:on 980626,leakage Through Redundant CR Steam Exclusion Dampers Was Found to Exceed Value Assumed in HELB Analysis.Caused by Actuator Being Out of Adjustment.Will Implement Design Change & Repair or Replace Dampers| ML20236T412 |
| Person / Time |
|---|
| Site: |
Prairie Island  |
|---|
| Issue date: |
07/27/1998 |
|---|
| From: |
Kivi J NORTHERN STATES POWER CO. |
|---|
| To: |
|
|---|
| Shared Package |
|---|
| ML20236T406 |
List: |
|---|
| References |
|---|
| LER-98-001, LER-98-1, NUDOCS 9807280168 |
| Download: ML20236T412 (5) |
|
text
e NRC MRM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY CCH4ISSION APPROVED kY CNB NO. 3150-0104 (4 gg
- EXPIRES 04/30/98 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS MANDATORY INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 PRS. REPORTED LESSONS LEARNED ARE INCORPORA LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
EIN 585 ATE Ib8* ^II0Eu'ATi!N SA"O EECOROs$"A TH U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE
- A[3g$T0N
" PROJECT (3150-0104L OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET.
, E" (See reverse for required number of 20 3.
digits / characters for each block)
FACILITY MAME (1)
DOCKET NUMDER (2)
FAi3E (3)
Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant Unit 1 05000 282 1 OF 5 TITIE (4)
Le kage Through Redundant Control Room Steam Exclusion Dampers Found to Exceed Value A% umed in the HELB Analysis EVENT DATE (5)
LER NUMBER (6)
REPORT DATE (7)
OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)
MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR GEQUENTIAL REVISION MONTH DAY YEAR FACILITY NAME DOCfET NUMBER
"""*E"
""8'"
Prairie Island Unit 2 05000 306 06 26 98 98 -
01 01 7
27 98 F^'1L m N^M' "T""
05000 OPERATING THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT IO Tk2, REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR S: (Check one or moIe) (11) 1 20.220ico) zo.2203(ex2)(v) so.73(a)(2xi) so.73(a)(2)(vui)
POWER 20.2203(ax1) 20.2203(a)(3)(i) 50.73(a)(2)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(x) 100 20.2203(ax2xi)
Zo.2203(ax3xn>
so.73(a)(2)(iii) 73.73 20.2203(a)(2)(ii) 20.2203(a)(4) 50.73(a)(2xiv)
OTHER m
Zo.2203(ax2xin) bo.36(c)(3)
V bo.73(ax2)(v) gggn Abs ra below or 20.2203(a)(2)(sv) 50.36(cx2) 50.73(a)(2)(vn)
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12) hedL i ti,La Mer, NJ13LE ilhbiude AIta LuGt)
Jeff Kivi 612-388-1121 CCHPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH CCHPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)
CAUSE
SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTAB(E
CAUSE
SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE TO NPRDS TO NPRDS X
VI CDMP Po14 N
3 4 SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)
EXPECTED MONTH DAV YEAR YES y
NO SUBKISSION (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE).
ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e.,
approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines)
(li)
On June 26,1998, follow-up testing (a corrective action from the originalissuance of this LER) found cn cdditional pair of inoperable steam exclusion dampers. Dampers CD-34146 and CD-34147 were t:st::d individually for leakage and were found to leak in excess of limits delineated in the USAR. Both drmpers were declared inoperable and closed in less than 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />, per Technical Specification 3.4.C.2. In addition, a blank was installed over the affected duct within approximately one hour of the det:rmination that the dampers were inoperable.
Tha blank will remain until CD-34146 and CD-34147 are repaired or replaced and post-maintenance t:sted to ensure they are operable.
980728016e 980724 PDR ADOCK 05000282 S
PDR NRC FORM 368 (4 951
MRC FCIDI366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY CChetISSICtt 14 est,
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION FACII.ITY MADE (1)
DOCKET 1.ER NUMBER (6)
PAGE (3)
MhdBER (2).
Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant Unit 1 05000 282 YEAR KUUN L R
2 OF 5
98 -- 01 01 i
TEKT UE more space is requiredo use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17) l i
i
EVENT DESCRIPTION
l On January 17,1998, Units 1 and 2 were operating at 100% power. As a part of the in-leakage testing bring conducted on the control room envelope (to support habitability assumptions for post-accident control room dose analysis), the control room outside air supply dampers' were tested individually for lerktge. These outside air dampers also serve as steam exclusion dampers in the event of a high en:rgy line break (HELB) outside of containment. Steam exclusion damper leakage limits for purposes of the test were based on values given in Appendix l of the Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR).
Tha tracer gas testing of these dampers indicated that damper leakage on each of two redundant steam exclusion dampers exceeded these leakage limits for steam exclusion.
Damper testing first revealed that one of the control room outside air supply dampers (CD-34180) j exceeded the steam exclusion damper leakage limits. The redundant damper (CD-34177) was then l
closed (per Technical Specification 3.4.C.1.a). During testing of damper CD-34177, damper CD-34180 was repaired. Results of testing CD-34177 revealed that it also exceeded the maximum leakage limits i
for steam exclusion.. Both dampers CD-34180 and CD-34177 were declared inoperable.
l An LCO was declared (per Technical Specification 3.4.C.2) based on two redundant steam exclusion dampers being inoperable. Damper CD-34180 was immediately re-tested and resultant leakage was acceptable. Damper CD-34180 was declared operable and the LCO exited. Damper CD-34180 as well as damper CD-34145 are currently maintained in the closed position (per Technical Specification 3.4.C.1.a), until damper CD-34177 is repaired or replaced.
Similar damper testing on the opposite train of control room outside air supply dampers revealed I:akege in excess of the acceptable limit for damper CD-34176 (the functional counterpart of CD-l~
34177). However, neither of its redundant dampers were found to have leakage in excess of j
ecceptable limits, thus, no LCO was declared for this train with respect to Technical Specification L
3.4.C.2. Currently, dampers CD-34178 and CD-34142 are being maintained in the closed position (per Technical Specification 3.4.C.1.a), until CD-34176 is repaired or replaced.
On June 26,' 1998, Units 1 and 2 were operating at 100% power. As a part of in-leakage testing of the Steam Exclusion Dampers undertaken as part of Corrective Action 3 of the originalissuance of this Licensee Event Report, the Control Room Exhaust Air Dampers CD-34146 and CD-34147 were tested individually for leakage. These exhaust air dampers also serve as steam exclusion dampers in the evsnt of a HELB outside of containment. Steam exclusion damper leakage limits for purposes of the l
tnt were based on values given in Appendix I of the USAR. Dampers CD-34146 and CD-34147 were dstsrmined through testing to exceed the steam exclusion damper leakage limits as delineated in the
- - USAR.
' (Ells Component identifier. CDMP)
Imc FOR'1386A 14954
{
sec poses 3c64 U.s. isUCLEAR REGULATORY C0bedISSICat WW.
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) t TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY ltAbe (1)
DOCIET LER madBER (6)
PAGE (3)
DIUteER (2)
Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant Unit 1 05000 282 WAR MgE R
3 OF 5
98 -- 01 --
01 TEXT (11 more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A)
(1*l) l Both dampers'were declared inoperable and closed in less than 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />, per Technical Specification 3.4.C.2. In addition, a blind flange was installed over the affected duct within approximately one hour 2
of the determination that the dampers were inoperable. The blind flange will remain until CD-34146 and l
CD-34147 are repaired or replaced and post-maintenance tested to ensure they are operable.
i
CAUSE OF THE EVENT
CD-34180 is a butterfly damper in a round duct. CD-34177 and CD-34176 are louvered dampers in rectangular ducts. The cause of the failure on damper CD-34180 was due to the actuator being out of I
edjustment. The repaired damper (CD-34180) was repaired by adjustment of the actuator - the actuator hid not driven the damper to a fully seated position.' The cause of the failures of CD-34177 and CD-l 34176 is not yet known, however, it appears to be associated with aging of the non-metal portions of the l
dampers.
l" CD-34146 and CD-34147 are louvered demnerc in rectangular ducts. The cause of the failure on CD-34146 and CD-34147 is not yet knowr twevar, it appears to be associated with aging of the non-L matal portions of the dampers.
1
ANALYSIS OF THE EVENT
l Tha assumed post-accident control room environment is 82.5 degrees F (dry bulb) and 50% relative l
humidity. An evaluation was performed to determine an acceptable damper leakage limit for steam exclusion purposes (assuming one train of control room ventilation system was operating) to assure that such leakage would not result in a control room environment beyond the assumed post-accident control i
room environment. However, the control room exterior atmosphere assumed in the evaluation was assumed to remain at worst case conditions. No account was taken of the transient heat load in the l
area and the time required to heat the structure and equipment within the control room.
Tha evaluation also assumes complete failure of the ducts between the affected dampers and outside
. cir. The affected dampers are protected against the effects of a HELB outside of containment, howsver, the ducts between these dampers and the outside air are not protected and are conservatively assumed to fail.
I l
2 (Ells Component identifier: DUCT) mconesawm i
0-_-_-_.---.._
lU.S. NUCLEAR REGUIATCaY ColeIISSION 84 95) e LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME (1)
DOCKET LER NUMBER (6)
PAGE (3)
NUMBER (2)
Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant Unit 1 05000 282 YEAR MOUE IAL M
4 OF S
98 01 --
01 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC form 366A) (11)
In their as-found condition, the affected steam exclusion dampers leaked in excess of the acceptable limit determined by evaluation and were, thus, declared inoperable. Inoperability of redundant steam exclusion dampers is a condition that could have prevented the safety function of the steam exclusion system and thus is reportable under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v).
In their as-found condition, CD-34146 and CD-34147 leaked in excess of the acceptable limit determined by evaluation and were, thus, declared inoperable, inoperability of reduridant steam exclusion dampers is a condition that could have prevented the safety function of the steam exclusion system and thus is reportable under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v).
CORRECTIVE ACTION
1.
The long term corrective action will be to: (a) implement a steam exclusion system design ch:nge, or(b) repair, or(c) replace dampers CD-34177, CD-34176, CD-34146, and CD-34147.
Thue dampers will be post-maintenance tested to ensure they meet acceptable steam exclusion l
leakage linkits.
I 2.
Based on the final determination of the failure mechanism and final resolution of the first l
ccti:n (design change, repair or replacement), maintenance procedures associated with steam l
exclusion dampers will be updated appropriately.
3.
Based on the results of the above two actions, the need for additional testing of the control d:mpers in the steam exclusion system will be evaluated.
FAILED COMPONENT IDENTIFICATION The cause of the failure on damper CD-34180 was due to the actuator being out of adjustment. The l
cause of the failures of CD-34177 and CD-34176 is not yet known, however, it appears to be associated with aging of the non-metal portions of the dampers.
Th3 cause of the failures of CD-34146 and CD-34147 is not yet known, however, it appears to be cssociated with aging of the non-metal portions of the dampers.
PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS
Prairie Island has previously reported other instances where steam exclusion dampers have failed.
Th::e instances were reported in LER's 75-43 (inoperability of Steam Exclusion Damper),82-03 (One__________-_____--_--_- __ - -_______-- - _______
w.0, twgEED CBEEGiw dEni!i0DiKT 14 951 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
+
TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME (1)
DCCKET LER NUMBER (6)
PAGE (3)
N%BER (2)
Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant Unit 1 05000 282 YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION 5
0F 5
l NUMER NUMER 98 -- 01 --
01 Text tit more space is required, use additional copies or upc Form 366A) (17) l Stsam Exclusion Damper Found inoperable During AnnualInspection), and Unit 1 LER 92-10 (Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements for Steam Exclusion Check Dampers not being Mat).
l i
1 l
i i
1 h__________-_-_____--_-__---__--__a
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| 05000282/LER-1998-001, :on 980626,leakage Through Redundant CR Steam Exclusion Dampers Was Found to Exceed Value Assumed in HELB Analysis.Caused by Actuator Being Out of Adjustment.Will Implement Design Change & Repair or Replace Dampers |
- on 980626,leakage Through Redundant CR Steam Exclusion Dampers Was Found to Exceed Value Assumed in HELB Analysis.Caused by Actuator Being Out of Adjustment.Will Implement Design Change & Repair or Replace Dampers
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000282/LER-1998-001-01, Forwards LER 98-001-01 Re Leakage Through Redundant CR Steam Exclusion Dampers Found to Exceed Value Assumed in HELB Analysis.Licensee Has Modified Three NRC Commitments Made in Original Ler,As Noted by Corrective Actions in | Forwards LER 98-001-01 Re Leakage Through Redundant CR Steam Exclusion Dampers Found to Exceed Value Assumed in HELB Analysis.Licensee Has Modified Three NRC Commitments Made in Original Ler,As Noted by Corrective Actions in Italics | | | 05000306/LER-1998-001-01, :on 980121,10 Transformers Were Locked Out. Caused by Cognitive Error by Sys Engineer Writing Work Order to Isolate Breaker 1H3.Revised Procedures |
- on 980121,10 Transformers Were Locked Out. Caused by Cognitive Error by Sys Engineer Writing Work Order to Isolate Breaker 1H3.Revised Procedures
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | | 05000306/LER-1998-001, Forwards LER 98-001-00 Re Lockout of 10 Transformer Resulting in Auto Load Rejection/Restoration on Safety Related Bus.Event Reported Via Emergency Notification Sys in Accordance w/10CFR50.72 on 980121 | Forwards LER 98-001-00 Re Lockout of 10 Transformer Resulting in Auto Load Rejection/Restoration on Safety Related Bus.Event Reported Via Emergency Notification Sys in Accordance w/10CFR50.72 on 980121 | | | 05000306/LER-1998-002, :on 980201,defect in Primary Sys Pressure Boundary Was Observed on Motor Tube Base of Part Length CRDM Housing.Caused by Flaw on G9 Part Length Crdm.Unit 2 Part Length CRDMs Have Been Removed & Replaced |
- on 980201,defect in Primary Sys Pressure Boundary Was Observed on Motor Tube Base of Part Length CRDM Housing.Caused by Flaw on G9 Part Length Crdm.Unit 2 Part Length CRDMs Have Been Removed & Replaced
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000306/LER-1998-002-01, Forwards LER 98-002-01,re Defect in Primary Sys Pressure Boundary Observed on Motor Tube Base of Part Length CRDM Housing.Commitments Made within Ltr,Encl | Forwards LER 98-002-01,re Defect in Primary Sys Pressure Boundary Observed on Motor Tube Base of Part Length CRDM Housing.Commitments Made within Ltr,Encl | | | 05000306/LER-1998-002-02, Forwards LER 98-002-02 Re Defect in Primary Sys Pressure Boundary.Encl LER Documents Closure of Event with Respect to Prairie Island,Unit 1 | Forwards LER 98-002-02 Re Defect in Primary Sys Pressure Boundary.Encl LER Documents Closure of Event with Respect to Prairie Island,Unit 1 | | | 05000282/LER-1998-003, :on 980122,routing of Containment Dome Fan Coil Unit Exhaust Dampers Control Circuit Wiring Contrary to Configuration Described in USAR Occurred.Investigation Produced No Conclusive Evidence for Cause.Procedure Revised |
- on 980122,routing of Containment Dome Fan Coil Unit Exhaust Dampers Control Circuit Wiring Contrary to Configuration Described in USAR Occurred.Investigation Produced No Conclusive Evidence for Cause.Procedure Revised
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000306/LER-1998-003-02, :on 980526,discovered Inadequate App R Fire Barriers & Unsealed Fire Barrier Penetrations.Caused by Lack of Adequate Separation of Safe Shutdown Equipment.Firewatch Has Been Established as Compensatory Measure |
- on 980526,discovered Inadequate App R Fire Barriers & Unsealed Fire Barrier Penetrations.Caused by Lack of Adequate Separation of Safe Shutdown Equipment.Firewatch Has Been Established as Compensatory Measure
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000306/LER-1998-003, Forwards LER 98-003-00 Re Inadequate App R Fire Barriers & Unsealed Fire Barrier Penetrations.Licensee Made Four New Commitments,Indicated as Corrective Action Statements in Italics | Forwards LER 98-003-00 Re Inadequate App R Fire Barriers & Unsealed Fire Barrier Penetrations.Licensee Made Four New Commitments,Indicated as Corrective Action Statements in Italics | | | 05000282/LER-1998-004, :on 980226,inoperable ESF Equipment Was Noted in Alternate Train During DG Monthly Surveillance Run.Caused by Changes to Settings.Procedure Changes Will Be Completed to Ensure Proper Molr Setpoints |
- on 980226,inoperable ESF Equipment Was Noted in Alternate Train During DG Monthly Surveillance Run.Caused by Changes to Settings.Procedure Changes Will Be Completed to Ensure Proper Molr Setpoints
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000306/LER-1998-004-01, :on 980910,shield Building Integrity Was Breached.Caused by Inadequate TS Change.Revised Affected Procedures.With |
- on 980910,shield Building Integrity Was Breached.Caused by Inadequate TS Change.Revised Affected Procedures.With
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | | 05000282/LER-1998-005-01, Forwards LER 98-005-01,re Inoperability of Actuation Logic for MSIV in Certain Flooding Conditions from Feedwater Line Break.Commitments Made within Ltr,Encl | Forwards LER 98-005-01,re Inoperability of Actuation Logic for MSIV in Certain Flooding Conditions from Feedwater Line Break.Commitments Made within Ltr,Encl | | | 05000306/LER-1998-005-02, :on 981109,RT from 22% Power During Planned SD Operation Was Noted.Caused by Tt.Fw Heater Drain Level Control Was Thoroughly Inspected & Calibrated.With |
- on 981109,RT from 22% Power During Planned SD Operation Was Noted.Caused by Tt.Fw Heater Drain Level Control Was Thoroughly Inspected & Calibrated.With
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | | 05000282/LER-1998-005, :on 980422,inoperability on Actuation Logic for MSIV in Certain Flooding Conditions from Fwlb Was Noted. Cause for Flooding Not Identified.Doors Have Been Opened on Unit 1 to Preclude Flooding Concerns W/Respect to MSIVs |
- on 980422,inoperability on Actuation Logic for MSIV in Certain Flooding Conditions from Fwlb Was Noted. Cause for Flooding Not Identified.Doors Have Been Opened on Unit 1 to Preclude Flooding Concerns W/Respect to MSIVs
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000306/LER-1998-006-01, :on 981219,unplanned Actuation of ESF Equipment During Performance of Sp.Caused by Personnel Error.Control Room Took Prompt Action & Returned Plant to Proper Status & Second pre-job Briefing for SP-2126 Was Conducted |
- on 981219,unplanned Actuation of ESF Equipment During Performance of Sp.Caused by Personnel Error.Control Room Took Prompt Action & Returned Plant to Proper Status & Second pre-job Briefing for SP-2126 Was Conducted
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000282/LER-1998-006, :on 980319,equipment Discrepancy Was Confirmed for Electrical Equipment Associated w/122 CR Outside as & Steam Exclusion Damper CD-34177.Caused by Failure to Find Location of CD-34177.Will Correct Documents |
- on 980319,equipment Discrepancy Was Confirmed for Electrical Equipment Associated w/122 CR Outside as & Steam Exclusion Damper CD-34177.Caused by Failure to Find Location of CD-34177.Will Correct Documents
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000306/LER-1998-006, Forwards LER 98-006-00 Re Unplanned Actuation of ESF Equipment During Performance of Sp Due to Personnel Error. Event Was Reported Via ENS IAW 10CFR50.72 on 981219.Two New Commitments Are Indicated as C/A Statements | Forwards LER 98-006-00 Re Unplanned Actuation of ESF Equipment During Performance of Sp Due to Personnel Error. Event Was Reported Via ENS IAW 10CFR50.72 on 981219.Two New Commitments Are Indicated as C/A Statements | | | 05000282/LER-1998-007-01, :on 980519,DG Logic Testing Was Noted in Violation of Ts.Caused by DG Testing Was Being Performed in Compliance W/Interpretation of Historical Regulatory Requirements & Commitments.Revised Surveillance Procedures |
- on 980519,DG Logic Testing Was Noted in Violation of Ts.Caused by DG Testing Was Being Performed in Compliance W/Interpretation of Historical Regulatory Requirements & Commitments.Revised Surveillance Procedures
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) | | 05000282/LER-1998-007, :on 980519,DG Logic Testing Was Performed. Caused by Four Lines of Reasoning Applied to Issue at Various Times in Past.Reviewed Control Circuits of EDGs & Control Circuits |
- on 980519,DG Logic Testing Was Performed. Caused by Four Lines of Reasoning Applied to Issue at Various Times in Past.Reviewed Control Circuits of EDGs & Control Circuits
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000282/LER-1998-008, :on 980605,Unit 1 Tripped.Caused by Equipment Failure.Plant Reactor Trip Recovery Have Been Improved Via Temporary Memo |
- on 980605,Unit 1 Tripped.Caused by Equipment Failure.Plant Reactor Trip Recovery Have Been Improved Via Temporary Memo
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000282/LER-1998-009, :on 980731,determined That Recent Testing of Rc Vent Sys Had Not Been Performed,Per Ts.Caused by Inadequate Procedures.Surveillance Procedures Will Be Modified to Verify Flow Through Rc Vent Sys Paths |
- on 980731,determined That Recent Testing of Rc Vent Sys Had Not Been Performed,Per Ts.Caused by Inadequate Procedures.Surveillance Procedures Will Be Modified to Verify Flow Through Rc Vent Sys Paths
| | | 05000282/LER-1998-009-01, :on 980731,noted That Recent Testing of RCS Vent Paths Had Not Been Performed in Literal Compliance with Wording of TS 4.18.1.Caused by Misunderstanding of Wording in TS Section 4.18.Will Modify Surveillance Procedures |
- on 980731,noted That Recent Testing of RCS Vent Paths Had Not Been Performed in Literal Compliance with Wording of TS 4.18.1.Caused by Misunderstanding of Wording in TS Section 4.18.Will Modify Surveillance Procedures
| | | 05000282/LER-1998-011, :on 980813,discovered That Valve Stroke Times Were Outside Alert Limits on Four Occasions & Corrective Acitons Were Not Taken.Caused by Erroneous Procedure. Subject Procedure Was Quarantined Until Corrected |
- on 980813,discovered That Valve Stroke Times Were Outside Alert Limits on Four Occasions & Corrective Acitons Were Not Taken.Caused by Erroneous Procedure. Subject Procedure Was Quarantined Until Corrected
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | | 05000282/LER-1998-012, :on 980826,some Cables in Two Fire Areas in Auxiliary Building Were Not Protected by 1 H Fire Barrier. Caused by Error in Rev of Safe SD Analysis.Installed 1 H Fire Rated Barriers to Protect MV-32080 & MV-32163 |
- on 980826,some Cables in Two Fire Areas in Auxiliary Building Were Not Protected by 1 H Fire Barrier. Caused by Error in Rev of Safe SD Analysis.Installed 1 H Fire Rated Barriers to Protect MV-32080 & MV-32163
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function | | 05000282/LER-1998-012-01, Forwards LER 98-012-01 Re Fire Area 58/73 App R Safe Shutdown Analysis Issues.Attachment 2 Contains Detailed Safety Significance Evaluation for Info.Event Reported Via ENS IAW 10CFR50.72 on 980826 | Forwards LER 98-012-01 Re Fire Area 58/73 App R Safe Shutdown Analysis Issues.Attachment 2 Contains Detailed Safety Significance Evaluation for Info.Event Reported Via ENS IAW 10CFR50.72 on 980826 | | | 05000282/LER-1998-012-03, Forwards LER 98-012-03,re Fire Areas 58/73 App R Safe SD Analysis Issues.No New Commitments Made,One Commitment Revised Previously Made Indicated in Corrective Actions | Forwards LER 98-012-03,re Fire Areas 58/73 App R Safe SD Analysis Issues.No New Commitments Made,One Commitment Revised Previously Made Indicated in Corrective Actions | | | 05000282/LER-1998-012-02, Forwards LER 98-012-02,re Fire Areas 58/73 App R Safe Shutdown Analysis Issues.Rept Has Been Changed to Delete Inappropriate Characterization of Aspect of Event as Violation of 10CFR50,App R | Forwards LER 98-012-02,re Fire Areas 58/73 App R Safe Shutdown Analysis Issues.Rept Has Been Changed to Delete Inappropriate Characterization of Aspect of Event as Violation of 10CFR50,App R | | | 05000282/LER-1998-013, :on 981011,discovered That Scaffold Installation Interfered with Operability of Steam Exclusion Check Damper.Caused by Inadequate Procedural Guidance.Util Removed Interfering Portion of Scaffold & Revised Procedure |
- on 981011,discovered That Scaffold Installation Interfered with Operability of Steam Exclusion Check Damper.Caused by Inadequate Procedural Guidance.Util Removed Interfering Portion of Scaffold & Revised Procedure
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000282/LER-1998-014, :on 980827,fire Area 32 App R SS Analysis (SSA) Issues Were Noted.Caused by App R SSA Being Reconstituted. Compensatory Measures Will Be Maintained in Fire Area 32 Until Fire Barrier for Control Cable Replaced |
- on 980827,fire Area 32 App R SS Analysis (SSA) Issues Were Noted.Caused by App R SSA Being Reconstituted. Compensatory Measures Will Be Maintained in Fire Area 32 Until Fire Barrier for Control Cable Replaced
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function | | 05000282/LER-1998-014-01, Forwards LER 98-014-01,re Fire Area 32 App R Safe Shutdown Analysis Issues.Detailed Safety Significance Evaluation for Event Included in Attachment 2.Event Reported Via ENS IAW 10CFR50.72 on 980827 | Forwards LER 98-014-01,re Fire Area 32 App R Safe Shutdown Analysis Issues.Detailed Safety Significance Evaluation for Event Included in Attachment 2.Event Reported Via ENS IAW 10CFR50.72 on 980827 | | | 05000282/LER-1998-015, :on 980827,containment to RHR MOVs App R Safe Shutdown Analysis (SSA) Issues Noted.Caused by Oversight During Completion of Current Ssa.Compensatory Actions Will Be Maintained Until Status of MOVs Resolved |
- on 980827,containment to RHR MOVs App R Safe Shutdown Analysis (SSA) Issues Noted.Caused by Oversight During Completion of Current Ssa.Compensatory Actions Will Be Maintained Until Status of MOVs Resolved
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function | | 05000282/LER-1998-015-01, Forwards LER 98-015-01,re Containment to RHR MOVs App R Safe Shutdown Analysis Issues.Attachment 2 Contains Detailed Safety Significance Evaluation for NRC Info.Event Reported Via ENS IAW 10CFR50.72 on 980827 | Forwards LER 98-015-01,re Containment to RHR MOVs App R Safe Shutdown Analysis Issues.Attachment 2 Contains Detailed Safety Significance Evaluation for NRC Info.Event Reported Via ENS IAW 10CFR50.72 on 980827 | | | 05000282/LER-1998-016, :on 981029,negative Flux Rate RT Occurred Upon CR Insertion After Failure of CRD Cable.Caused by Internal Short Circuit Developing in CRDM Patch Cables at Reactor Head Connector.Replaced CRDM Patch Cables.With |
- on 981029,negative Flux Rate RT Occurred Upon CR Insertion After Failure of CRD Cable.Caused by Internal Short Circuit Developing in CRDM Patch Cables at Reactor Head Connector.Replaced CRDM Patch Cables.With
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | | 05000282/LER-1998-017, :on 981103,failure to Test SR Hi Flux Trip Functions During non-refueling Outages as Required by TS 4.1-1A Was Noted.Caused by No Sp Existing to Test SR Hfr Trip Logic Function.Developed Procedure for Testing |
- on 981103,failure to Test SR Hi Flux Trip Functions During non-refueling Outages as Required by TS 4.1-1A Was Noted.Caused by No Sp Existing to Test SR Hfr Trip Logic Function.Developed Procedure for Testing
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) | | 05000282/LER-1998-018, :on 981117,discovered That Surveillance Testing of Boric Acid Storage Tank Level Instrumentation Places Plant in Condition Where Single Failure Could Cause Inability to Inject Concentrated Boric Acid |
- on 981117,discovered That Surveillance Testing of Boric Acid Storage Tank Level Instrumentation Places Plant in Condition Where Single Failure Could Cause Inability to Inject Concentrated Boric Acid
| 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000282/LER-1998-019, :on 981209,discovered Condition Where Thermally Induced Pressure Transient Has Potential to Overpressurize Containment Penetration Piping Segment.Caused by non- Conservative Assumption.Analyses Performed |
- on 981209,discovered Condition Where Thermally Induced Pressure Transient Has Potential to Overpressurize Containment Penetration Piping Segment.Caused by non- Conservative Assumption.Analyses Performed
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition |
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