05000286/FIN-2016004-03
From kanterella
Jump to navigation
Jump to search
Finding | |
---|---|
Title | Failure to Provide Indication of a Bypassed RPS Channel During Testing |
Description | Green. The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance when Entergy conducted testing on the Unit 3 reactor protection system (RPS) that was contrary to the guidance in IEEE standard 279-1968, a standard to which Indian Point Unit 3 was committed. Specifically, Entergy made temporary changes to their Unit 3 reactor coolant temperature channel functional test procedures, pressurizer pressure loop functional test procedures, and nuclear power range channel axial offset calibration procedures to use jumpers to bypass RPS trip functions, without meeting the requirement to have continuous indication in the control room when a part of RPS is bypassed for any purpose. Entergy closed the temporary modification and returned to testing without using jumpers to bypass the tested channel. The inspectors determined the finding was more than minor because this finding was associated with the procedure quality attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and affected its objective to ensure the reliability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the new test method reduced the reliability of the RPS tripping the unit under conditions requiring an overtemperature delta temperature (OTDT) trip. The inspectors evaluated this finding using IMC 0609, Attachment 4, Initial Characterization of Findings. The inspectors determined that the finding affected the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and evaluated the finding using Appendix A, Exhibit 2, Mitigating Systems Screening Questions. The finding is of very low safety significance (Green) because it did not affect both the RPS trip signal to initiate a reactor scram and the function of other redundant trips or diverse methods of reactor shutdown. The inspectors identified a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance, Conservative Bias, because Entergy did not determine the test method was safe in order to proceed. Specifically, Entergy staff rationalized that the use of jumpers was allowable because they were focused on completing the required surveillance testing. [H.14 Conservative Bias] |
Site: | Indian Point ![]() |
---|---|
Report | IR 05000286/2016004 Section 1R18 |
Date counted | Dec 31, 2016 (2016Q4) |
Type: | Finding: Green |
cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
Identified by: | NRC identified |
Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.18 |
Inspectors (proximate) | B Haagensen C Safouri E Dipaolo G Newman H Gray J D'Antonio J Deboer J Furia L Mckown M Henrion N Embert P Kaufman S Rich |
CCA | H.14, Conservative Bias |
INPO aspect | DM.2 |
' | |
Finding - Indian Point - IR 05000286/2016004 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Finding List (Indian Point) @ 2016Q4
Self-Identified List (Indian Point)
| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||