05000282/LER-2003-002, Appendix R Safe Shutdown Analysis Issues

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Appendix R Safe Shutdown Analysis Issues
ML031530368
Person / Time
Site: Prairie Island  Xcel Energy icon.png
Issue date: 05/23/2003
From: Solymossy J
Nuclear Management Co
To:
Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
L-PI-03-047 LER 03-002-00
Download: ML031530368 (5)


LER-2003-002, Appendix R Safe Shutdown Analysis Issues
Event date:
Report date:
2822003002R00 - NRC Website

text

Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant Operated by Nuclear Management Company, LLC Cornmilied b May 23,2003 L-PI 047 10 CFR 50.73 U S Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT DOCKET NOS. 50-282 AND 50-306 LICENSE NOS. DPR-42 AND DPR-60 LER 1-03-02, APPENDIX R SAFE SHUTDOWN ANALYSIS ISSUES The Licensee Event Report for this occurrence is attached. In the report, we made no new NRC commitments. Please contact us if you require additional information related rai T sland Nuclear Generating Plant CC Regional Administrator, USNRC, Region 111 Project Manager, Prairie island Nuclear Generating Plant, USNRC, NRR NRC Resident Inspector - Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant Glenn Wilson, State of Minnesota Attachment 1717 Wakonade Drive East Welch, Minnesota 55089-9642 Telephone: 651.388.1 121

NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-01 04 EXPIRES 6-30-2001 (1-2001)

COMMISSION

, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor and a person is not required to respond to. the information collection.

FACILITY NAME (I)

DOCKET NUMBER (2)

PAGE (3)

Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant Unit I 1 OF 5

TITLE (4) 05000 282 APPENDIX R SAFE SHUTDOWN ANALYSIS ISSUES EVENT DATE (5)

LER NUMBER (6)

REPORT DATE (7)

OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)

FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER SEQUENTIAL REV MO DAY YEAR YEAR NUMBER NO MO DAY YEAR Prairie Island Unit 2 05000 306 FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 03 26 03 03 00 05 23 03 LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

UAME I TELEPHONE NUMBER (Indude Area Code)

Jeff Kivi I

651-388-1 121 SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

EXPECTED MONTH DAY YEAR YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION SUBMISSION DATE).

I 4 I N 0 DATE (15)

WSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, Le., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16)

In August 2002, a Nuclear Management Company (NMC) evaluation of potential flow diversion (an mgoing assessment of the extent of a similar condition reported in LER 1-98-1 5) was in progress. At this Doint in the evaluation, NMC identified (as a conservative measure prior to completing the detailed evaluation) nterim actions to preclude the potential for adversely affecting safe shutdown. Before the interim actions were mplemented the potential existed for adverse effects on safe shutdown.

hat, absent compensatory measures, the ability to safely shutdown could have been adversely affected in two xses. In the first case, a tire postulated in certain Fire Areas could result in a spurious start of a containment
pray (CS) pump and spurious opening of its associated discharge motor-operated valve (MOV), which Nould divert the sole credited source of reactor coolant system (RCS) makeup - the refueling water storage

.ank (RWST) - into containment. In the second case, the scavenging and combustion air dampers for the jiesel-driven emergency cooling water pumps (which are required to open when the associated pump iperates) were found to be vulnerable to postulated fires in certain Fire Areas.

bund to be effective compensatory measures until corrective actions are completed.

On March 26, 2003, with both units operating at 100% power, the completed evaluation determined Upon completing the evaluation, the interim actions implemented in August 2002 were assessed and (If more space is required, use additional copies of (Ifmore space is required, use additional copies of (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

CORRECTIVE ACT1 ON Immediate:

1. Prior to completing the evaluation of these conditions with respect to whether they potentially affected the ability to safely shutdown, interim actions were implemented as a conservative measure. These actions consisted of revising the plant procedures for responding to a catastrophic fire. The revisions included steps for the operators to verify that the Containment Spray pumps for the affected unit were de-energized at the breaker and steps for the operators to isolate air to CD-34136 and CD-34139 to fail the dampers open.

Subsequent:

2. Upon determining that these conditions did indeed have a potential to affect the ability to safely shutdown, the interim actions were evaluated as suitable compensatory measures.

These measures will remain in effect until planned corrective actions are completed.

Planned:

3. With the compensatory measures in place, the affected components are considered to be operable, but degraded. Actions to restore full operability of the affected components will be selected and completed.

FAILED COMPONENT IDENTIFICATION None.

PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS

A similar issue related to flow diversion was identified in LER 1-98-1 5. The current conditions were identified as a result of completing corrective actions associated with LER 1-98-1 5.

NRC FORM 266A (1-2001)