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e NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150 0104 4 99 EXPIRES 04/30/98 ISilMATED SURDEN PER RESPON$t TO COMPLY WITH TMi$ MANDATORY INFORMATich COLLICil0N RIQUEST: 50.0 HRS. REPORTfD LISSONS Lt ARNED ARE INCORPORATED INTO LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) syys,'1lj!5s,glo,0,s,Ac,gwgouleonc,gR,ggjgM,y,NTS I r
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,- m Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant Unit 1 05000 282 1 OF 4 m.
m Leckage Through Redundant Control Room Steam Exclusion Dampers Found to Exceed Value A2::umed in the HELB Analysis svana LATE (53 LER NuncER (6)
REPGRT LATE (7)
OTHER FACILIIIES INVOLVED (5)
MUNIH DAY YLAR YLAR SLOUtNIiA(
Mt VL510N MUNIH DAY YtAR FACILITY NAME DOLF.ET NUMBER Prairie Island Unit 2 05000 306 01 17 98 98 01 00 2
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(1 i)
On January 17,1998, Units 1 and 2 were operating at 100% power. As a part of the in-leakage testing being conducted on the control room envalope (to support habitability assumptions for post-accident control room dose analysis), the control room outside air supply dampers were tested individually for Isakage. These outside air dampers also serve as steam exclusion dampers in the event of a high ensrgy line break (HELB) outside of containment. Testing of these dampers revealed that damper leckage exceeded that assumed for steam exclusion purposes on each of the two in-series dampers
(
on one train of outside air supply.
An LCO was declared (per Technical Specification 3.4.C.2) due to two redundant steam exclusion dampers being inoperable. One of the dampers was repaired and re-tested and resultant leakage was acceptable. The damper was declared operable and the LCO exited. Currently, one steam exclusion damper in each train is inoperable. Redundant (operable) dampers are maintained in the closed position (per Technical Specification 3.4.C.1.a), until repair or replacement of the inoperable dampers.
9902240054 900212 PDR ADOCK 05000202 g
PM a
.U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION M l9 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME (I)
DOCKET LER NUMBER (6)
PAGE (3)
NUMBER (2) i Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant Unit 1 05000 282 YEAR N
2 OF 4
98 -- 01 00 I
TEXT (Jt more space as requared, use adda t2onal cop 2es of NRC Form 366A)
( 7)
EVEllT DESCRIPTION On January 17,1998, Units 1 and 2 were operating at 100% power. As a part of the in-leakage testing being conducted on the control room envelope (to support habitability assumptions for post-accident control room dose analysis), the control room outside air supply dampers' were tested individually for I:akage. These outside air dampers also serve as steam exclusion dampers in the event of a high energy line break (HELB) outside of containment. Steam exclusion damper leakage limits for purposes of the test were based on values given in Appendix l of the Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR).
Tha tracer gas testing of these dampers indicated that damper leakage on each of two redundant steam exclusion dampers exceeded these leakage limits for steam exclusion.
Damper testing first revealed that one of the control room outside air supply dampers (CD-34180) exceeded the steam exclusion damper leakage limits. The redundant damper (CD-34177) was then closed (per Technical Specification 3.4.C.1.a). During testing of damper CD-34177, damper CD44180 was repaired. Results of testing CD-34177 revealed that it also exceeded the maximum leakage limits for steam exclusion. Both dampers CD-34180 und CD-34177 were declared inoperable An LCO was declared (per Technical specification 3.4.C.2) based on two redundant steam exclusion dampers being inoperable. Damper CD-34180 was immediately re-tested and resultant leakage was accaptable. Damper CD-34180 was declared operable and the LCO exited. Damper CD-34180 as well as damper CD-34145 are currently maintained in the closed position (per Technical Specification 3.4.C.1.a), until damper CD-34177 is repaired or repited.
Similar damper testing on the opposite train of control room outside air supply dampers revealed Isakage in excess of the acceptable limit for damper CD-34176 (the functional counterpart of CD-34177). However, neither of its redundant dampers were found to have leakage in excess of acceptable limits, thus, no LCO was declared for this train with respect to Technical Specification 3.4.C.2. Currently, dampers CD-34178 cnd CD-34142 are being maintained in the closed position (per Technical Specification 3.4.C.1.a), ur.til CD-34176 is repaired or replaced.
CAUSE OF THE EVENT
2 CD-34180 is a butterfly damper in a rounc duct. CD-34177 and CD-34176 are louvered dampers in rectangular ducts. The cause of the failure on damper CD-34180 was due to the actuator being out of adjustment. The repaired damper (CD-34180) was repaired by adjustment of the actuator - the actuator
' (Ells Component Identifier. CDMP)
(Ells Component identifier: DUCT)
MC FOCM 366A M 99 g
eU.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 6499 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION I
FACILITY NAME (1)
DOCKET LER NUMBER (6)
FAGE (3)
NUMBER (2)
Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant Unit 1 05000 282 YEAR jgf MV 3
Op 4
98 01 00 TEXT (Jt rnore space as required, use adda t2onal copies of NRC Fonn J66AJ (17) had not driven the damper to a fully seated position. The cause of the failures of CD-34177 and CD-34176 is not yet known, however, it appears to be associated with aging of the non metal portions of the dampers.
ANALYSIS OF THE EVENT
l i
The assumed post-accident control room environment is 82.5 degrees F (dry bulb) and 50% relative humidity. An evaluation was performed to determine an acceptable damper leakage limit for steam exclusion purposes (assuming one train of control room ventilation system was operating) tc assure that such leakage would not result in a control room environment beyond the usumed post-accident control room environment. However, the control room exterior atmosphere assumed in the evaluation was assumed to remain at wors+ case conditions. No account was taken of the transient heat load in the are. ind the time required u.aat the structure and equipment within the control room.
The oaceluation also assumes complete failure of the ducts between the affected dampers and outside air. Tt.c affected dampers art Jotected against the effects of a HELB outside of containment, however, the ducts between these dampers and the outside air are not protected and are conservatively assumed to fail.
In their as-found condition, the affected steam exclusion dampers leaked in excess of the acceptable limit determined by evaluation and were, thus, declared inoperable. Inoperability of redundant steam exclusion dampers is a condition that c nild have prevented the safety function of the steam exclusion system and thus is reportable under 10 Cr'P 50.73(a)(2)(v).
CORRECTIVE ACTION
1.
The long term corrective action will be to repair or replace dampers CD-34177 and CD :4176.
Th:se dampers will be post maintenance tested to ensure they meet acceptable steam exclusion liskege lim!ts.
2.
Maintenance procedures associated with these dampers will be updated appropriately b22ed on the final resolution of the first action (repair or replacement) and final determination of the failure mechanism.
3.
Based on the results of the above two actions, the need for additional testing of the control dzmpers in the steam exclusion system will be evalustad.
NRC PMI 303A M 99
e
.U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION M 9W LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME (1)
DOCKET LER NUMBER (6)
FAGE (3)
NUMBER (2)
Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Flant Unit 1 05000 282 YEAft jQU IAL RE N
4 OF 4
98 01 --
00 TnxT ut osoie space sa required, use additional cop 1es or nac rorm 3ssA) (11) l FAILED COMPONENT IDENTIFICATION The cause of the failure on damper CD-34180 was due to the actuator being out of adjustment. The cause of the failures of CD-34177 and CD-34176 is not yet known, however, it appears to be associated with aging of the non-metal portions of the dampers.
PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS
Prairie Island has previously reported other instances where steam exclusion dampers have failed.
These instances were reported in LER's 75-43 (Inoperability of Steam Exclusion Damper),82-03 (One Stcam Exclusion Damper Found Inoperable During Annual Inspection), and Unit 1 LER 92-10 (Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements for Steam Exclusion Check Dampers not being Met).
NRC FOR3 366A R 99
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05000306/LER-1998-001-01, :on 980121,10 Transformers Were Locked Out. Caused by Cognitive Error by Sys Engineer Writing Work Order to Isolate Breaker 1H3.Revised Procedures |
- on 980121,10 Transformers Were Locked Out. Caused by Cognitive Error by Sys Engineer Writing Work Order to Isolate Breaker 1H3.Revised Procedures
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | 05000282/LER-1998-001, :on 980117,leakage Through CR Steam Exclusion Dampers Found to Exceed Value Assumed in HELB Analysis. Caused by Actuator Being Out of Adjustment.Repaired & Replaced Dampers |
- on 980117,leakage Through CR Steam Exclusion Dampers Found to Exceed Value Assumed in HELB Analysis. Caused by Actuator Being Out of Adjustment.Repaired & Replaced Dampers
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function | 05000306/LER-1998-001, Forwards LER 98-001-00 Re Lockout of 10 Transformer Resulting in Auto Load Rejection/Restoration on Safety Related Bus.Event Reported Via Emergency Notification Sys in Accordance w/10CFR50.72 on 980121 | Forwards LER 98-001-00 Re Lockout of 10 Transformer Resulting in Auto Load Rejection/Restoration on Safety Related Bus.Event Reported Via Emergency Notification Sys in Accordance w/10CFR50.72 on 980121 | | 05000306/LER-1998-002-01, Forwards LER 98-002-01,re Defect in Primary Sys Pressure Boundary Observed on Motor Tube Base of Part Length CRDM Housing.Commitments Made within Ltr,Encl | Forwards LER 98-002-01,re Defect in Primary Sys Pressure Boundary Observed on Motor Tube Base of Part Length CRDM Housing.Commitments Made within Ltr,Encl | | 05000282/LER-1998-002, :on 980121,test Results in Excess of Assumed CR Inleakage Resulted in Four H non-emergency Rept,Per 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D).Caused by Leakage Past Door Seals. CR Door Seals Repaired & Replaced |
- on 980121,test Results in Excess of Assumed CR Inleakage Resulted in Four H non-emergency Rept,Per 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D).Caused by Leakage Past Door Seals. CR Door Seals Repaired & Replaced
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | 05000306/LER-1998-003, Forwards LER 98-003-00 Re Inadequate App R Fire Barriers & Unsealed Fire Barrier Penetrations.Licensee Made Four New Commitments,Indicated as Corrective Action Statements in Italics | Forwards LER 98-003-00 Re Inadequate App R Fire Barriers & Unsealed Fire Barrier Penetrations.Licensee Made Four New Commitments,Indicated as Corrective Action Statements in Italics | | 05000306/LER-1998-003-02, :on 980526,discovered Inadequate App R Fire Barriers & Unsealed Fire Barrier Penetrations.Caused by Lack of Adequate Separation of Safe Shutdown Equipment.Firewatch Has Been Established as Compensatory Measure |
- on 980526,discovered Inadequate App R Fire Barriers & Unsealed Fire Barrier Penetrations.Caused by Lack of Adequate Separation of Safe Shutdown Equipment.Firewatch Has Been Established as Compensatory Measure
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition | 05000282/LER-1998-004, :on 980226,inoperable ESF Equipment Was Noted in Alternate Train During DG Monthly Surveillance Run.Caused by Changes to Settings.Procedure Changes Will Be Completed to Ensure Proper Molr Setpoints |
- on 980226,inoperable ESF Equipment Was Noted in Alternate Train During DG Monthly Surveillance Run.Caused by Changes to Settings.Procedure Changes Will Be Completed to Ensure Proper Molr Setpoints
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | 05000306/LER-1998-004-01, :on 980910,shield Building Integrity Was Breached.Caused by Inadequate TS Change.Revised Affected Procedures.With |
- on 980910,shield Building Integrity Was Breached.Caused by Inadequate TS Change.Revised Affected Procedures.With
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000282/LER-1998-005, :on 980323,Unit 1 Main Steam Isolation Valves Were Declared Inoperable Due to Flooding Concerns in Event of Postulated Feedwater Line Break.Doors Have Been Opened on Unit 1 to Preclude Flooding Concerns W/Respect to MSIVs |
- on 980323,Unit 1 Main Steam Isolation Valves Were Declared Inoperable Due to Flooding Concerns in Event of Postulated Feedwater Line Break.Doors Have Been Opened on Unit 1 to Preclude Flooding Concerns W/Respect to MSIVs
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | 05000282/LER-1998-005-01, Forwards LER 98-005-01,re Inoperability of Actuation Logic for MSIV in Certain Flooding Conditions from Feedwater Line Break.Commitments Made within Ltr,Encl | Forwards LER 98-005-01,re Inoperability of Actuation Logic for MSIV in Certain Flooding Conditions from Feedwater Line Break.Commitments Made within Ltr,Encl | | 05000282/LER-1998-005, :on 980422,inoperability on Actuation Logic for MSIV in Certain Flooding Conditions from Fwlb Was Noted. Cause for Flooding Not Identified.Doors Have Been Opened on Unit 1 to Preclude Flooding Concerns W/Respect to MSIVs |
- on 980422,inoperability on Actuation Logic for MSIV in Certain Flooding Conditions from Fwlb Was Noted. Cause for Flooding Not Identified.Doors Have Been Opened on Unit 1 to Preclude Flooding Concerns W/Respect to MSIVs
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | 05000306/LER-1998-005-02, :on 981109,RT from 22% Power During Planned SD Operation Was Noted.Caused by Tt.Fw Heater Drain Level Control Was Thoroughly Inspected & Calibrated.With |
- on 981109,RT from 22% Power During Planned SD Operation Was Noted.Caused by Tt.Fw Heater Drain Level Control Was Thoroughly Inspected & Calibrated.With
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | 05000306/LER-1998-006, Forwards LER 98-006-00 Re Unplanned Actuation of ESF Equipment During Performance of Sp Due to Personnel Error. Event Was Reported Via ENS IAW 10CFR50.72 on 981219.Two New Commitments Are Indicated as C/A Statements | Forwards LER 98-006-00 Re Unplanned Actuation of ESF Equipment During Performance of Sp Due to Personnel Error. Event Was Reported Via ENS IAW 10CFR50.72 on 981219.Two New Commitments Are Indicated as C/A Statements | | 05000306/LER-1998-006-01, :on 981219,unplanned Actuation of ESF Equipment During Performance of Sp.Caused by Personnel Error.Control Room Took Prompt Action & Returned Plant to Proper Status & Second pre-job Briefing for SP-2126 Was Conducted |
- on 981219,unplanned Actuation of ESF Equipment During Performance of Sp.Caused by Personnel Error.Control Room Took Prompt Action & Returned Plant to Proper Status & Second pre-job Briefing for SP-2126 Was Conducted
| | 05000282/LER-1998-006, :on 980319,equipment Discrepancy Was Confirmed for Electrical Equipment Associated w/122 CR Outside as & Steam Exclusion Damper CD-34177.Caused by Failure to Find Location of CD-34177.Will Correct Documents |
- on 980319,equipment Discrepancy Was Confirmed for Electrical Equipment Associated w/122 CR Outside as & Steam Exclusion Damper CD-34177.Caused by Failure to Find Location of CD-34177.Will Correct Documents
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | 05000282/LER-1998-007-01, :on 980519,DG Logic Testing Was Noted in Violation of Ts.Caused by DG Testing Was Being Performed in Compliance W/Interpretation of Historical Regulatory Requirements & Commitments.Revised Surveillance Procedures |
- on 980519,DG Logic Testing Was Noted in Violation of Ts.Caused by DG Testing Was Being Performed in Compliance W/Interpretation of Historical Regulatory Requirements & Commitments.Revised Surveillance Procedures
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) | 05000282/LER-1998-007, :on 980519,DG Logic Testing Was Performed. Caused by Four Lines of Reasoning Applied to Issue at Various Times in Past.Reviewed Control Circuits of EDGs & Control Circuits |
- on 980519,DG Logic Testing Was Performed. Caused by Four Lines of Reasoning Applied to Issue at Various Times in Past.Reviewed Control Circuits of EDGs & Control Circuits
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | 05000282/LER-1998-008, :on 980605,Unit 1 Tripped.Caused by Equipment Failure.Plant Reactor Trip Recovery Have Been Improved Via Temporary Memo |
- on 980605,Unit 1 Tripped.Caused by Equipment Failure.Plant Reactor Trip Recovery Have Been Improved Via Temporary Memo
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition | 05000282/LER-1998-009-01, :on 980731,noted That Recent Testing of RCS Vent Paths Had Not Been Performed in Literal Compliance with Wording of TS 4.18.1.Caused by Misunderstanding of Wording in TS Section 4.18.Will Modify Surveillance Procedures |
- on 980731,noted That Recent Testing of RCS Vent Paths Had Not Been Performed in Literal Compliance with Wording of TS 4.18.1.Caused by Misunderstanding of Wording in TS Section 4.18.Will Modify Surveillance Procedures
| | 05000282/LER-1998-010-01, Forwards LER 98-010-01 for Discovery That 32 App R Re MOVs Susceptible to Physical Damage by Fire Induced Hot Shorts. Util Made Two New NRC Commitments,Indicated as Corrective Action Statements in Italics in Rept | Forwards LER 98-010-01 for Discovery That 32 App R Re MOVs Susceptible to Physical Damage by Fire Induced Hot Shorts. Util Made Two New NRC Commitments,Indicated as Corrective Action Statements in Italics in Rept | | 05000282/LER-1998-012-01, Forwards LER 98-012-01 Re Fire Area 58/73 App R Safe Shutdown Analysis Issues.Attachment 2 Contains Detailed Safety Significance Evaluation for Info.Event Reported Via ENS IAW 10CFR50.72 on 980826 | Forwards LER 98-012-01 Re Fire Area 58/73 App R Safe Shutdown Analysis Issues.Attachment 2 Contains Detailed Safety Significance Evaluation for Info.Event Reported Via ENS IAW 10CFR50.72 on 980826 | | 05000282/LER-1998-014-01, Forwards LER 98-014-01,re Fire Area 32 App R Safe Shutdown Analysis Issues.Detailed Safety Significance Evaluation for Event Included in Attachment 2.Event Reported Via ENS IAW 10CFR50.72 on 980827 | Forwards LER 98-014-01,re Fire Area 32 App R Safe Shutdown Analysis Issues.Detailed Safety Significance Evaluation for Event Included in Attachment 2.Event Reported Via ENS IAW 10CFR50.72 on 980827 | | 05000282/LER-1998-015-01, Forwards LER 98-015-01,re Containment to RHR MOVs App R Safe Shutdown Analysis Issues.Attachment 2 Contains Detailed Safety Significance Evaluation for NRC Info.Event Reported Via ENS IAW 10CFR50.72 on 980827 | Forwards LER 98-015-01,re Containment to RHR MOVs App R Safe Shutdown Analysis Issues.Attachment 2 Contains Detailed Safety Significance Evaluation for NRC Info.Event Reported Via ENS IAW 10CFR50.72 on 980827 | | 05000282/LER-1998-016, :on 981029,negative Flux Rate RT Occurred Upon CR Insertion After Failure of CRD Cable.Caused by Internal Short Circuit Developing in CRDM Patch Cables at Reactor Head Connector.Replaced CRDM Patch Cables.With |
- on 981029,negative Flux Rate RT Occurred Upon CR Insertion After Failure of CRD Cable.Caused by Internal Short Circuit Developing in CRDM Patch Cables at Reactor Head Connector.Replaced CRDM Patch Cables.With
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation |
|