet the design specifica-tions for structural integrity and leak rate. Thus, the health and safety of the public were not endangered by this incident.

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Corrective Action: The-immediate corrective action taken was to close the inner door and to verify that the Emergency Hatch doors and the Personnel Hatch doors on all three units were properly closed. The Reactor Building Emergency Hatch Leak Rate Test' procedure has been changed to include steps to properly close the Emergency Hatch doors. The procedure was revised to require that an independent verification be performed to assure that both hatch doors are properly closed. The analogous changes have also been made to the Leak Rate Test procedure for the Personnel Hatch. The local indicator lights located outside the outer hatch door for all three units were repaired as illustrated in Attachment 2. The remote indicator lights located in the control room and associated circuitry for all three units were verified to be functioning properly. The personnel involved in this incident have been counseled. In addition, a task force was formed to review all plant procedures /

practices and .to make the necessary changes to assure containment integrity is not compromised.

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